U587

UNIVERSITY OF
Toronto Quarterly

VOLUME XIV, 1944-5

Editorial Committee

A. S. P. WOODHOUSE (*Chairman*)

J. R. MACGILLIVRAY PHILIP CHILD A. BRADY

Business Manager

A. GORDON BURNS

THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

General
Dept
Enfield, Wm.
Law & Court
Problems

TABLE OF CONTENTS

X
Per
C58T
v.14
1944-45

VOLUME XIV, 1944-5

No. 1, October, 1944

In Memoriam: William John Alexander
I. Memoir ..... M. W. WALLACE 1
II. Critic and Teacher ..... A. S. P. WOODHOUSE 8
The Permanent Value of the Old Testament ..... W. R. TAYLOR 34
William Covell and the Troubles at Enfield in 1659: A Sequel of the Digger Movement ..... J. MAX PATRICK 45
I. A. Richards ..... WILLIAM BLISSETT 58
Areopagitica Revisited ..... ARNOLD WILLIAMS 67
The Nature of Satire ..... NORTHROP FRYE 75
What Kind of Post-War Security? ..... J. R. MALLORY 90

— Reviews —

American Foreign Policy ..... FRANK H. UNDERHILL 101
The Sociology of Law ..... G. S. BRETT 105
Fourscore Years ..... G. B. HARRISON 107
Prelude to Good Neighbourhood ..... EDGAR McINNIS 110
Shorter Notices 114

No. 2, January, 1945

The Future of Unity in Canada: Two Views
I. As seen by a French-speaking Canadian . EDMOND TURCOTTE 117
Rejoinder by B. K. Sandwell 124
II. As seen by an English-speaking Canadian . . B. K. SANDWELL 125
Rejoinder by Edmond Turcotte 132
New Testament Scholarship in My Time . . . . . SIR ROBERT FALCONER 135
Publication in the Ancient World ..... FRANK W. BEARE 150
Trends in Canadian Art ..... JOHN ALFORD 168
The English Education Act of 1944 ..... SIR FRED CLARKE 181
Nicolas Berdyaev ..... EGBERT MUNZER 188
Drieu La Rochelle: Study of a Collaborator . . . . BEATRICE CORRIGAN 199

— Reviews —

French Tragedy ..... A. F. B. CLARK 206
Pratt's Collected Work ..... E. K. BROWN 211
From Shakespeare to Joyce ..... ROY DANIELLS 214
Shakespeare and the Actors ..... ALLARDYCE NICOLL 217
Research Library of the Future ..... W. S. WALLACE 218
Physics of the Twentieth Century ..... FRANK ALLEN 220

498150

No. 3, April, 1945

François Mauriac and the Classical Tradition ..... A. E. Carter 225
Sir Arthur Eddington, O.M ..... A. Vibert Douglas 233
Intellectual Freedom and Political Co-operation ..... H. W. Wright 240
Epicureanism and Christianity ..... Norman W. DeWitt 250
Pacific Peace Aims ..... Donald Cowie 256

Letters in Canada: 1944. Edited by A. S. P. Woodhouse
Introduction 261
I. Poetry ..... E. K. Brown 261
II. Fiction ..... J. R. MacGillivray 267
III. French-Canadian Letters ..... W. E. Collin 275
IV. New-Canadian Letters ..... Watson Kirkconnell 300
V. Remaining Material ..... The Editor and Others 303

No. 4, July, 1945

The Achievement of George Sidney Brett ..... John A. Irving 329
The Second Birth of the English Novel ..... Lionel Stevenson 366
Some Modern Guides to Faith ..... William Robbins 375
Baroque Form in English Literature ..... Roy Daniells 393
Return to an Old Book ..... Carleton Stanley 409
The Legacy of Baudelaire ..... L. J. Bondy 414
The San Francisco Conference ..... J. E. Hodgetts 431

—Reviews—

The Early Roman Empire ..... Gilbert Bagnani 441
Log of the R.C.A.F ..... Edgar McInnis 444
Recreation: Book Collecting ..... N. J. Endicott 447
The Shape of Things That Came ..... Kenneth MacLean 449

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY

NO. 2 - 1944
Durham, N. C.

OCTOBER, 1944

In Memoriam: William John Alexander
I. Memoir.....M. W. Wallace
II. Critic and Teacher.....A. S. P. Woodhouse
The Permanent Value of the Old Testament.....W. R. Taylor
William Covell: A Sequel of the Digger Movement J. Max Patrick
I. A. Richards.....William Blissett
Areopagitica Revisited.....Arnold Williams
The Nature of Satire.....Northrop Frye
What Kind of Post-War Security?.....J. R. Mallory

Reviews
American Foreign Policy.....Frank H. Underhill
The Sociology of Law.....G. S. Brett
Fourscore Years.....G. B. Harrison
Prelude to Good Neighbourhood.....Edgar McInnis

PUBLISHED BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

SELF SEAL ENVELOPES

featured in

CHATEAU Ripple STATIONERY



SOLD BY LEADING STATIONERY, DRUG AND DEPARTMENT STORES

W. J. GAGE & CO., Limited - Toronto

Sole manufacturers of Self Seal Envelopes in Canada

PROGRESSIVE VIEWPOINTS

For more than 21 years, THE CANADIAN FORUM has reflected the views of intelligently progressive Canadians on politics, economics, literature and art.

In the midst of a world war which is also a social upheaval and a struggle of ideas, this magazine is filling an expanding role in Canadian intellectual life. It is a MUST for thoughtful readers.

THE CANADIAN FORUM

Canada's Progressive Monthly

28 Wellington St. W., Toronto

One Year.....$2.00
Two Years.....$3.00

BOUND VOLUME

Volume XII of the University of Toronto Quarterly is now available in bound form. Send in your separate issues together with the sum of **One Dollar** and a bound volume will be forwarded to you immediately.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
Toronto, Canada

Envelopes

PROMPT DELIVERY

TORONTO ENVELOPE

Toronto AD. 3135

The Bishop Strachan School

COLLEGE HEIGHTS, TORONTO

Established over 67 years

President: THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF TORONTO

A CHURCH RESIDENTIAL AND DAY SCHOOL FOR GIRLS

Kindergarten to Junior and Senior Matriculation

Principal: Miss Lowe, B.A., Toronto
Vice-Principal: Miss Rosseter,
Cheltenham and Froebel Institute

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY

Editorial Committee

A. S. P. WOODHOUSE (*Chairman*)

J. R. MacGILLIVRAY PHILIP CHILD A. BRADY

Honorary Advisory Board

Dean G. S. Brett (*Chairman*), Principal Sidney Smith, Chancellor W. T. Brown, The Rev. Provost Cosgrave, The Rev. E. J. McCorkell, Professors F. H. Anderson, C. N. Cochrane, B. Fairley, R. Flenley, H. A. Innis, R. S. Knox, T. J. Meek, G. Norwood, Felix Walter, A. E. Barker, K. MacLean, The Rev. L. J. Bondy.

Business Manager

A. GORDON BURNS

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
ON THE FIFTEENTH OF
OCTOBER JANUARY APRIL JULY

Editorial communications should be addressed to the Editors, Baldwin House, University of Toronto. All inquiries regarding subscriptions and advertising should be addressed to the Manager, The University of Toronto Press.

$2.00 a Year Three Years $5.00

498150

PROVINCIAL
PAPER
LIMITED

388-396 University Avenue
TORONTO, CANADA

MANUFACTURERS OF BOOK,
WRITING and COATED PAPER

CONTENTS

VOL. XIV OCTOBER, 1944 No. 1

In Memoriam: William John Alexander
I. Memoir ..... M. W. WALLACE 1
II. Critic and Teacher ..... A. S. P. WOODHOUSE 8

The Permanent Value of the Old Testament ..... W. R. TAYLOR 34

William Covell and the Troubles at Enfield in 1659: A Sequel of the Digger Movement ..... J. MAX PATRICK 45

I. A. Richards ..... WILLIAM BLISSETT 58

Areopagitica Revisited ..... ARNOLD WILLIAMS 67

The Nature of Satire ..... NORTHROP FRYE 75

What Kind of Post-War Security? ..... J. R. MALLORY 90

Reviews:
American Foreign Policy ..... FRANK H. UNDERHILL 101
The Sociology of Law ..... G. S. BRETT 105
Fourscore Years ..... G. B. HARRISON 107
Prelude to Good Neighbourhood ..... EDGAR MCINNIS 110
Shorter Notices 114

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

William Blissett is attached to the Office of the Prime Minister at Ottawa.

G. S. Brett, Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the School of Graduate Studies, is the Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Quarterly in succession to Principal M. W. Wallace.

Northrop Frye is a member of the Department of English in Victoria College.

G. B. Harrison, Professor of English and Head of the Department at Queen's University, has edited Elizabethan and Jacobean journals and has written a large number of works on that period.

J. R. Mallory is Assistant Professor of Political Economy at Brandon College.

Edgar McInnis, Associate Professor of History in the University, is the author of *The Unguarded Frontier* (1942).

J. Max Patrick, a graduate of the University and of Oxford, is on the staff in English at the University of Buffalo.

W. R. Taylor is Professor of Oriental Languages and Head of the Department in University College.

Frank H. Underhill is Professor of History in the University.

M. W. Wallace was for over twenty years Professor Alexander's colleague, and thereafter his successor as Head of the Department of English in University College.

Arnold Williams, a member of the English staff at the Michigan State College, is about to publish a volume of Renaissance commentaries on Genesis.



IN MEMORIAM

WILLIAM JOHN ALEXANDER

I. MEMOIR

M. W. WALLACE

THE fame of the university professor rarely penetrates far beyond a limited academic circle. Some of his colleagues and students may be impressed by his qualities of mind and character, but of these things the general public knows little. The fame of university presidents extends throughout the land together with that of politicians, soldiers, great business men, newspaper editors and lawyers. A new medical discovery (or pseudo-discovery) may familiarize the multitude with the name of the discoverer. But most men are too busy and too completely absorbed in their own activities to devote much curiosity or interest to such inconspicuous human beings as university teachers. At best they are regarded with a peculiar mixture of condescension and the respect which attaches to the specialist.

When Professor W. J. Alexander died recently, only those who had come into intimate contact with him felt that Canada was the poorer for his passing. A man of modest and retiring temperament, he had shunned publicity throughout his life. Even in the world of English scholarship he was not widely known. His studies in Browning and Shelley and his occasional articles in learned journals were regarded by all serious students of literature as original, highly competent analyses of the English poets. But he had published comparatively little, though that little had always been of the highest quality. He was the rare phenomenon of a great scholar who was more interested in life and in teaching than in pure scholarship. He prepared many texts for use in the high schools of the province, and in this way did more than any other single person to establish standards of taste and of the teaching of English in Ontario. A great multitude of teachers who had been his students recognized his determining influence on their taste and on their thinking. In a more sophisticated world than that which we inhabit he would have been generally regarded as one of the great men of his generation.

William John Alexander was born in Hamilton, Ontario, in 1855. Both his father and mother were natives of Aberdeenshire, and both had emigrated to America only a short time before their marriage in 1843. Alexander Alexander, the father, has been described by his son as shy, proud and reserved, showing little of his feelings, a lover of flowers, fruits and birds, absolutely unbookish and unintellectual. It was from his mother, Isabella Buchan, that Professor Alexander inherited his passionate love of learning. Like all her family she delighted in books, and she would tell her son tales of the literary interests of her Scottish home and especially of a performance of Allan Ramsay's *The Gentle Shepherd* which had been superintended by her older brother. She was ambitious for her children, and like most Scotch

parents she sought to make religion and learning the corner-stones of their lives.

From his earliest years Professor Alexander was a precocious boy, and he was fortunate in the fact that Hamilton Collegiate Institute was an excellent school. The headmaster was J. M. Buchan, M.A. (his own cousin), who was succeeded a year or two after young Alexander became a student by George Dickson, M.A. Both were cultivated, scholarly men, and both were later to become Principals of Upper Canada College.

Alexander passed the University of Toronto matriculation examination in 1873 with the highest honours, winning two scholarships. The next year he won the Dominion Gilchrist Scholarship in the University of London, ranking fourth among six hundred and fifty-two competitors—"the highest place attained by a gentleman in the colonies." In their day the Gilchrist Scholarships opened the way to several brilliant young Canadians including President Schurman of Cornell and President Walter Murray of Saskatchewan. To be transported from a small provincial town to the capital of the Empire would be a thrilling experience for any intelligent youth, but to young Alexander with his insatiable thirst for knowledge it was more than that. At the age of nineteen he found himself precipitated into a world of which he had only dreamed. The controversy over evolution was at its height. Irish Disestablishment and the Franco-Prussian War were still being discussed and their significance assessed. Reports of Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria were under debate in the House, and Alexander and his friends were able from time to time to hear the actual discussions, and to become acquainted with the faces of Gladstone, Disraeli and many lesser luminaries. The great Victorian poets and prose-writers were pouring out new works which were a major interest in the conversations of brilliant young university students. Occasionally there was an opportunity to see them plain, and to hear the actual voices of those who had already established their places in the history of English literature. All the ideas which united or divided men took on a new actuality. European politics ceased to be merely matters for debate. The theatres, museums and art galleries were in themselves a world of wonder and inexhaustible pleasure.

During the last two years of his residence in London, Alexander saw much of J. G. Schurman, another Canadian Gilchrist Scholar, who was to become his closest friend throughout his life. In commending Alexander for appointment to the Toronto chair many years later Schurman wrote:

> I venture to assert that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a man, at least of his years, who could make any pretension to the richness, variety, and extent of Mr. Alexander's culture, especially on the literary side. In the years we spent together as students, Mr. Alexander was always surprising me by his knowledge and attainments—scientific, philosophic and literary—in which, so far as my experience went, he had no equal among the undergraduates of London University. His reading in literature and history was already extensive, and far beyond his years; and while he naturally took University Honours in English Language and Literature, he did advanced work in Chemistry and Physiology, read the Greek Dramatists, and joined the class in Kant's *Prolegomena*. He had great capacity for study, and his delight in it was not less.

This is surely a remarkable sketch of a youth of great ability who would seem to have taken all knowledge to be his province. The writer was himself a well-known scholar and man of the world, acquainted with most of the promising young men of his generation in America, and eminently fitted to express a judgment on their individual capacities. On taking his degree with first-class honours in 1877 Alexander returned to Canada and spent the next two years teaching English Literature on the staff of Prince of Wales College in Charlottetown. But he still craved an opportunity to equip himself more completely before entering on the work to which he wished to devote his life.

The opening of Johns Hopkins University in 1876 marks an epoch in the history of higher education in America. Instruction by general lectures was supplemented, and indeed largely superseded, by work in seminars and laboratories. Under the influence of American students who had worked in Germany, research became the dominating ideal in American graduate study. At Johns Hopkins was assembled the most notable group of scholars that had ever been brought together in the country, and men like Gilman, Gildersleeve, Sylvester, Remsen, Welch and Osler soon spread the reputation of the new institution throughout the university world. Gradually it came to be taken for granted that the qualification for the Ph.D. degree consisted mainly in the accomplishment of an exhaustive piece of research in some special field, and publication of the thesis was imperative. A general acquaintance with the whole field was no longer regarded as adequate preparation for the work of the college teacher; indeed, in too many cases, the demonstrated capacity for minute research dispensed the candidate from having anything more than a superficial acquaintance with the general field of his subject.

Two years of teaching in Prince of Wales College had persuaded young Alexander that he wished to devote his life to the teaching of English Literature, and that he needed much more preparation to equip himself for the work.

> As no advanced instruction in English Literature proper [he writes] was to be obtained in any university, either in America or Europe, I determined to continue in private my more direct study of the subject, and to avail myself of university assistance in gaining a wider knowledge of other literatures, especially of those of the classical languages—which I deemed the best preparation for the study of any literature—and also in gaining a better acquaintance with scientific Philology.
>
> In accordance with this plan I entered the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, (in 1879) where I remained as a graduate student during four years. Besides availing myself of what assistance that University offered in English (which was, as far as I was concerned, Anglo-Saxon) I followed courses in Comparative Philology, Latin and Greek. I was so successful in my studies as to win a graduate Scholarship in the year after my entering, and to be appointed to a Fellowship in Greek in the following year (1881). This Fellowship I held during two years, and then graduated as Doctor of Philosophy, in June, 1883. My graduating thesis is published in the *American Journal of Philology* for October of the same year.

Few university teachers can have had a training for their work compa-

rable in range and intensity to that of Professor Alexander. The years which he spent in Baltimore were a sheer delight to him, and he always recalled them with special satisfaction. His scholarly instincts rejoiced in the keen, forward-looking atmosphere of the university, and the stimulus of daily association with older scholars who recognized the young man's capacity, must have had no small share in his development. Professor Gildersleeve, perhaps the greatest Greek scholar that America has produced, regarded him as one of his ablest students, and delighted to bear testimony to that fact. "While Professor Alexander," he wrote, "did not neglect the technical side of Greek, so to speak, his chief desire was to penetrate into the secrets of Greek literary art, and in my long career as a teacher I have never had a more sympathetic pupil in all that pertains to the aesthetic part of my work; and since he returned to his favourite province of study, as he did shortly after leaving the Johns Hopkins, he has shown in his chosen field the same insight, the same enthusiasm that made me hope so much for his future as a classical scholar." President Gilman, who knew him well, concurred warmly in this estimate. They recognized in him the unusual combination of capacity for intense scholarly research with broad philosophic and aesthetic preoccupations. Professor Schurman merely re-echoed their judgment, though perhaps with greater discrimination. "As a preparation for a professorship of English Language and Literature," he declared, "his scholarship is perfectly ideal. To this add his fine literary taste and feeling, his literary appreciation and insight, as delicate as subtle, along with his love of literature, his devotion to its diffusion, his belief in its potency to refine and ennoble mankind, and you have a scholar who would adorn any chair of literature in America."

Immediately after graduating from Johns Hopkins in 1883, Professor Alexander spent a year in the University of Berlin, where he gave his time mainly to a study of German literature and to perfecting himself in the language. Before returning to Canada he was appointed Professor of English Literature in Dalhousie University. This chair was the only one in the Dominion for the teaching of English Language and Literature to the exclusion of all other work. Here he remained for five years, and here he was married in 1887 to Laura Morrow, a daughter of James Bain Morrow of Halifax, the shipping agent for the Cunard Steamship Company. Dalhousie's reputation at that time was very high, as well it might be, for on the staff were young men who were to occupy distinguished places in the academic world—James Seth, J. G. Schurman and Gordon McGregor. On hearing of Professor Alexander's death one of his Halifax friends of those early days said: "The last of the giants is gone." He was very happy in his Dalhousie post, and only after serious hesitation did he decide to apply for the Toronto chair. He began his work here in September, 1889, and retired in 1926, during the whole of which period he was the universally recognized leader in shaping the ideals of English teaching in Ontario both in the universities and secondary schools.

Within the limited space allotted to this article it is not possible to record, except in a cursory way, the revolutionary development in the university teaching of English initiated by Professor Alexander. He established the English and History course with supplementary work in either the classical or modern languages and also in philosophy. The writing of English essays became an important part of the course, though he had little faith in formal courses in composition. His own preparation for the study of English had been on so broad a front, it was so intimately linked with a knowledge of other literatures and philosophy, that a narrow or isolated approach to it as a "subject" would have seemed to him to convert the rich variety of life and thought into something fragmentary and mechanical. He required from his students minute technical studies, some demonstrated capacity for literary analysis and for coherent presentation of ideas, but always behind the exercises of training was the assumption that art and literature constituted a unique approach to the understanding and enjoyment of life.

It is difficult to explain the secret of his great influence as a teacher by any description of his method. One remembers the effect of his lectures rather than the manner of presentation. In his hands the exposition of a great poem or play carried with it a sense of the sudden enrichment of life—delight mingled with understanding. One of his old students has compared the experience to that described by Keats in his great sonnet, when "a new planet swims into his ken," when he "stared at the Pacific" with a breathless realization of an enlargement of his world.

The intense vitality of his mind and imagination kindled a corresponding life in all but the dullest of his hearers. His assumption that literature dealt with the highest realities went unquestioned. His passion to know, to understand, to distinguish precisely, to be as nearly unbiassed as it is possible to be, communicated itself to others by virtue of its inherent reasonableness. It carried its own credentials with it, and though much—most—of his lecture was given to understanding, to a grasp of the intellectual or philosophic foundation on which the play or the poem was built, we were never in doubt that this was all preliminary work. It was the necessary preparation that fitted us to enjoy the total artistic effect, the delight in living intensely in an experience where the intellectual, the emotional and the aesthetic were merged, and where the one reinforced the effects of the others.

Under the spell of the lecturer's persuasiveness it was impossible to doubt the supreme importance of such experiences. To read *Hamlet* or *The Green Linnet* with an awareness of all its values was to become aware of a new power to understand, to live more fully, to enjoy more intensely. The enigmas of life seemed no longer insoluble. The alchemy of the artist had turned even the mean and sordid into pure gold.

Perhaps no recollection of Professor Alexander's lectures remains more vividly in the memories of his old students than that of the utter simplicity

of his presentation. There was never any attempt to capture their approbation through taking it by storm. He had no impulse to confuse the issue in a mist of fine sentiments or beautiful language. Indeed he made us constantly aware of his stern disapproval of all such meretricious aids to thinking or appreciation. J. W. Balfour in reference to Asquith's perfectly simple, clear style has remarked that "such simplicity is a positive disadvantage if one has nothing to say." It is a just observation. But Professor Alexander always had something to say, and the directness and simplicity of his language was an index of the honesty and simplicity of his own character. Insincerity of any kind was abhorrent to him whether in personal relations or in the discussion of a work of art. That there were graces of literature beyond the reach of exposition no one knew better, but he was incapable of the pretence or pose that could only cloud the issue.

Many of his students realized his unique powers only after they were able to compare him with the famous scholars of other universities. His passion to understand, to know the best that had been thought and said elsewhere, to criticize each student's efforts intelligently and sympathetically—these things they took for granted, until in later life they discovered that they were not universal. His learning, his native ability, his powers of judgment whether in university administration, literary analysis or in the commonplace matters of daily life, he carried as though he were unconscious of them. Penetrating wisdom in him seemed mere common sense. Never in class or in private conversation did a tinge of pose or insincerity mar the impression of integrity, of simple honesty and the desire to arrive at the truth of the subject. In discussion with him the essentials of a problem emerged, and the non-essentials fell away into their proper place. Instinctively he avoided the partisan or merely sentimental view, and his strong convictions were held in check by his over-riding desire to marshal all the relevant considerations essential to a right judgment.

Modest and retiring by temperament, Professor Alexander was incredibly indifferent to recognition, for he had almost no worldly ambition. Early in life he achieved the post which he was to occupy throughout his active years and it gave him ample scope for all his energies. His personal happiness found its centre in an unusually happy domestic life. In the affection of his family and immediate relatives he found his most enduring satisfactions, and he liked to quote Burns's lines:

> To mak a happy fireside clime
> To weans and wife—
> That's the true pathos and sublime
> Of human life.

Not deceived by his unconscious simplicity, his children thought of him as kindly, humorous, unselfish, wise, but they dimly realized that in him the combination of these qualities was unique.

Many an old man finds himself at the end of his days hopelessly out of

sympathy with contemporary thought, and regretfully or stubbornly confining himself to the role of *laudator temporis acti*. With Professor Alexander it was not so. He had always maintained an open mind on all questions and a willingness to give new ideas a sympathetic hearing. His youngest colleagues found themselves treated as equals. Their chief took it for granted that youth might contribute as much to the health of the department as experience. He exulted in the ideal of a new world in which the welfare of the common man should be given a supreme place. Intensely democratic by nature he resented bitterly the inhumanity of man to man, and believed that a democracy could achieve a full measure of health only when it had made provision for the fullest development of the latent qualities of all its members. The horrors and savagery of modern war shook his natural optimism to its foundations, but he refused to despair utterly, and continued to hope that the dawn of a better day was about to break. His faith in the common man increased with his years. His descent from farmers and stonemasons left him unimpressed by worldly success, and throughout his life his friendship was given as unreservedly to his servants and to workmen as to his colleagues, and that with no touch of condescension. He had always been quick to resent injustice, and the modern tendency to extend social services more widely appealed to his deepest instincts. His political convictions instead of hardening into conservatism and a defence of the *status quo* grew ever more radical, and he found something to sympathize with in most of the new doctrines of his day, though he felt little impulse to identify himself completely with any of them.

Retirement from active university duties brought to him rather the opportunity to invade new fields than any lessening of his intellectual energy. Though he had previously known almost nothing of music, he now took up serious study of the subject with the aid of records, and derived great pleasure from it. He made many new friends among Canadian painters, in whose work he took especial interest. Young authors were encouraged and helped by his discriminating criticism. His bodily health gave way only in the last year or two of his long life, and his mental vigour was hardly impaired even at the end. With only slightly lessened energy he pursued what Sir Robert Falconer once called his "voyage of discovery into the mind of man and his world." The chaos of modern times depressed his spirit but he continued to wrestle with contemporary problems and to appraise the men and measures of today as he had always done.

Nor was his life uncrowned with honours—of the only kind that he esteemed. His colleagues—and especially those of his own department—felt a great pride in his achievements and character, and recognized in him their master, the first of those who know. Several hundreds of his old students united to establish the Alexander Lectureship as a fitting memorial, and this evidence of their respect and affection touched him deeply.

> That which should accompany old age,
> As honour, love, obedience, troops of friends,

was his in full measure. To have known him intimately as teacher and friend was a great privilege, and in a real sense a liberal education. He performed a notable service for his university and native province, partly because of his great intellectual powers, the breadth of his training and his unfailing aesthetic discrimination, but not less because of the unshakable integrity of his character and his devotion to the things of the mind in an intensely practical age which chiefly esteems worldly success.

II. CRITIC AND TEACHER

A. S. P. Woodhouse

The common opinion is that Professor Alexander was first and last a great teacher—perhaps the greatest this University has seen—and that in him the activities of scholar and critic were subordinated to those of the instructor and educator. In this common opinion there is a large measure of truth, but it needs to be placed in its proper context.

That he was unsurpassed in oral instruction, no one who has had the privilege of studying under him will question. One memory among many stands out. It is of the bleak lecture theatre in the old Medical Building: grim and repellent setting, but the only available room large enough to accommodate his audience of honours-men, pass-men, and those who came in from other colleges and faculties to hear him expound Browning or read Rossetti's *Sister Helen*, and to gain thereby entrance to a new world. One will not forget the serried ranks of unselected students, the power that his words had over them, the hushed attention that was their tribute to him and to the experience into which they were being drawn. It is not easy to recover the secret of that amazing success. Many things contributed to it: his sympathetic insight into the mind of his author and of his audience, which enabled him to mediate between them, a wide tolerance coupled with uncompromising standards of literary excellence, a sanity of judgment and cogency of argument that won the intellectual respect of his hearers, a quiet but pervasive sense of humour, and unrivalled powers of interpretative reading, free from every hint of the elocutionist's art. He was not a spectacular lecturer. He disdained the tricks of the trade, and emotionalism in all its forms withered in his presence. No one was ever moved to go out and give the Toronto yell for Browning when the last lecture was over; but Browning meant more to him for the rest of his days. And here perhaps we approach the secret: the emphasis was on *meaning*. In great literature—in poetry, let us say,—the meaning embraces intellectual content and feeling and art, which there become one and indivisible: the meaning in its fullest sense is a unifying experience, and to stop short of that experience is to fail of a complete comprehension of the poem.[1] But it can be ap-

[1]Cf. "Study of Literature" (1898), xv. The date in brackets indicates the edition of *Select Poems* in which the essay appears as an introduction. The quotations from *Select*

proached in different ways; and in nine out of ten of the poems with which Professor Alexander dealt, and for nine out of ten of the students to whom he spoke, the best way into the experience was through an exposition of the content, the meaning in its more limited and ordinary sense. On that method generally his treatment of the work was grounded; and it gave a firm foundation for whatever he had to say of feeling and of artistry. Often it was not necessary to say very much: the feeling and the artistry were borne in upon the audience in the very terms of the exposition and in the reading that accompanied it. And so he brought them, almost unawares, to the experience which was the total meaning of the poem. This was essentially the method of *the teacher;* but it was one that could be successfully applied only by a teacher who was also a literary critic of a high order.

No doubt his natural medium was the spoken rather than the printed word. He wrote relatively little, and in later life virtually nothing. By that time (as I am credibly informed) he had come to feel that writing demanded an artistic genius which he did not possess. One respects the standard but deplores the self-denying ordinance which was its result. For his published criticism is unfailingly cogent and suggestive and, in substance at least, is not inferior to the best academic criticism of his period. In earlier days circumstances had conspired with temper to prevent a larger output. When, fifty-five years ago, he was appointed to the newly separated chair of English in University College, he set himself almost single-handed to shape and teach the whole range of necessary courses in literature, as well as to give guidance to the study of English in the schools. He had to rescue the teaching of literature from the dead hand of linguistic analysis, to free it from the mere cramming of irrelevant information and unattached literary history, and to show how the subject could be presented as a thing of ideas, of beauty and of power. It was an enormous task, and he discharged it to the full.[2] His mark is upon the English courses in the University, and in the schools, to this day. And long may it continue to be! But part of the price paid may well have been the opportunity of becoming one of the more widely valued academic critics of his time. To

Poems are by the kind permission of the publisher, The Copp Clark Company, Toronto; those from *Select Poems of Shelley*, by the kind permission of its publisher, Ginn and Company, Boston.

[2]Of his own school days, in the eighteen-sixties, Professor Alexander writes: "There was no text in literature studied in any course. To be sure, I remember having to bring to school *Paradise Lost*, [Book] II, in order to parse and analyse the opening passages, which were particularly resistant to such operations. English, as we should now define the subject, was just coming into existence and experiments were being made in text books, resulting in odd concoctions of miscellaneous information" (*The School*, XVII, 1928, 119). In the next decade Hales's influential *Longer English Poems* (1872) was a step in the right direction. But in his "Introduction on the Teaching of English," after laying some stress on content, and even more on information, which the student should be made to acquire for himself, Hales proceeds with gusto: "And now it is time that we should turn to matters of Grammar"; while only at the very end does he add: "The subject-matter of the poem and the language . . . having been carefully studied, some attempt at a criticism of it

the daily assignment in lecture hall and class room, and to the preparation of school and college texts, he brought mature scholarship, the power of luminous exposition, and a discriminating taste. His talents were equal to any demand that could have been made upon them. He did not think them too high for the demands which his situation actually made.

So his effort was directed in the main to educational ends, not to research and not to the production of critical studies unconnected with his work as a teacher. He did not, as was sometimes hastily inferred, undervalue these activities:[3] it was simply that they were not among the chief needs of his time and situation. He had a lively sense of the differences in times and situations and their corresponding needs: in my last long conversation with him, he brought up this subject and talked of it with his accustomed cogency and wisdom. But he held that in a university teaching should at all times come first; and this conviction bestowed a remarkable unity on all that he did. In his writing he pursued the same end and quality of instruction as in his lectures. More than half of what he wrote is addressed to the general reader as well as to the student of letters—the *Introduction to Browning*, the edition of Shelley, the essays on *Hamlet*, *Sartor Resartus* and "Browning Once More"; but the distinction is not important. For he knew that general reading, to be worth very much,

might be encouraged." The interval between this pedestrian essay and Professor Alexander's pronouncements in the eighteen-eighties and nineties is as striking as the difference between his annotations and Hales's.

For the schools Professor Alexander produced admirable editions of *Select Poems* prescribed for matriculation, with first-class literary criticism and other aids to the teacher. His final service to the schools was his selection and brief annotation of some three hundred *Shorter Poems* (1924) for their use, which (I have been told) revolutionized the teaching of literature in the lower forms. He was himself an inspired teacher of composition, and *Composition from Models* (1894) is a unique book, a brilliant application of the classical principle of excellence through intelligent imitation. For the University he produced, with Dr. Clawson, *Representative Poetry* (1912-28), whose annotations are perfect in their brevity, lucidity and relevance.

But his greatest work for the higher study of English, which also paid its dividend in the schools through the teachers that it trained, was his founding, with his friend Professor George M. Wrong, of the honours course in English and History, one of the most successful of Toronto courses. English was the senior partner, and the object was to provide for a carefully graduated and integrated study of the chief periods in English literature, coupled with the appropriate courses in English history, and supported by courses in Greek and Latin or (later and alternatively) French and German. This honours course has now given place to English Language and Literature, which, however, retains in its honours options provision for the five supporting subjects, with the addition, of a sixth, Philosophy. The scheme, as Professor Alexander devised it and as it has since grown, is more broadly and securely based, I think, than the Oxford English schools or the Cambridge tripos. It was, and probably still is, without counterpart in the United States, or in Canada save in so far as the smaller Ontario colleges and the Western universities have adapted it to their needs.

[3]He thought that research of a narrow and factual kind had little value as discipline for the researcher, though the results might be of some use; but to research coupled with criticism or an effort of synthesis—to anything indeed that called the activities of the mind into play—he was uniformly friendly.

must partake of the nature of study, and as a teacher his principal end was to fit his students to become general readers in the best meaning of the term. In his literary criticism he could afford to be "educational" in aim, and even in manner, because he entertained so humane and liberal a conception of education and had so high and true a sense of the role of literature therein.

* * * * *

Underlying both teaching and critical writing was an interesting and clearly thought-out body of literary and educational theory. What is literature in its wider and in its stricter sense? What is its place in liberal education? What are the proper aims and methods of literary study? These are the questions which Professor Alexander answers in his two *Inaugurals* and in a series of briefer essays written for the guidance of teachers.[4] They belong to the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when the modern study of English was in its infancy here and indeed everywhere, and are thus an historical landmark. No doubt they are "dated" by their sense of nobility in poetry and its elevating influence on the mind; but this is presented as only one quality and effect among several and, thus conditioned, is no Victorian aberration but fully justified by the history of English poetry taken over its whole extent. More questionable perhaps are the definition of style primarily in terms of emotion and the insistence on subjectivity as a mark of the specifically poetic, both of which, if Victorian, are part of the age's inheritance from Romanticism. That his view of poetry was deeply coloured by the theory and practice of the great Romantics may be thought a limitation by those who worship at the shrine of Mr. T. S. Eliot; but a view that makes for a sympathetic reading of Wordsworth and Coleridge, Shelley and Keats and Tennyson, is not necessarily more limiting than one that renders such a reading difficult or impossible. In Professor Alexander, Romantic theory encountered a taste and a set of principles founded upon the classics, which it might indeed liberalize but could not overthrow; and in this he is true to the best tradition of English Romanticism itself. His emphasis on subjectivity and emotion may also be read as an effort to differentiate poetry and stake its claim in a world increasingly dominated by natural science, and (though in this he is much less successful, I think) an attempt to record the individu-

[4] I refer to the two *Inaugurals* by that name instead of by their confusing titles, for which see the Check-List at the end of this essay. The *Second Inaugural*, delivered at University College in 1889, is a careful reworking of the ideas contained in the *First*, given at Dalhousie University in 1884. Its excisions, additions and rephrasings are the result of five years' thought and experience; and its new section on aims and methods clearly envisages the honours course as Professor Alexander was to shape it at Toronto (see above, note 2). The supplementary essays are: "Poetry: Its Thought and Form," "The Study of Literature," "Metre in relation to Thought," and "The Nature and Office of Poetry" (in *Select Poems* for 1897, 1898, 1899, and *An Anthology of English Poetry for Schools*, 1901). To these may be added: "English in the High Schools" (*Canada Educational Monthly*, 1893), the Introduction of *Composition from Models* (1894), the preface to *Shorter Poems* (1924) and "The Purpose of *Shorter Poems*" (*School*, 1932).

ality and completeness of the poetic experience, to present it as the response not of the fact-finding and reasoning mind, but of the whole personality. In his last years, as we shall see, Professor Alexander came to question a too exclusive emphasis on emotion and on subjectivity in its narrower sense. But the point of view in the *Inaugurals* is the one from which his earlier teaching and nearly all his critical writing were undertaken.

In its widest definition, he says,

> literature is written thought. . . . Of the infinite thoughts which have swept in ceaseless streams through the numberless minds of successive generations, a few were recorded, and of these again, a few are still preserved in written language. This is our material, be the nature of the ideas and the form of the expression what they may. . . . So that we may find ourselves concerned not only with such works as the *Iliad* or *Lear*, but with others like . . . Darwin's *Origin of Species*, whose claim to the title of literature would be less generally admitted.[5]

This wide primary definition, with its emphasis on intellectual content, is significant. So also are the pyramiding definitions built upon it, each one narrower and higher than the preceding. Literature in a stricter sense is required to present its thought "powerfully, appropriately and beautifully" or to possess "the characteristic of style" with its expression of a personality and its colouring of emotion. But by literature in a still stricter sense we mean imaginative literature: wherein the writer does not merely shape and colour his material but really creates it and, to present the truth as he sees and feels it, resorts to fiction. And, finally, when this imaginative content "is expressed with the highest beauty, fitness and power, it receives an additional element of form and becomes poetry": poetry is the highest and purest kind of literature.[6] To this hierarchy of values corresponded Professor Alexander's own emphasis as critic and teacher; and what his old students will first remember as they think of him, is his interpretation of the poets. But next they will recall that for him literature and its study were broad-based: the final definition supplemented but did not supersede those that had gone before. He never acquiesced in the narrowing down of literature to *belles-lettres*. Though in its purest forms it was creative, and even poetic, it also included works of science, of history, of opinion, and even of philosophy, but the student of literature had his own way of looking at them: "We students of literature are interested in all departments of thought, and yet stand apart from and outside of all." If, "in the course of our study of the literature of England in the eighteenth century" we turn to Locke, Berkeley and Hume, "we set ourselves to determine just what these treatises of theirs contain and mean, not necessarily because we suppose they will afford any substantial philosophical result, but because we want to know what men have thought, because of the insight we gain into the character of these writers and of the age and nation in which they lived."[7] This statement brings into relief another fact which may be

[5] *Second Inaugural* (1889): *Select Poems* (1908), viii.

[6] *First Inaugural* (1884), 4-5. Cf. *Second Inaugural*, xiv-xv (quoted below).

[7] *Second Inaugural*, ix.

noticed in passing. Literature, clearly, was *inter alia* a record; and to its absolute value in its highest reaches was added, at every level, an historical which was also often a human interest. The two things were perfectly compatible, but not to be confused. As against the mere historian of letters he asserted the uniqueness of the masterpiece; as against the unhistorical critic, the place even of the masterpiece in history.

The uniqueness of the masterpiece lay in what he called its style, which was felt as emotion and which expressed not only the mood but the total personality of the writer:

> Style, reflecting the mood of the writer, is pathetic or humorous or indignant; and yet, behind all that, there is a constant element of individual characteristics which serve to distinguish one author from another, and to which we refer in speaking of the style of Demosthenes or of Virgil, of Burke or of Milton. *Le style*, says the adage, *c'est l'homme*. The genuine stylist depicts himself to the adequate literary critic, with unconscious fidelity, in lineaments adequate and unmistakeable. . . .
>
> Style is the most pervading manifestation of form. We find it present when the literary structure is not otherwise elaborated. Thucydides' *History*, for example, has the simple mould of a chronicle . . . . Its style, however, is very marked; the character of the writer is felt throughout and . . . he bathes such narratives as those of plague at Athens or the Sicilian expedition in a certain emotional atmosphere. But an author may not merely impress his character and mood upon his matter; he may shape that matter itself to the production of certain effects. Here we reach literature in its purest form—literature which is literature first of all, not history or science or philosophy. In it the writer's aim is primarily artistic, the embodiment of a beautiful conception in appropriate language. Of this species there are several varieties, but we may take poetry as the best and highest representative. The poet is in the fullest sense creative; the subjective factor reaches its maximum; and hence poetry is in an especial degree the subject of the student of literature. . . . Poetry . . . is differentiated from [works of science and history] in that the production of emotion is here the chief aim, in subordination to which the facts themselves are chosen and moulded. As by its form, then, so by its aim, poetry is the highest species of literature. For the highest manifestations of human nature are emotional. Emotion raises morality to religion.[8]

The connection of Professor Alexander's view of poetry with the theory and practice of the Romantics is, as we observed, obvious. But I would hazard this further suggestion. The emphasis on subjectivity may be associated with his individualism, his feeling for the integrity of the human personality, whether his own or another's, and his sense of the processes of thought and feeling—or, more accurately, the single vital process compounded of thought and feeling—by which the personality fortifies itself in a partially alien world and seeks to impose a kindred unity upon it. And this again may help us to explain the heavy emphasis on emotion in the definition of style. Up to a point, of course, no explanation is needed: the emotional element in style, particularly in poetry, and the appeal which it makes to the emotions of the reader, are inescapable. But I cannot help thinking that the dominant role assigned to emotion was intended to imply something more. It was an attempt, not completely successful in its formulation, to give due weight to the single vital process which depends

[8] *Ibid.*, xiii-xv.

on more than intellect, on all the resources of the personality. Other activities were specialized and did not involve the whole man. The scientist, *qua* scientist, was concerned with external facts; the philosopher, with a chain of reasoning from premises to conclusion, and so forth. It was the poet who came nearest to recording the response of the living individual, the total personality, to a fact, a situation, an argument, whatever it might be; and he did this by his individual way of speaking about it, by his style, in which thought was coloured by feeling and both were guided and controlled by the unifying instinct of the artist. The emphasis on subjectivity sprang from the critic's sense of the individuality of the poet's response. The emphasis on feeling was an attempt to express its totality, or at least its dependence on more than the fact-finding and reasoning mind. This would account for the dominant role assigned to emotion by one who habitually viewed emotionalism with suspicion and some contempt.

Does the subjectivity of poetry and its suffusion with feeling, on the one hand, or its creativeness, its resort to fiction, on the other, militate against its essential truth and value? The second half of the question had been answered by Aristotle once for all: poetry, by means of fiction, imitates nature and presents a universal truth inaccessible to history, which is confined to the particular. When the Romantics came to assert the validity of what they called the creative or the poetic imagination, they drew in the elements of subjectivity and emotion. And at least one of them—Coleridge in his essay *On Poesy or Art*—built directly upon the Aristotelian dictum, reinterpreting it in terms of his own theories of nature and imagination, and throwing thereby a flood of light back upon the dictum itself. This clearly is the background of Professor Alexander's answer to the question, though he does not commit himself to Coleridge's transcendental idealism, or indeed to Aristotle's teleology, but rests the case for poetry on the experience of the reader. The substance of "all great and abiding artistic work is truth. . . . Enduring works of imagination are not fiction in the sense of being false; on the contrary, they are truer embodiments of observation and insight than the vast majority of mankind can arrive at for themselves. . . . Shakespeare's men and women are, as Coleridge says, embodiments of the universal, individualizations of the type, and consequently possess validity everywhere and for all time."[9] But poetry does not confine itself to presenting pictures of human action and character, however rich in insight: it deals, as one of the greatest of the Victorians had averred, with ideas in their application to life: " 'The highest poetry,' Matthew Arnold says, 'is at bottom a criticism of life, and the greatness of a poet lies in the beautiful and powerful application of ideas to life, to the question—how to live.' It is the business of science to attain truth; of poetry, to seize that truth in so far as it is applicable to life and to give it perfect expression. Hence Wordsworth has called poetry . . . 'the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge.' " In poetry we meet ideas humanized by having

[9] *Ibid.*, xv-xvi.

become a part of the poet's experience, and given a new potency by the beauty and the feeling with which they are expressed: we meet "suggestions, the more stimulating that they are but suggestions; partial solutions, the more enduring that they are but partial; and sometimes, when we least expect it, a complete philosophy implicit. So that in poetry we find not only a fountain of beauty . . . but a storehouse of wisdom whence we may draw treasures new and old, and arm ourselves with weapons for the battle of life."[10]

In all its higher reaches, and particularly in poetry, literature has for its end, or its accompaniment, pleasure. Little is said of this directly in the *Inaugurals*, more in "The Nature and Office of Poetry"; but it is a fact whose bearing on the teaching of literature Professor Alexander never forgot. As a means of education—and it was in this context that he most often spoke of it—literature had valuable knowledge to bestow, not in the main a knowledge of particular subjects, but of life and human nature as they were presented by minds more than commonly percipient and acute. Reading was vicarious experience. But in order that it might discharge this function the experience must be entered into, lived through; and this could happen only as the reader's interest was quickened, as he came to read the book for its own sake: not for some ulterior result, but for the pleasure of the process itself. Because the style was the man, literature could bring you, in no merely metaphorical sense, into the presence of the writer and enable you to catch the tones of a living voice. Thus wide reading made you free of the best society in the world. But as social intercourse would yield its benefits only as it was enjoyed, so with the society of books. Among the cultural benefits accruing from the study of literature he placed high the entry which it gave into the realm of art, by awakening the perception of formal beauty. But formal beauty again could be perceived only as it was enjoyed. Finally, if the aim of literary education was to fit and induce students to become general readers for the rest of their lives, it could do this only by fostering a love of letters, that is, by helping them to realize, through their own experience of it, the inexhaustible source of high and enduring pleasure which literature affords.

All liberal studies, as Newman long ago taught (and it was with Professor Alexander that many of us first read our Newman and learned to think about these things)—all liberal studies must be pursued for their own sake: in them the process is the end; and "for their own sake" can only mean for the interest that they arouse and the pleasure that they yield. They have indeed a result, even a utility of their own, but one measurable only in terms of the good life. These characteristics the study of literature shares with the rest, but it has them in double measure because, by virtue of its subject-matter, it belongs also to another world: not to liberal studies only but the liberal or fine arts, whose end is to give pleasure, whose enjoyment is an experience complete and self-sustained, and whose value is also

[10] *Ibid.*, xix.

measurable only in terms of the good life. That, I think, is a fair summary of Professor Alexander's doctrine, though he nowhere states it precisely in this way. And it has the most definite implications for the teacher of literature at all levels, who is under a twofold constraint to carry his students with him, to have them take pleasure in the subject and be willing to pursue it for itself. In his last public utterance, an address in 1932 to the teachers of his *Shorter Poems* for use in schools, he said:

> The fundamental difficulty inherent in the teaching of these selections may be brought out by a contrast with the three subjects which lie at the basis of school work: reading, writing and arithmetic. In the case of each of these the teacher and the learner have before them a definite and practical end whose attainment can be seen, even by the dullest pupils, to be extremely desirable. For in the conditions of modern civilized existence, the lack of a fairly easy mastery of any of these three is comparable with the lack of a bodily sense, for example, having to go through life blind or deaf. On the other hand, in the case of poetry there is no such definite practical end which can easily be apprehended by average boys and girls—or, indeed, for the most part even by their parents. "What," they say, "is the use of poetry?" By what is "useful" we mean something that leads to something else; and in ordinary thinking and talk that something else refers to some material, tangible result. We rightly enough look upon certain material things like food, clothing, shelter (all of which are to be obtained in modern times by money) as of the first importance; for without them we cannot live at all. Yet what we shall eat and what we shall drink, and wherewith we shall be clothed, are not the chief things in life, as indeed people in general would admit. Notwithstanding, in our time and place material results are treated by the overwhelming majority of men as the chief aim of life. . . . The successful man in popular estimate is the one who is making or has made money, though his mind may be dwarfed, his interests few and hence his life narrow and poor, though his temper may be morose, his relations with his family and fellow men unhappy. Having succeeded in the main thing, he is looked up to; his opinions have weight; his utterances are good newspaper copy . . . . Is it any wonder if Ontario children commonly grow up, taking it for granted from what they observe and hear, that to make money is the great thing in life? Now, reading and writing and arithmetic will plainly help one towards making money. Will the study of poetry?
>
> It certainly will not; it has no such purpose. The end of the study of poetry is emotional and intellectual enjoyment, just as this is the end of music and painting and other arts. Further, we notice that the advantages of the study of arithmetic, for example, are not dependent on the pupil's liking the subject. . . . On the other hand, if with the study of poetry the boy associates dullness and boredom, if it has aroused no interest, no emotions save those that are disagreeable, how is it possible that that enjoyment which is the very aim of the study should be reached? So you have to make the poetry hour pleasurable. . .
>
> Now this enjoyment and appreciation of poetry—as all who have experienced it will know—is of an exceptionally pure, permanent and elevating kind, belonging (as many of our legitimate enjoyments do not belong) to the highest and most characteristically *human* part of our nature. . . . In poetry there is something which appeals to both mind and heart. To further this power directly, to implant and cultivate it, was the end in view in making this book.[11]

It was the end in view also in Professor Alexander's teaching and in his literary criticism—in all his dealing with literature. It meant that the curriculum should be carefully drawn up with an eye to the natural interests and tastes of the students for whom it was designed, commencing with the thing in which every one is interested, life and action in their more obvious

[11] *School*, XX, 1932, 684-5.

and external aspects, and leading on gradually to the more inward and subtle and to the more purely intellectual and aesthetic. It did not mean that difficulties were to be eschewed or concealed, that English was to be made an easy subject. He knew that you did not interest people by persuading them that they need not think, but by leading them on to think to some purpose. Literature, he said, was like good society in this way among others: it was not easy of access, nor were its benefits to be had without effort.[12] He went straight to the essential quality of an author and to the heart of his meaning, and he introduced whatever was necessary to bring home to a reader that quality and meaning, and to explain them. He was a man of great and varied learning, thoroughly grounded in the classics, well read in philosophy and history, familiar with the methods of all the main departments of knowledge, including mathematics and the natural sciences, and saturated, above all, in literature; and this learning was in the service of an eminently reflective and philosophic mind and a humane spirit, so that it was fitted for dealing with literature and its problems, and illuminated instead of submerging them. Only when learning was mechanical, irrelevant to the matter in hand, or unattached (as, for example, when the history of literature was pursued without a study of the literature itself) was he, very properly, impatient with it. This requires to be said because students of literature, and even sometimes teachers, are prone to exalt the amateur spirit, as Professor Alexander very well knew:

> The student of literature, perhaps more than others, is tempted to dilettantism, too apt to be satisfied with a species of passive enjoyment, prone to overlook the claims of accuracy and thoroughness. Experience in my own case, and observation in that of others, has taught me that it is a great mistake to study in a subject just what we care for and what is pleasant to us. Thoroughness and completeness lend interest in time to the driest subjects, but slovenliness and self-pleasing are fatal to it. . . . Remember that we, inside the University, are scholars, not amateurs, and thoroughness is the first characteristic of the true scholar.[13]

"The enjoyment and understanding of literature—the fundamental requisite of the literary student—has accidentally originated in various men through the perusal of very different books, as tastes and circumstances may have determined."[14] It is the business of the educator to work out a scheme which may minister to this end, and of the teacher so to apply the scheme as to achieve it. In the schools the best plan, he held, is the study of individual works without the introduction of anything extraneous to them—the plan envisaged in *Shorter Poems* and *Short Stories and Essays*. In the Pass course in the University (for it is clearly of that level he is speaking though he does not mention it by name) the plays of Shakespeare are perhaps "the best instruments for awakening genuine literary taste and for the disciplining of that which has been already awakened. . . . Other writers appeal to a more or less narrow circle, Shakespeare to all men. . . . Having acquired some insight into Shakespeare, we ought . . . to make an accurate study of, and learn to enjoy, a considerable number

[12] *Second Inaugural*, xiv. [13] *Ibid.*, xix. [14] *Ibid.*

of our greatest and most typical English writers. The more diverse these are in genius, the more complete and adequate will the student's training and culture be."[15]

In the passage which follows in the *Second Inaugural* he is evidently setting forth in advance what is to be the principle of the Honours course, which builds upon the taste for literature already achieved, and fosters it, by wide reading and an adequate historical approach:

> But our University studies must not stop here. This is merely the first, though the most important and most difficult, stage. When we have read a book with interest, when it has been a source of keen enjoyment and stimulus, when it has widened our horizon, we then naturally wish to know something of its author and the circumstances of its production. This indeed, as I explained at the opening, is a necessary factor in the complete understanding of a book. We are thus led from the study of single works to the study of writers, —from books to men. But again, we find it not sufficient merely to master a man's collective writings and the details of his life. To complete our understanding of the work, or our conception of the writer, we must know something of the intellectual atmosphere which surrounded him, of the currents of thought, and of the spirit of his time.[16] In doing this, we pass from the study of the individual writer to the study of the period in which he lived—to the history of literature. Arrived at this stage, we find that books and authors possessing but little in themselves to merit our attention have now, as links in the chain of literary development, a new interest and importance through their influence upon greater writers and through the insight which they afford into the current thought of the age. Thus, starting from single authors, with a desire of fully understanding their works, and of forming a complete and true likeness of them as men, we find a new conception and a new aim dawning upon us—the conception of the solidarity of literature, the aim of forming a complete image of the thought of an age in all its manifold relations. . . . But this picture is still incomplete unless we follow backward and forward the lines of development and see the passing phenomena in their relation to their antecedents and their results. We thus arrive at our final task . . . of tracing out and imaging the development of national thought from the time when it first emerges from the obscurity of an illiterate and prehistoric past to its culmination in the multitudinous streams of literary activity amidst which we ourselves live.[17]

The ideal of the Toronto honours course in English, with its firm foundation in the study of masterpieces, and its extensive application of historical method, has never been better stated; nor is it likely to be.

Professor Alexander's tastes were catholic. He had a lively interest in the literature of thought and opinion. When he was a student at University College, London, the great Victorian critics, the true *philosophes* of English letters, were household names: Carlyle and Ruskin and Newman, T. H. Huxley and Matthew Arnold, and (above all) John Stuart Mill. He read them eagerly, and when he came to establish the honours course at Toronto he made for them a conspicuous place, which they still hold. Creative

[15] *Ibid.*, xxii.

[16] Cf. *ibid.*, ix-x, where he deals with the matter in relation to Herodotus: "To answer this question the student betakes himself to the study of Greek history and Greek modes of thought: and until he has thrown himself into Hellenic life of the fifth century and grasped Herodotus' relation to the civilization of his time he will not have attained the aim of literary study, the reproduction in one's self of the writer's state of mind."

[17] *Second Inaugural*, xxii-xxiii.

literature he valued as offering vicarious experience of life: "Literature not merely affords information and sets us thinking; it also enables us, in a measure, to live through an experience."[18] As a lad in the restricted environment which was Ontario of the 1860's, he read the great novelists and they opened for him windows upon the world. "Falsity," he said, "is neither a necessary characteristic of fiction nor a consequence of the unreality of the persons and events. . . . Indeed I know not if the sum total of truth contained in English fiction be not greater than the sum total of truth contained in English history."[19] This aspect of fiction, and of much poetry, he never failed to emphasize, or (on a different level) the power of poetry to give entrance to the inward experience, emotional and spiritual, of gifted individuals. His reading of literature in close relation to life implied no neglect of its more purely aesthetic qualities and values. In nothing had poetry served him better from his earliest days than as a high-road into the world of art. It is again of his own early experience that he is thinking when he writes:

> Our surroundings and education are wont to leave neglected the aesthetic side of our nature, and except in literature we have scarcely any means for its cultivation. In this land the young and ardent spirit cannot find food for ideal inspiration in the masterpieces of Phidias or of Praxiteles, of Raphael or of Titian. Our college towns are not Oxfords; nor can we feel the serene and majestic calm which clings about the cathedrals of England and Normandy or the towers and basilicas of Tuscany. . . . The more need then, in the dearth of other means of aesthetic culture, that we should have recourse to literature, which is fortunately at once the widest, most efficient and most easily appreciated of artistic forces.[20]

Only, he refused to dissever form from content, or emotion from idea, having in measure anticipated in his own thinking Bradley and Croce on this subject:

> Form and thought are, indeed, considered apart for purposes of convenience; but they cannot in reality be separated. Expression must be the expression of something: thought is not thought till it takes form in the mind. At any rate, while the substantial drift of a poem might be conveyed otherwise,—in prose, for example,—the emotional accompaniment can be accurately rendered in no other way than that which the poet adopts. Change stanza, imagery, vocabulary, and you introduce a new emotional atmosphere. It may possibly be as good; in any case it is different. The student should therefore rid himself of the idea that form is a trivial thing in poetry; that prose might adequately express what is embodied in a poem. . . . The more perfect and the higher is the poetry, the more inseparably and organically are thought and form interwoven.[21]

In poetry his taste was formed upon the great tradition, the main line of development, European and English, from Homer to Tennyson: Homer and Virgil, the Greek tragedians and pastoralists (with the *Poetics* to expound the nature of poetry); Shakespeare, like Homer, a world in himself; Spenser and Milton; the interlude of Neo-classicism, French and English; the great Romantic revival, with its fresh impulse in criticism, seen in Coleridge and Goethe, whereby the *Poetics* might be supplemented

[18] "Study of Literature" (1898), xiv. [19] *Second Inaugural*, xv.
[20] *Ibid.*, xviii. [21] "Poetry: Its Thought and Form" (1896), x-xi.

and Shakespeare and Milton be seen in their full majesty, and with its yet more important impulse of creation, commencing in Wordsworth and drawing to its final close, as he recognized, its power spent, in Tennyson;[22] finally the new poetry—it was still the new poetry in his early days—of Browning. I encountered the other day two or three sentences in one of our contemporaries, of no particular authority but marked good sense, which seemed to me to express Professor Alexander's attitude:

> The main current of English verse, I suggest, runs through Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, Dryden, Gray, Wordsworth and Tennyson. It is a European current that has its sources in Greece and Rome and that can profitably be compared with similar streams in Italy and France, from which, indeed, frequent channels have brought to it further width and depth. The poetry of the Metaphysicals is remarkable and rich, a backwater exuberant with rare flowers, and not unconnected with certain little-visited Continental creeks named Gongora and Marini. But to denigrate Milton or Keats for the greater glory of the Metaphysicals seems to me as unnecessary as it is provincial.

This, too, was his sense of the great tradition, and its implications. It constituted a norm by which everything in poetry was judged, even the individual figures in the tradition itself. Thus he was able to profit to the full by the liberalizing tendency of Romanticism without acquiescing in its sentimentality and extravagance or sacrificing his genuine classicism. At only one point, as it seems to me, did his sense of the tradition momentarily fail him, when he accepted too readily and fully the estimate offered by the Romantics (Byron excepted) of Pope and the poets of the Neoclassical school: it is not an entirely false estimate, and just because it was entertained by the Romantics it is helpful in tracing the course of their reaction, a purpose for which Professor Alexander frequently used it, but as a view of Pope and his school it is incomplete, one-sided and inadequate.

* * * * *

Much of Professor Alexander's published criticism is hidden away in the *Select Poems* prepared for the matriculation examinations. As the prescription was altered, he brought different poets under review in admirable accounts (designed primarily for the teachers) of their lives and general characteristics. These are critical essays of a range and quality very seldom found in introductions to school texts, embodying as they do many of the ideas which he was in the habit of presenting to his university classes. The form was in some degree controlled by the purpose for which they were written; but it was not felt to be a restraint, and was voluntarily assumed in his larger edition of the *Poems of Shelley*. There he explains the purpose of the biographical sketch, in words which *mutatis mutandis* may be applied to his treatments of the other poets:

> It is difficult to characterize him without overstating or overlooking essential qualities; hence the complex impression of his personality is best rendered directly from a record of his life. Such a record should be written rather from the point of view of Shelley himself than from that of a moralizing critic. . . . The selection [of biographical data] is de-

[22] Cf. his "General Characteristics" of Tennyson in *Select Poems* (1904), especially 102-3.

termined not by the absolute importance of the facts chosen, but by their effectiveness in producing an impression of Shelley's character, and especially of those sides of it which most influenced his poetic work.[23]

Thus the biographical sketch becomes an essay in characterization and an essential part of the critical estimate, leading on naturally to the section on General Characteristics, which is an effort to isolate the essential qualities of the poetry. In this he seems to me very often successful beyond almost any other critic that I know, with his true and vivid impression of what the poetry is actually like, his unfailing realism, tempered by sympathy, his ability to phrase with complete precision the powers and limitations which he discovers and to suggest their cause. Among his biographical studies that of Cowper is a model of insight and tact: it assigns just the right proportion of emphasis to the domestic felicities and the play of Cowper's humour about them (illustrated by the obvious, which are also the indispensable, quotations from "the best letter-writer in English literature") and to the haunting spectres that lay in wait for him all around the charmed circle and at intervals crowded in to seize their victim.[24] Not less revealing is his essay on Gray,[25] which succeeds in isolating the tone and temper of his life, and explaining the tenuity of his poetic utterance, more adequately than Arnold's famous "he never spoke out." These, however, with the essay on Goldsmith,[26] are in a sense preliminary studies: it is in his treatment of the Romantics, and of Tennyson and Browning, that his full powers as a critic appear. With some of them he felt more natural sympathy than with others. Wordsworth's profundity coupled with simplicity, and his preoccupation with the ethical in a large sense, struck in him an answering chord.[27] For Scott the man he felt a warm admiration, and he certainly did not underestimate the writer whose work lacked these Wordsworthian qualities, but had instead a sanity and objectivity that reminded him of Homer. With these two divergent types he found it easy to sympathize. But one of the fruits of literary study, he said, was not only tolerance but the development of an active sympathy (understanding meant a degree of sympathy) for points of view very different from one's own.[28] His essay on Shelley is wholly free from the censoriousness of Arnold's, but equally it avoids every temptation to heroize Shelley or to minimize the interval between his benevolent intentions and the devastating conduct to which they gave rise; and it explains him far more fully than the theory of "the beautiful and ineffectual angel." Repeatedly what one admires most in Professor Alexander is the blend of sympathetic insight and uncompromising realism. With Coleridge's addiction to mystical philosophy and the curious lore of old naturalists, visionary moralists and popular legends, his sympa-

[23] *Select Poems of Shelley*, xii.

[24] *Select Poems* (1898), 166-82. The same qualities appear in one of his most extended pieces of biography, "The Love Story of Miss Jane Welsh" (*University Magazine*, 1910).

[25] *Select Poems* (1898), 128-46.

[26] *Select Poems* (1897), 109-19.

[27] *Select Poems* (1909), 126-9.

[28] *Second Inaugural*, xii.

thy, one supposes, was not great; but he recognized in these things the stuff with which Coleridge's imagination worked and, when the artistic sense was in full control (as it but rarely was), worked with triumphant success. Byron's morals were even less congenial to him than Shelley's. Cynicism, affectation, what would today be called exhibitionism, were among the weaknesses which he found it most difficult to pardon; yet the essay on Byron brings out perfectly the elements of the poet's true greatness. A later school in the criticism of Keats will think that Professor Alexander emphasizes his sensuousness and aestheticism[29] to the virtual ignoring of the philosophic interest and social sense that were struggling to be born; but he was concerned with the Keats that was, not the Keats that might have been, and it is by no means clear that his kind of over-emphasis (if over-emphasis it be) is more misleading than that of Mr. Middleton Murry and his fellows. No critic was ever less given to conjecture than Professor Alexander or felt less impulse to re-create the poets in his own image.

These observations set down, I cannot do better than quote, as nearly as may be without comment, from two or three of his estimates.[30]

Of Scott he writes:

> Though a literary man, and from childhood a great reader, he was not prone, as bookish people often are, to over-estimate the importance of literature .... Scott mingled with the world, looked upon it and was interested in it, much as the ordinary man; only his horizon was broader, his interest keener, and his sympathy wider. ... He liked what the multitude liked, what appeals to eye and ear,—incidents, persons, the striking and unusual. ... It is this panorama of human life ... with which Homer and the ballad singers delighted their unsophisticated audiences. This is also the theme of Scott's works. They do not chiefly represent the writer's reflections, his feelings or his moods; but they picture the spectacle of life as seen from the outside, with a breadth and vivacity unsurpassed in our literature except by Shakespeare alone. The particular kind of life and character which Scott presents, is determined by his tastes and temperament. The interest in the past was extraordinarily strong in Scott. He was an antiquarian before he thought of being a poet. But he was not a pure antiquarian. He was not stimulated to the study of antiquity merely by the desire of truth. His interest was based on feeling,—on the feeling for kin, for example, so strongly developed in the typical Scotch character, and on the love of country. From the antiquarian he differed in another way,—in a way which showed that he was really first of all a poet. He desired his antiquarian facts, not for their own sake, but as elements out of which his imagination might picturesquely reconstruct the life of past generations. ... When we pass to the examination of Scott's style, we naturally find analogous peculiarities to those presented by his matter. The general effects produced by his workmanship are excellent; but when we examine minutely, when we dwell upon particular passages or lines, we find it somewhat rough and ready. This defect is a much more serious one in poetry than in prose. ... "I am sensible," he himself says, "that if there is anything good about my poetry or prose either, it is a hurried

[29] *Select Poems* (1897), 254-8.

[30] In his lectures he quoted fairly freely from other critics—whenever, indeed, he found one of them making a point he wanted to elaborate—and this habit of the lecture room passed over into his essays; but he never allowed the critics to come between him and the author or work under examination. He was independent in his judgments and taught us to rely finally on our reading of the text and on nothing else.

frankness of composition which pleases soldiers, sailors, and young people of bold and active dispositions." Besides this peculiarity, which is so injurious to his poetry, and scarcely affects his novels, Scott is inferior in his poems because they do not exhibit the full breadth of his genius. Many of his best scenes and characters are of a homely sort which is not fitted for poetic expression. Shakespeare could not have adequately represented Falstaff or Dogberry in a narrative poem. But if Scott's poetry has limitations and defects when compared with the work of his great contempories, or even with his own work in the sphere of prose, it possesses rare and conspicuous merits. . . . "He is the most unselfconscious of our modern poets, perhaps of all our poets; the difference in this respect between him and his friends Byron and Wordsworth is like a difference of centuries. If they give us the inner spirit of modern life, or of nature, enter into our perplexities, or probe our deeper passions, Scott has a dramatic faculty not less delightful and precious. He hence attained eminent success in one of the rarest and most difficult aims of poetry,—sustained vigour, clearness and interest in narration."[31]

And of Byron he writes:

"Some," says Arnold, "of Byron's most crying faults as a man,—his vulgarity, his affectation—are really akin to the faults of commonness, of want of art in his workmanship as a poet. . . ." He lacked the patience and self-discipline, he lacked the single-minded devotion to art without thought of self, requisite for the production of perfect works of art. . . . "I can never recast anything," he says. "I am like the tiger, if I miss my first spring I go grumbling back to my jungle." He wrote to relieve himself, or impress the public, not to produce something perfectly beautiful. He falls beneath Scott in the broader technical excellencies of structure, unity, development, etc. His poems consist of passages of greater or less excellence, strung together without much connection or plan. Yet there is a force and variety in Byron's works which carries us along, so that in such poems as *Childe Harold* and *Don Juan* we scarcely note this lack. Here, indeed, we come upon the qualities that give Byron's verse its permanent place in literature. Two critics as different as Swinburne and Matthew Arnold agree in according to his poetry "the splendid and imperishable excellence which covers all his offences and outweighs all his defects: *the excellence of sincerity and strength.*" To be sure, as has been said already, he was often affected, hence neither sincere or strong; but when at his best,—when his emotion really mastered him, "then at last came forth into light that true and puissant personality, with its direct strokes, its ever-welling force, its satire, its energy, and its agony." There is a fascination to the reader in the mere sense of the power and ease with which the poet handles the language; even when his expression is imperfect, it is marked by perfect fluency and extemporaneousness. This force and impetuosity of his character drew him into sympathy with the mighty aspects of things: mountains and the ocean, the roar of the elements, tempest and shipwreck and battles, are the spheres of description in which he most excels. It is not, however, in his uniformly serious poems that the full compass of Byron's genius is manifest. In actual life he was by no means always plunged in gloom. He was fond of the world and its pleasures, of society and clubs and gossip. . . . But he possessed qualities which enabled him to see through, and in some measure despise, the pettiness and superficiality of society; the treatment which society accorded him quickened this insight, and he had a rare gift of courage; hence he is a great satirist. It is therefore in such a poem as *Don Juan*, which, however objectionable its moral tone, exhibits the whole breadth of his genius, that Byron is at his best. There he passes lightly from grave to gay, from sentiment to satire; there he can reveal all his dearly bought knowledge of the world, all the store of natural imagery with which his journeyings to and fro had furnished him; above all, he throws aside his affectations and speaks with absolute

[31] *Select Poems* (1897), 182-6. I have corrected one misprint. The concluding quotation is from R. H. Hutton. Here, and in the remaining quotations, because of the necessity of omissions, I have suppressed the division into paragraphs.

sincerity. There even his lack of metrical finish, his indifference to minutiae, his careless abandon, his impetuous ease, are in harmony with his changeful theme and add to, instead of detracting from, the general effect.[32]

These two extracts will sufficiently illustrate Professor Alexander's general critical method, and his extraordinary success in isolating the essential quality of an author and his work. The next will illustrate his manner in dealing with a special critical problem, and also his unfailing realism. On Shelley's religion, about which there has been so much loose talk, he goes straight to the heart of the matter. That the poet came to take a more friendly view of the personality of Jesus, and to contrast his utterances with the conduct of the Church, that he passed from materialism to a kind of idealism, does not mean that he was by nature religious or ever became anything remotely resembling a Christian.

Shelley was, indeed, naturally non-religious. The two fundamental religious emotions, the feelings of awe and reverence and the feeling of sin, he almost entirely lacked. There was no holy ground for him. . . . And . . . acting, as he uniformly did, on impulse, he knew little of the conflict between the natural man and the higher law, which begets in spirits such as Paul or Bunyan the sense of personal unworthiness, the need of dependence on some higher power. Hence Shelley easily adopted atheism in his college days; and later, when his nature mellowed, he never felt the need, in the emotional sphere, of an infinite being to love and reverence, any more than in the intellectual sphere he perceived any necessity for some central personal force to account for the phenomena of the universe. The sense of personality was extraordinarily weak in Shelley. . . . Accordingly, personality and will, and even mind, were rejected in [his] earlier philosophy, enunciated in the text and notes of *Queen Mab*. There he appears as a believer in crude materialism. . . . As he grew maturer, this most unpoetical of philosophical systems was abandoned; from a materialist he became a kind of idealist. . . . He now admitted the existence of mind: not, however, of individual minds, but of mind in general, of universal mind—whatever that may mean. . . . In his *Essay on Life* . . . he writes: "Let us recollect our sensations as children. . . . We less habitually distinguished all that we saw and felt, from ourselves. They seemed, as it were, to constitute one mass. There are some persons who, in this respect, are always children. Those who are subject to the state called reverie feel as if their nature were dissolved into the surrounding universe or as if the surrounding universe were absorbed into their being. They are conscious of no distinctions. And these are states which precede or accompany or follow an unusually intense and vivid apprehension of life. . . . The view of life presented by the most refined deductions of intellectual philosophy is that of unity. Nothing exists but as it is perceived. The difference is merely nominal between those two classes of thought which are vulgarly distinguished by the names of ideas and external objects. Pursuing the same thread of reasoning, the existence of individual minds is likewise found to be a delusion. The words *I, you, they* are not signs of any actual difference subsisting between the assemblage of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks employed to divide the different modifications of the one mind . . . ." These ideas are mainly negative; but to them Shelley added a positive conception derived from Plato, viz.: that these sensations with which alone we are acquainted in this world are imperfect shadows of a higher world . . . where exist in perfection the archetypes of all we dimly perceive here. He did not bring this conception into logical connection with his other theories. . . . He was brought to it by his persistent discontent with the actual and by his yearning for ideals that would completely satisfy the cravings of his nature. . . . One of these archetypes plays a very important role in Shelley's poetry—the archetype of beauty. About this conception some of those feelings cluster which, in the

[32] *Select Poems* (1897), 205-6.

> case of the majority of men, connect themselves with the idea of a personal God. . . . As the desire for the ideal,—in other words, beauty,—was his strongest motive, so he sometimes conceives this beauty as the moving force of the universe,—the ultimate spirit which works toward good in the mind of man and in the external world. This is Shelley's nearest approach to the conception of the divine, and it receives its most adequate poetic expression in the *Adonais*. But, though there spoken of as a "spirit", it is a spirit without personal attributes, a blind power which impels all that is highest and best in the world.[33]

In addition to the main problem solved, there is implicit in the passage quoted a sense of most of the distinctive marks of Shelley's poetry—its unconcern with the actual save as a source of pain and disillusion, its addition of fervour to philosophic idea, its treatment of nature; and the essential quality of the poetry is, of course, the chief concern of this, one of the most illuminating essays on Shelley ever written.

In Professor Alexander's printed criticism there are too few examples of the detailed discussion of individual poems, or groups of poems, which was a special feature of his instruction. One recalls, for example, a comparison of Shelley's *Skylark*, Keats's *Nightingale* and Wordsworth's *Green Linnet* and *Skylark*, which brought home to his students like a revelation the qualities and differences of the three poets. This, like so much else in his teaching, did its work upon us, but is a fading memory, which cannot now be verified and refreshed. His exposition of the *Ancient Mariner*, however, has received the permanence of print.[34] Undertaken before the exhaustive researches into the origin of the poem, it nevertheless contains everything necessary for its appreciation. The difficulty in the way of that appreciation is testified by the objections of Southey on the poem's first appearance and of others since, "sometimes because of its alleged lack of truth and good sense, sometimes because of its incoherence, sometimes for its want of moral significance, sometimes, on the contrary, because its imaginative excellence has been sacrificed to moral sentiments." These objections are irrelevant because, properly understood, "the *Ancient Mariner* appeals so exclusively to the aesthetic sense, and so little to the intellect and to normal human sympathies" to which a great deal of literature, even poetry, addresses itself. It is a work of pure art, wrought upon a theme which has no more to do with reality than a fairy-tale. Such themes make their primary appeal to the feeling of wonder and the taste for the marvellous. They were everywhere in the minor literature of Coleridge's day, but he knew how to turn them to the purposes of the highest art, just as Gray in the *Elegy* produced the one masterpiece of the graveyard school. For his task Coleridge was peculiarly fitted by temperament and interests: his "dreaminess and

[33] *Select Poems of Shelley* (1898), lxxix-lxxxiii.

[34] *Select Poems* (1909), v-xiv. Some indication of his mode of dealing with individual poems in class can also be got from his *Introduction to Browning*, the notes of *Select Poems* (1908: Browning), the brief analyses of Keats's *Eve of St. Agnes* (*Select Poems*, 1897, 257-8) and Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound* (*Poems of Shelley*, 314-19), and from the essays on Scott's *Lady of the Lake* in *Select Poems* (1899), and *The Lay of the Last Minstrel* (1902).

visionariness, . . . the love of mysticism which is manifest even in his philosophy, his confessed taste for 'all the strange phantoms that ever possessed your philosophy dreamers', and his 'odd and out-of-the-way reading in the old-fashioned literature of the marvellous . . . like Purchas's *Pilgrims*, early voyages like Hakluyt's, old naturalists and visionary moralists like Burnet.' " Then Coleridge was a psychologist: he well knew that if the theme which he essayed was to take the requisite hold on the mind of the reader, a fundamental truth to human nature must be preserved and the emotions be such "as would naturally accompany the situations . . . , supposing them to be real"; and he knew how to compass this end. "But, after all, it is not so much Coleridge the psychologist, or Coleridge the student of quaint and bygone literature, or even Coleridge the dreamer, as Coleridge the artist of the beautiful, that does most for the success of the poem. . . . The ultimate secret of the impression produced . . . is that every one of these components serves to intensify the others; it is the perfect unity of conception and execution." The setting in a past remote but vague, reinforced by the adaptation of the ballad form and the quaint printed gloss, the interposition between poet and reader, not only of the haunted narrator, but the reluctant auditor on whose pulses, as it were, the story first proves itself and so on ours, the description of those distant and awe-compelling scenes in which the drama is enacted: all these contribute to the one cumulative effect. "Even the moral, of which Coleridge thought there might be too much, and which many critics find inadequate or unsatisfactory, is merely a chord in this imaginative symphony," whose effect is "to give a sense of repose and homeliness in which we may rest after the weirdness and excitement of the voyage." And in lectures, if memory serves me, he used to add, what is certainly in harmony with this exposition and perhaps required to complete it, the significance of "kirk and hill and lighthouse top," the landmarks of the homely world, which figure at the beginning and end of the story, with the wide sweep out into the terrors of the unknown intervening between the two references and framed, as one may say, by them. They are the same landmarks (seen now in reverse order), but they are viewed with other eyes, and through the kirk they are linked directly with the moral whose ethical adequacy may indeed be questioned, but whose aesthetic office no percipient reader can doubt.

The emphasis upon imaginative unity expressing itself in aesthetic pattern is characteristic. From the great critics of the Romantic era, Coleridge among the rest, Professor Alexander had learned, not to abandon the canons of criticism derived from Aristotle, but to interpret them in the light of modern literature, and to extend the concept of unity to unity of effect. This deeply coloured his reading of Shakespeare, of which unfortunately only two records survive: a lecture on the unity of *As You Like It* and an essay on "The Mystery of Hamlet." The former[35] serves to recall

[35] "*As You Like It* and Dramatic Unity" (*Proceedings of the Ontario Educational Association*, 1903, 155-64).

his graduate course on the Comedies of Shakespeare, where his expositions seemed to us superior to all the criticism we were reading. He begins (as he did in the course) by an examination of the nature of Shakespeare's romantic comedy in contrast with the comedy of manners and other kinds. Its predominant note, in one way or another, is beauty, and its end, delight. It is compounded of various elements: the main story, with its shadows dispelled in the happy ending, its pair of romantic lovers, and especially its delightful heroine; the subordinate plots (some of them variations on the love theme); the charm of romantic setting, incidental poetry, music and song; the wit, which time can rob of its point, but not of its gay vivacity; the humour of the characters of common earth introduced into this scene. But of these elements Shakespeare, in each of the great comedies, produces a work marked by imaginative unity—unity of effect, and this is the key to an understanding of the play. In *As You Like It* the note of *idyllic* beauty, struck in the scenes in Arden, dominates the whole, and in harmony with it the other elements are compounded, as we can see by an analysis of the play, and confirm by a study of what Shakespeare took from Lodge's *Rosalynde*, what he rejected, and how he heightened and supplemented his borrowings. The great merit of such criticism—of all Professor Alexander's criticism—is its single-minded effort to bring out the essential quality of the work under examination. To this purpose all his learning and all his powers both of analysis and generalization were directed.

In the essay on the character of Hamlet[36] he examines and rejects the theory of "external difficulty," which was coming to dominate American criticism, ranges himself with the great exponents of "internal difficulty," Goethe, Coleridge and Bradley, but with an important reservation, and disposes in advance of the theory that *Hamlet* is defective as a work of art because the character is not finally explicable. The "objective" view is negatived by the text of Hamlet's speeches. The "subjective," especially as formulated by Bradley, squares with much in the text and offers a far more acceptable explanation. But it cannot be a complete explanation and, if adopted as such, would imply a radical misapprehension, not of the creative process in general (for many artists work from idea to character), but of that process in Shakespeare. He, it is evident, worked from *story* to character. Reading the Hamlet story, Shakespeare asked himself (with what degree of consciousness, we do not know) what sort of persons would act as did the figures in this imperfectly motivated fable. The answer which gradually took shape in his mind was—the characters of his own play, and pre-eminently the character of Hamlet. Only the character which springs from an idea can be fully explained (and in being explained exhausted) by an idea. This is the limitation of the "internal difficulty" theory, which nevertheless, in so far as it is faithful to the text and illuminates it, has much to teach us.

[36] "The Mystery of Hamlet" (*University Magazine*, 1907, 457-72). This is a review of the translation of Karl Werder's *The Heart of Hamlet's Mystery*.

No account of Professor Alexander's criticism can omit his treatment of Tennyson and, above all, Browning, the two greatest names among his elder contemporaries, of whose contrasting genius he was keenly aware. On Tennyson, already to all appearance a classic, he set a high value, but with a full consciousness that his thought, so perfectly attuned to his age, might make for immediate popularity rather than lasting reputation, and that his self-conscious artistry marked the end of the old, not the beginning of any new, movement in poetry.[37] In Browning he found far more to challenge his mind and his independent critical judgment, meeting him as we today might meet Eliot (little as the worshippers will relish the comparison). In the exposition of Browning, who was late coming into his own with the reading public, though already suffering a dubious deification by the Browning societies, he did an important pioneer work. The *Introduction to the Poetry of Robert Browning* (written in 1886) is still a valuable and stimulating book. When it appeared, in 1889, it was among the very best criticisms of the poet in existence, not inferior to the essays by Edward Dowden and R. H. Hutton (to which it acknowledges a debt) and superior to Corson's *Introduction* (of which, save as regards *My Last Duchess*, it is quite independent). The opening chapter on "General Characteristics," which seeks to isolate the special quality of Browning's genius, is closely tied to the exposition of *My Last Duchess* and three briefer poems, which are printed in full and analysed. The same method is followed in the three succeeding chapters: "Browning's Philosophy" (with an exposition of *Cleon*); "Christianity as Presented in Browning's Works" (the *Epistle* and *Death in the Desert*); "Browning's Theory of Art" (*Andrea del Sarto*); there are, of course, quotations from other poems, for example, in this last chapter, from *Fra Lippo Lippi* and *Old Pictures in Florence*. The second half of the book presents a rapid survey of Browning's poetic career, pausing only to give a detailed analysis (without quotation) of *Sordello*, and to quote in full and expound *The Bishop Orders his Tomb*. The approximation to the method of the class room is characteristic, and nothing in the *Introduction* was more valuable or wears better than the sensitive and penetrating analyses of the individual poems. The account of Browning's thought, which gets more weight here than in Professor Alexander's later criticism, has never been superseded. It remains true, however, that when the *Introduction* was written, Browning had not yet slipped back into perspective; and on the whole the estimate given of him twenty years later, in *Select Poems* for 1908, seems to me superior, and is certainly closer to his lectures as I recall them.

In this little volume—it is the last of my quotations—he writes:

> Browning holds a somewhat isolated position in the development of poetry; he was a man of marked originality and independence, and thought and wrote as seemed good to him, with less regard than usual for the traditions of his art. . . . His poems . . . cover a wide range of subjects, . . . present thoughts and a point of view novel and sometimes foreign

[37] *Select Poems* (1904), 101-22.

to ordinary ways of thinking, and contain an unusual number of idiosyncrasies in form and expression. . . . The literary and artistic temperament is prone to have a morbid side; but Browning was endowed with an organization eminently wholesome and well-balanced. He had a strong will, a full and varied emotional nature, an active and subtle intellect, keen and observant senses. Thus equipped, he entered into life with zest and energy . . . :

> How good is man's life, the mere living! How fit to employ
> All the heart and the soul and the senses forever in joy. . . .

He welcomed whatever called for the energies of man,—whatever challenged effort and compelled struggle. He was ardent, buoyant, confident, an inveterate optimist. Discouragement and repining were alien to his spirit. . . . In harmony with this temperament are his fundamental beliefs as to the meaning and purpose of the universe. This present existence of ours with the obstacles which it is ever placing in the way of the spirit's highest aspirations—this unremitting war of the will against the members—has its purpose and explanation in the development of the soul. That purpose is best attained by the strenuous and ardent pursuit of those unattainable ideals that hover before us, and are, by the very fact that they transcend man's powers, a pledge of his kinship with the infinite and the divine. . . . Evil and pain are needful hindrances, by struggle against which the soul may grow and gather strength. . . . The next world will be but another stage in progress, where the soul, strengthened and developed by the discipline of earth, may enter upon new struggles with novel difficulties and limitations, in order to attain a higher plane of existence. . . . To measure life in any other terms than of soul-development is therefore absurd. Success depends on the loftiness of the ideal and the strenuousness of the struggle, not on the attainment of external results. The man who fails is he who . . . shirks the discipline, sinks into indifference or is content like Andrea del Sarto with lower and attainable achievement. Based upon such a philosophy, and the outcome of such a temperament, it is not wonderful that Browning's poetry is eminently tonic; that the reader, coming perhaps from the brooding pessimism, the hopeless doubt, the depressing materialism, the cloying sensuousness, of so much of the verse of the closing half of the Victorian era, feels in the poetry of Browning a bracing and stimulating atmosphere like the keen breezes from the salt ocean or the open prairie. . . . In his form and style, there are effects analogous to these peculiarities of temperament and thought. . . . [His] roughness and obscurity arise, in part at least, from the alertness of the poet's mind, from his love for striking, energetic effects. He passes from thought to thought so swiftly as to disregard the intervening links, and his reader, less ready of apprehension, may feel the shock of disconnectedness. . . . His style is full of contrasts, of swift transitions, of abrupt changes of emphasis, of startling imagery. . . . His versification is broken, animated, dramatic. . . . Readers of recent English poetry are accustomed to the flawlessly harmonious expression of some dominant mood . . . to which the poet wholly surrenders himself. Such complete sinking of himself in mere feeling is not usual in Browning. He himself is always there, watching (as it were) the mood—alert, keenly observant, probing his theme, not possessed by, but possessing it. So that the purely lyrical attitude, which is usually the poetic condition productive of the smoothest and most harmonious verse, is not common in Browning's work. Most of his lyrics fully justify the name he gives them: they are *dramatic* lyrics. This does not signify merely that they voice the sentiments of another than the writer, "are so many utterances of so many imaginary persons, not mine." They are not the expression of a general typical feeling, but of [a] very definite imaginary personage in a certain definite situation. . . . They reveal a personality, a situation, quite as much as a sentiment or emotion. . . . The dramatic quality, which pervades even Browning's lyrics, is . . . one of the most distinctive and important characteristics of [his] work as compared with the great bulk of nineteenth-century poetry. It presents neither the feelings and inner life of the poet himself . . . nor material nature and scenery . . . nor the world of myth and fancy . . . , but realistic pictures of men and women as they actually are or have been. In later generations this sort of work has been done in novels, and not to any great extent in poetry. But Browning depicts men and women with a breadth, profundity and skill

unparalleled in poetry since the days of Shakespeare. He is, however, quite unlike Shakespeare in his point of view and method. . . . "My stress lay on the incidents in the development of the soul," he said in his preface to *Sordello;* "little else is worth study." . . . The best form for evolving this inner life, the secret of character, Browning gradually learned to be the dramatic monologue. . . . His preference is for the striking, subtle and significant in life and character . . . [and] for personages and situations that involve some conflict of motive, some subtle phase of character, some debatable problem in conduct, especially some illustration of those principles which Browning holds to be fundamental. In these abstract questions Browning has an interest unusual among poets. . . . He loves to give play to his subtle intellect in argument, which is sometimes sophistical. He likes to state a difficulty from every side. So his volumes are full of poems which not only delineate human nature but discuss or throw light upon some abstract problem. These may be problems of man's relation to the universe, of conduct, or even of aesthetics . . . . [He] shared in that power which received so vast a development in the nineteenth century, . . . of seeing and understanding past historical conditions . . . . Yet he lacks Tennyson's political sense, his interest in the race . . . , in communities . . . . With him the individual dominates, and the development to which he looks forward is not the development of mankind—the frequent topic of Tennyson's earlier enthusiasm—but the development of the soul in other worlds than this. Here, as in so many other ideas, Browning holds the characteristically Christian point of view. Again, he does not share the enthusiasm of Tennyson and of his own generation in regard to the progress of science, though in method his work shows the influence of the scientific spirit . . . .[38]

This must have been written about 1906. Twenty years on again, in "Browning Once More,"[39] he sees no reason greatly to modify his judgment, though he is inclined to regard Browning's thought, on which he had laid great stress forty years before, as the perishable element in his work, and his power of characterization as, what indeed he had always maintained it to be, his unique and imperishable virtue. By this time the critic found himself in a world much altered, in which the classics were being forgotten, the Romantics belittled and the Victorians reviled. He could not accept the standards of the new generation, though he felt some sympathy for its free and inquiring spirit and gave full weight to the political and economic causes of its disillusion and discontent. Even in old age the mind which had accepted Browning and provided so full and just an appreciation of him, did not readily reject the new simply because it was new and different. Indeed, he always wished to estimate authors on their merits—he had become, for example, an enthusiastic exponent of Shaw—and to modify his judgments where necessary. He read Mr. Stoll's Shakespeare criticism with interest and confessed that there was much in his point of view. He came to think that in his own treatment of poetry he had laid too much stress on emotion, and he deplored the narrowing down of the idea of subjectivity till it reduced poetry to an impassioned diary of the poet's

[38] *Select Poems* (1908), 140-8. One omission I regret, perhaps the best brief account ever given of the dramatic monologue as Browning shapes and uses it. This criticism is, of course, keyed to the poems prescribed. The notes (especially to *My Last Duchess, Andrea del Sarto* and *An Epistle*) represent, even better than the *Introduction to Browning*, Professor Alexander's mode of dealing with the poems in his lectures.

[39] *Dalhousie Review*, 1926, 451-64.

personal experiences and reactions.[40] He had lived long enough to see a revolution in poetry and criticism, the counterpart in some degree, and even the outcome, of a revolution in individual and social values; and the historical observer in him viewed it with keen interest, as was evident in his last public lecture at University College, delivered in 1926, "Traditional and Contemporary Poetry."[41] The title is significant. The marks of the great tradition, which had inspired and controlled the utterance of the Victorians, even of Browning, had been: an effort—say rather, an instinct—for the creation of beauty in the common acceptance of the term; a sense of the worth of human life, of "love and man's unconquerable mind"; a concern for intelligibility, for the communication of thought and feeling to the ordinary reader. This was the tradition against which, particularly in its Victorian manifestations, the new poets were in revolt, as he illustrated from their poems and pronouncements. How was the revolt to be explained? No single reason would suffice. Something was to be attributed to the outworkings of scientific naturalism, whose impact the Victorians indeed had felt but without its sensibly altering the form of their expression; something to later developments of this naturalism, and notably the psychology of the sub-conscious; something, no doubt, to the decay, towards its close, of the great poetic impulse of the nineteenth century, of which he had himself been fully aware; something, to youth's impatient reaction against its predecessors, a phenomenon witnessed before in literary history, but never (it would appear) to quite the same extent, never to the point of calling in question virtually the whole poetry of the past. So sweeping a reaction was not to be accounted for in merely intellectual terms or (though it extended in measure to the other arts) in merely aesthetic. It sprang in its extravagance from a profound malaise, from the discontent and disillusion of a whole generation whose portion had been the most hideous war in history, followed by the most unsatisfactory peace. Something like this was his diagnosis in 1926. Nor would it have differed essentially at a later date. The limit of his receptiveness to new purposes and new modes of expression had been finally reached with his qualified approval of D. H. Lawrence. By T. S. Eliot and his followers he was in the main repelled. Despite his disclaimer, his reading of the poem left no doubt that he understood *The Waste Land*—as his comments left no doubt that he disliked what he found there. As for the new writers of the Left, he would perhaps have felt some sympathy with their politics, but none with their poetry. And he would have asked them and us the question whether, not the Victorian age but all the ages, the great tradition, the whole majestic sweep of poetry from Homer to Tennyson, could really have been wrong about the nature and function of the art.

* * * * *

[40] *Ibid.*, 463.

[41] Forty-five years separates this last lecture from his first, a paper in exposition and defence of Matthew Arnold's "touchstone" method in criticism, read at Johns Hopkins University shortly after *The Study of Poetry* had appeared as the General Introduction of Ward's *English Poets*.

This is, I suppose, a debatable question. What is certain is that within the terms of the great tradition Professor Alexander did his work. He expounded the literature of the past, and especially its poetry, with singular open-mindedness, insight and power; and, so doing, he extended the horizons and enriched the lives of generation after generation of his students. Let one—who, in simple truth, owes him everything—voice the gratitude of them all, as memory travels back to the bleak lecture theatre, the serried ranks, the hushed attention, and the voice we shall hear no more.

CHECK-LIST OF WRITINGS*

(1) Participial periphrases in Attic prose (*American Journal of Philology* IV, 291-308, 1883).

(2) The study of literature [not the same as no. 4, or no. 10]; inaugural address delivered at the Convocation of Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S., Oct. 28th, 1884. 22 pp. Halifax. Nova Scotia Printing Co. n.d.

(3) An introduction to the poetry of Robert Browning. v, 212 pp. Boston. Ginn. 1889.

(4) The study of literature; inaugural lecture delivered in the Convocation Hall, October 12th, 1889. 34 pp. Toronto. Rowsell. 1889. (Also in *Canada Educational Monthly and School Magazine* XI, 337-43, Nov.; 383-90, Dec., 1889.)

(5) Browning's Sordello (*University Quarterly Review* 40-60, Feb., 1890).

(6) English in the high schools (*Canada Educational Monthly and School Magazine* XV, 83-8, March, 1893).

(7) Blank verse (*Ontario Educational Association, Annual Report and Proceedings* XXXIII, 72-9, 1894).

(8) [with M. F. Libby]: Composition from models. 494 pp. Toronto. Copp. 1894.

(9) [ed.] Select poems 1897. xxix, 288 pp. Toronto. Copp. 1896. Introd.: Poetry, its thought and form; selections from, and essays and notes on, Goldsmith and Wordsworth.

(10) [ed.] Select poems 1898. xxii, 294., 27 pp. Toronto. Copp. 1897. Introd.: The study of literature; selections from, and essays and notes on, Gray, Cowper, Wordsworth, Scott, Byron, Shelley, Keats, Tennyson.

(11) [ed.] Select poems 1899. xxii, 364 pp., 28 pp. Toronto. Copp. 1898. Introd.: Metre and its relation to thought; Scott's *Lady of the Lake;* selections from Wordsworth; essays and notes.

(12) [ed.] Select poems of Shelley, edited with introduction and notes. xci, 383 pp. Boston and London. Ginn. 1898.

(13) Graduates' reading-literature (*Ontario Educational Association, Proceedings of the 38th Annual Convention*, 264-72, 1899).

(14) Literature (Methods in teaching. Toronto. Morang. 1899).

(15) [ed.] Tennyson select poems, edited with introduction and notes. xxii, 134., 27 pp. Toronto. Copp. 1900. Introd.: The study of literature [same as no. 10]. (Reissued 1903, 1907, 1909.)

(16) [ed.] An anthology of English poetry for schools. xxiii, 201 pp. Toronto. Copp. 1901. Introd.: The nature and office of poetry.

(17) The beginnings of poetry; review (*University of Toronto Monthly* II, 96-101, Jan., 1901).

(18) English literature in the nineteenth century (*Canada Educational Monthly* XXIII, 127-31, April, 1901). (Also in *Varsity* XX, 183-5, Jan. 15, 1901).

(19) [ed.] Scott's Lay of the last minstrel, edited with introduction and notes. xli, 157 pp. Toronto. Copp. 1901.

*This check-list was prepared by the University of Toronto Library.

(20) The aim and results of Plato's Theaetetus (Studies in honor of Basil Lanneau Gildersleeve. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins Press. 1902. pp. 169-80).

(21) [ed.] Select poems 1903. xiv, 198 pp. Toronto. Copp. 1902. Introd.: The characteristics of the Ancient Mariner; selections from, and essays and notes on, Coleridge and Wordsworth. (Re-issued as Select poems from Coleridge and Wordsworth 1907, 1909.)

(22) "As you like it" and dramatic unity (*Ontario Educational Association, Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Convention*, 155-64, 1903).

(23) Sartor Resartus (*University of Toronto Monthly* III, 149-55, March; 195-204, April, 1903).

(24) [ed.] The University of Toronto and its colleges, 1827-1906. 330 pp. Toronto. The University Library: published by the Librarian. 1906; Gen. ed., and joint auth. of chap. v "The Faculty of Arts" [with R. Ramsay Wright], and chap. vi "University College" [with Maurice Hutton].

(25) A new book about the University; review (*University of Toronto Monthly* VII, 88-9, Feb., 1907).

(26) The mystery of Hamlet; review-article (*University Magazine* VI, 454-72, Dec., 1907).

(27) [ed.] Select poems 1908. xxiv, 195 pp. Toronto. Copp. 1907. Introd.: A lecture on literature [same as no. 4]; selections from, and essays and notes on, Tennyson and Browning.

(28) Tragedie of Abraham's sacrifice; review (*University of Toronto Monthly* VII, 184-5, May, 1907).

(29) Love story of Miss Jane Welsh (*University Magazine* IX, 627-53, Dec., 1910).

(30) [ed.] [with W. H. Clawson]: Representative poetry. [ed. 1.] xi, 498 pp. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 1912 [see below no. 34].

(31) A Scottish "Intermediate grade school" programme (*University of Toronto Monthly* XIV, 91-5, Dec., 1913).

(32) George Shields Stevenson (*University of Toronto Monthly* XV, 273-7, April, 1915).

(33) [ed.] Selections from Coleridge and Tennyson, edited with introduction and notes. xiv, 131 pp. Toronto. Copp. 1915.

(34) [ed.] [with W. H. Clawson]: Representative poetry. ed. 2. ix, 493 pp. (double columns). Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 1916. (Subsequent editions, slightly enlarged, 1920, 1923, 1928.)

(35) Sir Philip Sidney; review (*University of Toronto Monthly* XVI, 289-92, March, 1916).

(36) Graduate participation in University affairs; letter (*University of Toronto Monthly* XXII, 385-6, June, 1922).

(37) The exodus from University College (*University of Toronto Monthly* XXIV, 308-9, April, 1923).

(38) [comp.] Shorter poems. xvii, 510 pp. Toronto. Eaton. 1924.

(39) Browning once more (*Dalhousie Review* VI, 451-64, Jan. 1925).

(40) Memories of school sixty years ago (*The School* XVI, 640-5, March; 754-7, April; XVII, 116-20, Oct.; 223-6, Nov., 1928).

(41) [comp.] Short stories and essays. xii, 435 pp. Toronto. Ryerson Press. 1928. (Re-issued 1931.)

(42) Address (Addresses delivered at a complimentary dinner to Sir Robert Falconer, President, University of Toronto, December 15th, 1931. 31 pp. Toronto. Department of University Extension. n.d. pp. 3-7).

(43) The purpose of "Shorter poems" and its use in class (*The School* XX, 683-91, April, 1932).

THE PERMANENT VALUE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT*

W. R. Taylor

IN the discussion of the topic indicated by the title of this article, I assume that those who read it have a general knowledge of the contents of the Old Testament, and that the immediate interest is to know how this literature is to be viewed or assessed in the midst of the hurly-burly of contemporary thought and attitudes.

We scarcely need to remind ourselves that the Old Testament is, in one sense, an artificial creation. It is the net result of a selective process applied to Hebrew literature over a series of about nine centuries. The work of selection was completed some twenty years after the Romans destroyed Jerusalem. Faced with the dissolution of their nation and the scattering of its people to the four corners of the earth, the Jews had to decide what of their writings should for all time be reckoned as containing the authoritative standard of their faith. The decision was made about 90 A.D. in a council of the elders at Jamnia. As they approached their task, they were conscious that their literature had been suffering a decline in quality and in power for over two centuries. They explained this defect as due to the cessation of Divine inspiration. In fact, they agreed that this inspiration had come to an end by the time of Ezra in the fifth century B.C. So, roughly, no book was admitted to the sacred list unless it could be shown that: first, it had been composed in Hebrew, secondly, it was in accord with their religious laws and thirdly, it was written before the time of Ezra. Decisions as to the dates of certain books were based on poor or even fictitious grounds. An inferior and late book such as Ecclesiastes was admitted because the name of Solomon, associated with it, seemed to guarantee both its earliness and its sanctity, whereas a finer book, such as the Wisdom of Ben Sira, written about the same time as Ecclesiastes, was excluded because it was too frank about itself to be pushed forward over the assumed terminal date, for inspiration. But on the whole, the spiritual instincts of the members of the Council were better than their professed criteria. In spite of their rules, the Old Testament emerged as the monumental creation that history knows it to be.

But many Jews were dissatisfied with the work of the Council. For example, the Jews in Alexandria added several other books to the list adopted in Palestine. This fact explains why the Old Testament of the Roman Church contains more books than the Old Testament of the Protestants. The former follows the Alexandrian tradition, and the latter the Palestinian. In each case, however, the Christians took over a Jewish pronouncement without any re-examination of its soundness or validity. Then, by ca. 200 A.D. the Church added the New Testament to the Old

*This article was written for the centenary of Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918).

and regarded them not as literature but as oracles of God, inspired in every word and letter and inerrant in all matters, religious, historical and scientific. Where statements occurred that jarred on conscience or common sense, resort was had to allegorism in order to explain away the difficulties. This conception of the Scriptures continued down to the time of the Reformation. Finally, under the reformers and their successors, it was raised to a higher pitch of sanctity and became nothing less than bibliolatry. From time to time, first in the seventeenth century and then in the eighteenth century, there were vigorous protests against the dogmatic assumptions of the theologians, but it was left to the nineteenth century to rid the Bible of the incumbrance of false and indefensible assumptions about its nature, and to redefine the grounds of its authority and its claims to permanent worth.

The crisis came scarcely more than seventy-five years ago. At that time religious belief was passing through a serious struggle because of the growing tension between doctrine, on the one hand, and science and philosophy, on the other. The definitions of religious doctrine remained as they had been formulated by men who, in most instances, had lived prior to the work of such scientists as Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and Harvey. But in the nineteenth century the discoveries in the biological and physical sciences by such men as Laplace, Darwin, Lyell and Joule, and the development of the new sciences of anthropology and archaeology had almost within the brief space of a generation effected such a revolution in the knowledge and understanding of the nature of the physical order that it was clear to men of thought that the traditional religious conceptions were obsolescent. And, as the century progressed, men were impatient to free themselves from all that seemed unreal, and trusting in reason, to look at things as they are. In short, a spirit of realism had spread abroad in the world. Such a temper was not without its faults; its faults arose from too great a trust in reason as the solvent of every riddle of existence, but the faults were atoned for by the spirit of courageous and sincere search for truth that dominated it.

To such a situation, the Church in its official creed refused to adjust itself or even to exhibit intelligent sympathy. For the most part it regarded the new intellectual ferment as impious and sacrilegious. Serious men, as they became conscious of the growing gap between what the intellect accepted and what religion affirmed, were driven either to agnosticism or to the search for a new form of faith which would be a substitute for the old, stereotyped orthodoxy. They sought it in some worship of nature, in some deification of man, or by this way or that in some God other than that of the Church. Swinburne gave voice to the spirit of this revolt, when he sang:

> Thou art smitten, thou God, thou art smitten; thy death is upon thee, O Lord.
> And the love-song of earth as thou diest resounds through the wind of her wings—
> Glory to Man in the highest! for Man is the master of things.

And Walt Whitman in America confessed that the keynote of his huma-

nistic poetry was "an attempt to drop in the earth the germ of a greater religion."

It was in this period of growing tension between formal religion and thought that what we call the modern attitude to the Bible came to recognition. This new method of interpreting and evaluating the sacred literature, so far as the Old Testament is concerned, rested on the results of not less than a century of study and research which reached their final form in Julius Wellhausen's *History of Israel* (1878). The impression that this book produced on the minds of his younger contemporaries in the field of Biblical studies was almost irresistible. It was pronounced by the best minds to be "the crowning fight in a long campaign." The validity of his results was not conditioned by any *a priori* conceptions as to the nature and history of the Hebrew religion. In the identification of the various literary strata of the Old Testament, in the arrangement of them in their chronological sequence and in the elucidation of their evidences, Wellhausen was governed by the same objective method which was winning ascendancy in other fields of historical research. Von Ranke (1795-1886) and Mommsen (1817-1903) had already, each in his field, demonstrated the impassive scientific approach and the use of "higher criticism" in the handling of documents for the recovery of a knowledge of past times. It was Wellhausen's role to represent this principle of research in respect to the literary remains of the Hebrews. From time to time we are warned, of course, that we are about to witness a reaction in Old Testament criticism, that it is not what it used to be; (the latest warning has come from a Professor of Anatomy at McGill, Cecil P. Martin, in his recent book, *The Decline of Religion*, a sort of modern *Anatomy of Melancholy*, forsooth!) but the oft-predicted event has never quite come off. It reminds us of a witty saying of Burnand, the editor of *Punch*. When a censorious friend complained, "*Punch* is not as good as it used to be," he made the rejoinder, "It never was."

But at the moment we are not concerned with the course of the later fortunes of the work of Wellhausen, but rather with the service it rendered to faith as the nineteenth century moved on to the twentieth. If, as a certain French writer has declared, "The cure for the disease of scepticism is to remedy the dogmatism of which it is the consequence," then the decline of atheism about the turn of the century, the abatement of the earlier clamorous and arrogant antagonism to a theistic interpretation of life and the world, the disappearance of the Colonel Bob Ingersoll type of literature and lecture, must be attributed to the effects which the new historical approach to the Biblical records had on the dogmatic situation. Just what did this new approach accomplish?

Its supreme service lay in shifting the emphasis from what was secondary to what was primary in scriptural tradition, in subordinating the accidental to the essential. In the process certain things had to go—such as a belief in verbal inspiration and the inerrancy of the Bible in all its parts in science

and history. It affirmed that the Bible is not itself the revelation but rather the record of revelation and, as such, subject to all the limitations and disabilities and varying fortunes of an ancient literature. Such a view of the Old Testament eased immediately the need of a special science of Biblical apologetics; it saved men from trying to live with a bifurcated mind, their intellect in one century and their religion in another. Better still, it corrected the exaggerated transcendentalism of the creeds, against which Edwin Hatch thundered in his famous Hibbert Lectures, by a conception of God as immanent in the world processes. It gave a new significance to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and awakened a new sense of the divine activity in our contemporary life; it opened the eyes to new horizons towards which men of faith could move. The religious mind was brought to perceive that nature and history have significance in the divine economy and that revelation is a progressive operation in history, conditioned at each epoch by the human cofactors. I need not remind the reader that this historical approach to the Old Testament affected directly the study of the New Testament also. It restored to us the Jesus of history and gave Him a more central position than earlier theology had accorded Him as the ultimate criterion of Christian faith and practice. It shifted the emphasis from the Pauline theology back to where it belonged, with consequent modifications in our doctrine of God and of the legalistic or forensic interpretations of the Atonement.

The repercussions of Wellhausen's *Religion of Israel* were vast. They were felt in ever-widening circles, Protestant, Catholic and Jewish. And, outside of the bounds of the several religious groups, the secular literature of the twentieth century also gave abundant proofs that the tension between religion and scientific thought had been relieved.

But within the last twenty-five years there have been some changes in contemporary thought, and new problems have emerged with respect to the Old Testament. Let me say here that men's attitude to the Old Testament is always the touchstone of their theological *niveau*. And we are at the present in danger of losing through wrong attitudes some of the rich heritage of the immediate past. Fallacies long dead have in these days been revived, and new ones have been invented, fulfilling the ancient aphorism,

> Oats, peas, beans and barley grows
> Where you, nor I, nor nobody knows.

Now the most serious menaces to the new spiritual insights gained through historical criticism have arisen from our reactions to the world-shaking events which our generation has witnessed.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, we enjoyed an era of general peace, prosperity and expansive opportunity. We believed that we were in all respects evolving surely and steadily into the golden age. The Kingdom of Heaven, as we understood it, was just around the corner. Every fresh triumph of science and invention seemed to demonstrate the

rationality of the universe and the power of the human mind to enter into and share its purposes. Dewey's pragmatism and Professor William James' studies in psychology were products of this epoch. In fact, whereas the earlier generation had thought of themselves as members of a fallen race—this generation thought of itself as moving upward, self-propelled, towards the mastery of the cosmos. In student circles, it became the fashion to speak of God as an hypothesis tenable so long as a better could not be contrived. The Lord was not for them so much a "dwelling-place in all generations" as a temporary boarding-house. The mood of the times was unbounded optimism in Man. We dub it Humanism. Men spoke loosely of the Throne of God as in the heart of man. Even William James, though he claimed to be a supernaturalist, stooped to say that he thought of God as "a more powerful ally of my own ideals." The Church shared in the mood of the age and set out to transform the world overnight by the social gospel and to evangelize the world "within this generation." It was inevitable in this situation that the newer views of the Old Testament were interpreted humanistically. Through an over-emphasis of the human factor in Prophecy, it was made to appear that God was something passive, "an inert continent waiting to be discovered"; in short, that a noble God was the noblest work of man. Needless to say, that point of view is not inherent in the historical criticism of the Old Testament. Rather, as we shall see, it has proved a menace to the work of criticism.

Now the end of the first Great War was marked by a complete change, a *volte face*, in our view of the world. Instead of the old jaunty air of contentment with ourselves, and the rationality of things, a feeling of the power of fate and of the irrationality of the world-order, a feeling of the power of evil, of the weakness of human reason and design, crept over us and devitalized, where it did not bring to death, the forms of thought in which much of the pre-war culture had had its springs.

This post-war mood manifested itself in various ways. There was first a decade of pessimism and scepticism. The traditional sanctions and morals of society were mocked. In literature, life was depicted as a sort of mad dance like that of gnats in the breeding season: the code of the period was eat, drink and be merry for tomorrow we die; its music was jazz with its raucous dissonances and broken rhythms; its literature D. H. Lawrence and the pupating Aldous Huxley. The pre-war man, who had stood erect and looked into the heavens and considered himself the crown of creation, now sank back into the mud of things and gave up his sanguine cosmology. It was the shock of the apparent discovery that the world had no meaning which accounts for the undertones of disquiet in the clamour of those years.

But man cannot live by negations. This post-war generation, which had made a mad break with religion and morals in a bid for freedom, found that its freedom was false; and then came another wave of disillusionment, produced by the social and political chaos in Europe and the world-wide economic distress. It drove unwilling minds to a new examination of the

human plight. Gradually, a reaction against the regnant assumption of the meaninglessness of existence emerged and crystallized in various ideologies, which are of immediate concern to us. None of them arose spontaneously in the thirties, but each took its inspiration from earlier forms of thought. In essence these structures represent a revival of interest in a mystical view of things. But they diverge widely because of differences as to the type of mysticism severally followed.

The first reaction found expression in a philosophy of the mystical significance of race and blood and soil—a sort of Hegelian immanentism or romantic naturalism. We know the power and the fallacies of this creed. As Aldous Huxley later said, it introduced meaning into the world but "only in patches," national or racial patches. It implied that human society was in retreat to the primitive order of tribalism and racialism.

The second reaction took an opposite direction. It is a form of transcendentalism. It was evoked through a revival of interest in the writings of a hypochondriac Dane, Sören Kierkegaard, who lived in the middle of the nineteenth century. Rudolf Otto's book, *Das Heilige* (1917), had contributed to the Kierkegaard revival, and Karl Barth and his school popularized it through his so-called dialectic theology. The Barthian construction was useful as a corrective of the false immanentism of Humanism. But it corrected one error by committing another. God was defined as the *ganz anderes*, the wholly other. Even von Hügel, the Catholic writer, found religion in a sense of an immense *over-againstness*, of a huge *Other* before which man felt himself to be a nothing. The God whom Jesus had taught men to address as "Our Father" became a transcendent, incomprehensible, awe-ful Lord, a theological abstraction, a τὸ ὄν. Man, therefore, does not think or reason, he submits to what he is commanded, the Word. There is no fellowship with God in this, only a slave-ethic. Calvin was out-Calvined. It was in theology, roughly, the counterpart of the totalitarianism in the political domain. And it belonged to the state of mind of pre-war Europe.

But there is a third reaction. This is an attempt to defend faith in a time of crisis by reaffirming formulas that belong to the past. It falls into two types. The first is Fundamentalism which is a retreat to the authoritarianism of the Reformation. The other is the oecumenical movement, which is a retreat still farther back towards the creeds of the earliest church—in other words, to neo-Platonism, the old Logos philosophy with the menace of Greek dualism at its base. It is a search for unity by a common subscription to something like a Nicene symbol. It springs from a false hope of attaining the unity of the Spirit in the bonds of love along credal lines.

Now the Bible and, particularly, the Old Testament is drawn into the issues raised by these contending points of view, philosophical, political, theological and ecclesiastical. In the first place, the dialectic theology implies that the Old and the New Testaments contain quite the same revelation. There is no difference in principle between them. Emphasis

on the unity of the Old and New Testaments as the common embodiment of "the Word" must lead consequently to emphasis on the identity of the concept of God in the Old and New Testaments. The God-concept of Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Jesus and Paul is the same. It follows, then, that the interpretation of the Bible along literary-historical canons goes by the board. That is the end of all of which the name of Wellhausen is a symbol. It cuts scripture off from the methods of investigation now employed in every other field of historical research and from all the processes of history. That is the menace of Barth and his school.

In the second place, the secular ideologies deliver an assault on the Old Testament from the opposite direction. About twenty-five years ago Friederich Delitzsch, the Assyriologist, published a book entitled, *Die grosse Täuschung* (*The Great Delusion*) and, shortly thereafter, Adolph Harnack released a work on Marcion, the Christian heretic of the second century. Both of these Germans, smarting under the defeat of their country and resentful at the Jews for their alleged complicity in the national humiliation, agreed in general that Marcion had been right when he declared that the God of the Old Testament was other than and inferior to the God of the New Testament and that the Old Testament should form no part of the Christian canon of scripture. The influence of these scholars and the social and historical situation in Germany started a campaign for "Die Abschaffung des Alten Testaments." Though at first we failed to measure its significance, we know now the tragic results of this propaganda in the European scene. It led on to the slaughter of the Jews and it split the Christian body into two sections: the Confessional Christians and the German or Aryan Christians. And, in English-speaking countries, although we have seen no such assaults on the Old Testament, yet it must be confessed that the heresy of Marcion has made no small progress in our churches by the relegation of the Old Testament to disuse and neglect. A glaring instance of this lapse came to my notice within the last month. A British scholar has just published a book on *The Trinity*. He attacks the problem without a single reference to the Old Testament where the roots of the matter lie and he ends in Tritheism, just as we should expect. To such a low estate in theological science have we descended! A lapse to the Dark Ages! In the end "Die Abschaffung des Alten Testaments" whether done by the German or the English or the American way is to deprive our religion of its historical relations. Sunder the New Testament from the Old, and Christianity evaporates into a foggy theosophy or something like the Hegelian concept of a David Strauss or that of the German Christians. Wellhausen calls us back to the shining fact that our religion is an unfolding evolution in time through historical forms. It comes *out of* as well as *into* history.

Having reviewed the struggle of the Old Testament against the menaces of contemporary ideologies, let us see how it fares in the light of new and expanding sciences. When Wellhausen was at work, archaeology and

anthropology were only in their infancy—Palestinian archaeology was only to get on its way twelve years later—and that branch of anthropology, which we designate as Comparative Religion, was still an unborn child of Wellhausen himself (when it did come to birth, he tried to disown it!). Wellhausen's results, therefore, were formulated without any clear knowledge of the cultures of the peoples adjacent to the Hebrews, and for that reason need in certain aspects to be amplified or restated. For example, the perspective within which the Old Testament has to be viewed has been vastly lengthened. Within the last sixty years the frontiers of history have been pushed back more than five thousand years and the frontiers of prehistory five hundred thousand years. The oldest parts of the Old Testament were just coming into existence one thousand years after the literature of Egypt had passed its period of greatest efflorescence. In such circumstances the Old Testament, at first blush, seems to shrink into a very small document in the very long course of human affairs. We ask ourselves, "Can this book have special authority, or can we employ it any longer with authority as 'the sword of the Spirit'?"

The answer to this problem is not far to seek. In the broad field of comparative literature the discoveries of archaeology which, at first, seemed to reduce the level of Old Testament literature to that of neighbouring peoples, has more recently in the light of fuller results and more study reacted in the opposite direction. Professor T. Eric Peet in a comparative study of the hymns of Egypt, Palestine and Babylonia declares that

> when we add together all that Egypt has left us in this kind of writing there is but little to set against the Book of Psalms alone. In no department of literature do the Hebrews more completely outdistance their masters and their competitors than in their hymnody. The world has produced no more spontaneous outburst. Think of the immense quantity of it—of the higher ethical tone, of that consciousness of moral responsibility, of sin and forgiveness; whose total absence is such a remarkable feature of the Egyptian hymns.

And with respect to the Hebrew debt to Babylonian hymnody he writes: "we can assert that they borrowed nothing which they did not improve upon." Further, when through the combined results of archaeology and anthropology we can study the Old Testament on the background of the millennia of human history that antedate it, we see, as never before, that its authority rests not on any of its own claims alone but more broadly, on its genetic relation to the cultural process. It is a phenomenon imbedded not alone in Israel's evolution, but in the evolution of the race. It came into being in an age, when man after a long tutelage was becoming aware of his spiritual nature and sensitive to his spiritual environment. It articulated that for which earlier ages and other peoples could find no clear utterance; it defined religion as the total response of the will within us to the voice of a supreme Moral Will without us. That is the water-shed, the great divide, in the history of culture as of religion. Archaeology and anthropology have therefore served in this respect to stress the riddle of Hebrew history. For excavation has revealed no groups of people in antiquity who seem to have been less equipped in resources, material and

immaterial, to say a word that could outshine and outlive the achievements of their contemporary nations. It is the paradox of history that "out of Zion should come the teaching for the nations; and out of Jerusalem the word of the Eternal."

But archaeology and the sister-sciences have contributed in other respects to our understanding and appreciation of the Old Testament. Hebrew literature, as we see now in a way that Wellhausen could not see, was unique in that it was approaching what we call the "grand manner," that is to say, it had developed other qualities than the mere love of writing or recording facts, and facility of style. The Hebrew author could introduce atmosphere and liveliness into his narratives, and in his poetry he could come close to playing on words and ideas. The Greeks, as early as Homer, surpassed the Near East in this respect, but the Hebrews stand nearer the Greeks than their neighbours in literary art. Their excellence is at its best in depicting a situation with a few, graphic strokes, for example, Zephaniah's picture of the impending desolation of Nineveh:

He will stretch out his hand
    against the north and destroy Assyria.
He will make Nineveh a desolation,
    a waste like the desert;
the flocks shall lie down in the midst of her,
    all the beasts of the wild.
The raven and the buzzard
    shall roost in her capitals;
the owl shall hoot from the window.
    The vulture from the doors
        when I destroy that city.
This is the proud city
    that dwelt so confidently,
that said to itself
    "I am and there is none beside me!"
She is a ruin—
    a lair for the wild beasts!
Everyone that passes by her hisses
    and shakes his fist.

Combined with this literary genius is a notion of history that is without a parallel in ancient literature. The structural idea is that events are not a congeries of isolated incidents but are in a single pattern moving towards ends under the control of Jahweh. In other words, this literature is from its beginning to its end inspired and governed by the invincible belief that history has meaning. The Hebrews, therefore, were the first people in the world to write history. All who preceded them produced only inscriptions of single events or annals.

It is in line with these contributions of comparative literature that a newer type of criticism has made its appearance since Wellhausen's day. The tendency now is to shift the stress from the fine hair-splitting of documentary analysis to a study of the fragments of folk-literature buried in the conglomerate of the larger documents. We call this *Gattung* or form-

criticism. In the Old Testament it is now possible to follow fairly clearly the evolution of a type of poetry from its simplest single-line form in early folklore through various stages and varieties to its highest artistic development, and the development of prophecy from the early brief oracular utterance. In this way it is possible to probe more deeply back into the rich variety of life and thought behind the written page. This means that the Old Testament is now a greatly expanded record of the life and world out of which it came. Through its pages we discern, as with a microscope, stages of culture, stages of song, thought and ritual which Wellhausen's eye had not perceived.

I have been showing that, in spite of the hostility of contemporary ideologies in Church and State, the sober sciences of archaeology, anthropology and comparative religion and literature are steadily demonstrating that the Old Testament is a greater and more unique book than we or our forefathers have ever dreamed it to be. But it is still pertinent to ask whether it is only great as a museum piece. Has it any authority for today?

The answer to this question is another one. What do we mean when we describe a book or a literature as classical? Do we not mean that when we read the *Phaedo* of Plato and follow the discussion on the dimensions of human personality and its logic of immortality, we are witnessing one of the greatest moments in history—man's affirmation of the deathless qualities of his soul, which once made, is in that once made forever. Shaw's clever "Apple-cart" dramas and Housman's threnodies may be literature, but they are not that kind of literature, not the bread of which if a man eats he will never hunger again. And the Old Testament is classical literature. If we view history as a genetic process which cannot be repeated in which there are creative acts of decisive moment, then in this book we see a closed event of history never to be repeated. Religion, as it has been pointed out, is not like the physical sciences and the crafts, the results of which are absorbed and superseded by their successors. Religion is like the arts. Bach and Beethoven are creative spirits. No succeeding musicians absorb, supersede or make them void; they have a timeless significance. So in the words of the prophets and the psalmists, there is something definitive. Religion may advance along many lines, but only on lines that move out from this book. "I came not to destroy the Law and the Prophets but to fill them out." Here, then, is finality in the sense that its views of God and man and sin and suffering and the rule of God in society are a permanently creative spring of life. When we break with them, we lose ourselves and grope about in the dark. "This Lord," says truly the Psalmist, "is my light and my victory." It was of the self-authenticating value of this literature that Henry Newbolt was thinking when in his poem "Clifton Chapel" he makes a father say to his son, on visiting the chapel:

> This is the chapel: here, my son,
> Your father thought the thoughts of youth,
> And heard the words that one by one
> The touch of Life has turned to truth.

In conclusion, then, it can be said that the major results of the work of Wellhausen and his school still stand; they have, however, been enlarged and enriched by new and improved critical techniques and by certain of the newer sciences. The historical approach to the Old Testament associated with his name is not to be confused with more recent forms of free and aimless speculations nor with Humanism. Nor is it to be obscured by theological vagaries and neglect. Our real problem today is not one of the validity of historical criticism; it is far other. In this day of death when men and society crave a word to live by, without abating one whit our scientific method of approach to the documents of our religion and with complete faith in a moral purpose in history, we must be careful to see that the essential truths which we reach in scripture by our methods can and must be related and made meaningful to our generation. Neglect of this concern is our immediate menace.

WILLIAM COVELL AND THE TROUBLES AT ENFIELD IN 1659 A SEQUEL OF THE DIGGER MOVEMENT

J. Max Patrick

A great revolution always involves changes in land ownership. That the Puritan Revolution was no exception is proved by the story of agrarian riots in 1659 over property rights to Enfield Chase, a tract of land in Middlesex about nine miles from London. The struggle was between a moneyed group of Intruders who had encroached upon or purchased part of the Chase and a group of Inhabitants who had traditional feudal property rights, including rights of common, over the area.[1] Their quarrel reproduced in miniature the conflict between moneyed men attached to the new capitalism and men whose wealth consisted mainly of "feudal" rights and properties—the conflict which underlay the Revolution. It is also significant because it led to the collectivist theories of William Covell, just as the agrarian struggles of the Diggers helped to provoke the communistic writings of Gerrard Winstanley. The purpose of this study is to tell the story of the troubles at Enfield and to examine Covell's pamphlets.

Enclosure quarrels in Enfield were not new: they provoked a petition in 1575 and a riot in 1589.[2] The immediate cause of the struggle in 1659 was a scheme drawn up by Parliamentary commissioners as a result of surveys of the Chase conducted in 1650, 1656, 1657 and 1658.[3] According to the first of these, the area consisted of 7,900 acres worth £4,742 annually and possessed of deer and timber valued at £14,350. The next two survey commissions were ordered by Parliament to decide who legally held rights of proprietorship and rights of common. Their activities meant that Inhabitants of Enfield who, "time out of mind," had "enjoyed common for all manner of commonable beasts without number and common of estovers and divers other great privileges and advantages," were put to considerable expense and loss of land.[4] The scheme then drawn up allotted 3,399 acres for commons, 140 for roads and 4,360 for sale by the Protectorate. An

[1]The words "Intruders" and "Inhabitants," in this restricted and local sense, appear in the original documents, and are used throughout this article to designate the two main parties in the dispute.

[2]Lansdowne MS. 105, no. 7; Lansdowne MS. 59, fols. 30-1 (British Museum).

[3]G. H. Hodson and E. Ford, *A History of Enfield* (Enfield, 1873), 36; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic*, 1656-7, 169, 175, 591; *C. S. P. Dom., 1657-8*, 16; "A Relation of the Cruelties and Barbarous Murders Committed by some Footsoldiers and Others upon the Inhabitants of Enfield, Edmonton, etc." (London, 1659), reprinted in W. Robinson, *The History and Antiquities of Enfield* (London, 1823) I, 180 ff.; *A Plan Proposed for the Division of Enfield Chase* (London, 1775); F. Russell, *Enfield Chase Division* (London, 1776).

[4]*To the Honourable Committee of Parliament Appointed for the . . . Hearing of Grievances, the Humble Petition . . . on behalf of . . . Inhabitants of Enfield . . .* (London, 1659), single sheet. Spelling, capitalization and punctuation have been modernized in all quotations.

outcry of protests from the Inhabitants caused a new division in 1658, by which 546 acres were added to the common, leaving 3,814 to be sold.

The Inhabitants, already forced to appeal to public charity because of a disastrous fire,[5] were even more incensed by this division. They claimed that the survey failed to account for two or three thousand acres which were being quietly taken over by Intruders; that persons possessing rights of common should have been allotted 6,600 acres containing two-thirds of the wood and the best soil instead of 3,399 acres of woodless, infertile land; and that the Intruders, not satisfied with obtaining two or three thousand acres without payment, had stopped and turned rights of way, had laid out impassable new ones, and were digging and despoiling even the small part of the waste which was allotted to the Inhabitants—an area so small that it would not "maintain the tenth part of their cattle as were maintained in the same Chase before the enclosure thereof."[6] A further grievance was that the commissioners had taken more than half of the 546 acres returned in the allotment of 1658, the half taken being the fertile and wooded portion.

These wrongs were blamed on the Surveyor-General and the purchasers of the land. Many of the latter were great officers in the Army: they included Adjutant-General John Nelthrope, Colonel Joyce, and Colonel Webbe, who was himself the Surveyor-General. They had purchased poor soldiers' debentures at prices varying from one shilling and sixpence to two shillings and sixpence in the pound, but they expected allowances and interest for the whole face value of the debentures. Yet the Inhabitants had "paid the greater taxes to the Army for their land." If their common was taken, they could pay no more taxes, and "above two hundred families" would be forced to take alms from their parishes.[7]

The troubles began about May, 1659, when several of the Inhabitants destroyed some of the new enclosures and drove in cattle upon the standing grain, "to the great loss and damage of the purchasers."[8] In their view the trespass was lawful, "the pretended purchasers having no title."[9] The Intruders complained to the Council of State, who ordered local justices to protect the Intruders and to make use of two troops of horse which were sent to aid them if needed.[10]

According to the Inhabitants, when the troops arrived in Enfield, they were given strong beer and money by the Intruders. The soldiers then fell upon some of the Inhabitants, slashed several of them and their servants, and even attacked poor labouring men who passed that way. Naturally the victims fought back. The Intruders then made legal complaints about

[5] *C.S.P.Dom., 1657-8*, 329.

[6] "A Relation of the Cruelties," 182; *To the Honourable Committee.*

[7] "A Relation of the Cruelties," 184.

[8] *A Relation of the Violent Insurrection of Divers Inhabitants of Enfield* (London, 1659), single sheet.

[9] "A Relation of the Cruelties," 185.

[10] *C.S.P.Dom., 1658-9*, 363-4.

the injuries suffered by their side. At first the Inhabitants refused to give evidence against their neighbours; threats forced them to give some evidence, but they refused to maintain it on oath. As a result of the declarations of the Intruders, several of the Inhabitants were bound over. When the jury could not find a bill because of insufficient evidence, Justice Hobert, one of the Trustees of the Chase, forced them back. They found an indictment against some men who had nothing to do with the riot but who had previously said that they would put their sheep and cattle into the new enclosures to test their title. The other accused persons were acquitted.[11]

The Inhabitants' triumph was short; for "there was a design by some of the said Justices, who were purchasers and trustees and men concerned therein and judges in the cause upon the Bench, to find a bill against those persons to take off the courage of the proprietors and commoners from their claims to the common, that they might the better force the proprietors' common from them in the said Chase."[12] To aid this design, the Intruders protested to Whitehall that the slow proceedings against the first offenders were encouraging others to imitate their misdeeds. Accordingly the Council of State urged the Justices to take speedier action.[13]

Meanwhile the Inhabitants laid countercharges against the Intruders and their agents, and an indictment was found against several of them. A warrant was issued to apprehend three of the enclosers, but Justice Hobert, who was "a great agent and stickler against the said proprietors and a great offender in the destruction of wood in the said Chase, called to see the warrant and had and did then tear the same in pieces." The Inhabitants were thus left without legal remedies; they could not even look for their cattle in the Chase because of threatened violence.[14]

The threat became actual. Soldiers hired by the Intruders shot several sheep and ate them, killed valuable cattle and challenged the commoners to fight. On July 10, some drunken soldiers shot at Inhabitants who were walking on the common. On the next day, a number of the Inhabitants, according to their own account of the fray, armed themselves with cudgels, mattocks and forks, and challenged the authority of the soldiers. Seventeen soldiers and their commander marched against them, fired, killed one man and wounded others. The Inhabitants then turned upon the soldiers, captured nine or ten, and took them before Justice Rich. After examining their confessions and the testimony of witnesses, he sent them to Newgate prison. They admitted that they were hired for sixpence a day more than their ordinary pay and that they had no authority from their chief commanders.[15] Such was the Inhabitants' story.

In the Intruders' accounts of the fray, the behaviour of the "country people" at Enfield was cited as a horrid example of the depravity of human

[11] "A Relation of the Cruelties," 186-7. [12] *Ibid.*, 187-8. [13] *C.S.P.Dom., 1658-9*, 368.
[14] "A Relation of the Cruelties," 188-9. [15] *Ibid.*, 189-91.

nature. Thirty soldiers, under proper orders and leadership, had been sent to oust the trespassing cattle in a peaceful manner. They were attacked by about a hundred and sixty country fellows; ten of their number fought for almost an hour and finally yielded, "being so mightily overpowered. . . . So that, this bloody conflict being ended, a guard was put upon the prisoners till they had cleared the field of the dead bodies, which is said to be two men and one woman of the countrymen's side, besides many wounded; and one soldier, the Sergeant, was carried off . . . in a dying condition." "Out of his favour to these inhuman fellows," Justice Rich sent the other nine prisoners to Newgate, "with their wounds bleeding."[16] The Inhabitants then fell upon the enclosures, set fire to the hedges, burnt up the stackwood, destroyed a barn and demolished houses. Their example, it was said, might well "inflame the whole nation."[17]

A brief account, written from the Intruders' point of view, appeared in the government organ, *Mercurius Politicus*.[18] Clearly the Intruders were too well entrenched and too influential in the Law Courts, Parliament, Council of State, and Army, for humble yeomen, tenant farmers and other commoners to be able to resist them by "legal" means. The resistance of the Inhabitants was suppressed. On July 16, the House of Commons issued orders concerning the riot. These were read in the churches on the following day.[19] Now assured of their predominance, the Intruders trampled upon the rights of the small proprietors and commoners. They or their hirelings wounded some of the inhabitants of Edmonton and killed a mare in the Chase, "at the insolency of which soldiers and purchasers of Enfield Chase without title, the country stands amazed."[20] But amazement was all; some troops of horse, sent by Parliament, restored order.

There were no further disturbances. In August, 1659, the much enduring Inhabitants suffered twenty-three deaths in a severe outbreak of the plague.[21] With the Restoration, the Chase was given to the Duke of Albemarle, but the enclosures remained. Subsequently, almost the entire Chase was converted to tillage. In 1783, only a small common, a rough lot and a small wood remained unenclosed; even these disappeared when an enclosure act was passed in 1801. At first, efforts to improve the gravelly clay soil of the Chase had little success, for much capital had to be expended to clear, drain and marl it.[22] Obviously the Inhabitants could not have afforded to develop it properly for themselves.

The small yeomen, tenant farmers and others who had traditional rights over the Chase probably had the better legal and moral case. The unscrupulous behaviour of the Intruders seems to prove this. Nevertheless,

[16] *Bloody News from Enfield* (London, 1659), 4-6.
[17] *A Relation of the Violent Insurrection.* [18] *Mercurius Politicus*, July 7-14, 1659.
[19] *C.S.P.Dom., 1659-60*, 32; "A Relation of the Cruelties," 191.
[20] "A Relation of the Cruelties," 191. [21] Hodson and Ford, *A History of Enfield*, 311.
[22] *Ibid.*, 52; H. C. Weld, *An Account of . . . the Charities and . . . Properties belonging to the Parish of Enfield* (Enfield, 1895), 41; *A Plan Proposed;* Russell, *Enfield Chase Division.*

the Inhabitants were undoubtedly unprogressive: their small property rights stood in the way of the efficient development of the productive resources of the Chase. The encroaching moneyed interests were better fitted to exploit and develop it. Continuance in the late feudal organization would have meant that although many would have rights of woodcutting and pasturage on the Chase, none would have the power, resources or inspiration to take full advantage of its productivity. Capitalistic development would mean greater production and possibly employment for more men. It would result in greater wealth for the exploiters and the reduction of independent or semi-independent commoners to the status of labourers. The resistance of the Inhabitants was necessarily in vain: not only were economic, political and ecclesiastical powers largely in control of the new interests, but also the forces of historical progress. If the Chase was to be efficiently exploited to produce for the adjacent London market, a more advanced method of farming had to replace the traditional, late feudal system which was better suited for subsistence farming in a landed economy than for production for markets and profits in a moneyed economy.

A peculiar feature of the enclosure troubles at Enfield was that while the Inhabitants protested loudly against the Intruders, they seem to have made no effort to eject some poor families who settled upon the Chase. Possibly the squatters' encroachment was abetted by the Intruders in their desire to weaken the claims of their opponents. Certainly the toleration extended to this group differs from the eagerness with which persons with rights of common joined local lords of manors to eject the Diggers from common land which they had occupied in 1649. Perhaps the Inhabitants of Enfield were too much exhausted by the agrarian conflict, the fire and the plague to take any effective action. Shortly after the Restoration, the residents of Enfield, including tenant farmers, prepared a petition complaining that two or three hundred families had settled on the Chase during the late unhappy times; they were destroying the timber and, if not restrained, would become chargeable to the parish. Therefore the petitioners asked leave to bring in a bill to Parliament to enclose their common fields and to establish a fund for employing the poor.[23] The economic transition from the common fields to private ownership was thus to be greatly furthered; but details about what, if anything, was done at this time are lacking.

The scheme for employing the poor was possibly inspired by William Covell, a preacher and landowner at Enfield. He was the author of a compromise solution for the agrarian troubles there: workers' co-operatives were to be established and financed by wealthy benefactors in order to use the resources of the Chase not primarily for profits, but to satisfy the needs of the community and to raise its general standard of living. Though his plans were never carried out, they are significant in the history of radical social thought; they have interesting parallels in some of the ideas of the Diggers; and they exemplify an aspect of Puritan utopianism.

[23]Hodson and Ford, *A History of Enfield*, 52.

II

Very little is known about Covell's life. He served the state, presumably as a soldier, for eight years "suffering hardship, imprisonment, and loss of my blood," and was tried by articles for heresy in Edinburgh.[24] He describes himself as a preacher, but apparently he was not attached to the established church.[25] In a petition to the Protector, he states that he is resident in Enfield. By his marriage to Dorothy, widow of Major Beaumont, he was entitled to Beaumont's estate and £218 owing to Beaumont for his services in the army. In addition Covell had bought claims to other army arrears amounting to £490. He was given land in Enfield Chase in settlement of all these claims.[26] However, it is not known whether he sided with his fellow purchasers in their violent resistance to the claims of the commoners. His pamphlets never advocate violence and always urge co-operation, and therefore it is unlikely that he actively participated in the enclosure struggle. But he probably sympathized with the Intruders, not only because of his own property interest, but also because he disliked the inefficient exploitation of the commons by those who traditionally controlled them. He felt that if the Chase were properly developed, more than enough would be produced to support the contending groups in comfort. If he played any part in the struggle, he probably tried to reconcile the factions. It may be conjectured that he helped in the final pacification and that he inspired the scheme for employing the poor which was propounded in the petition of 1660: such projects are expounded in his works.

Covell's first publication, a single sheet, appeared in 1654, five years before the troubles at Enfield. It was entitled *A Proclamation to All of All Sorts, High and Low, Rich and Poor, wherein is Proclaimed the Law Royal which, in Keeping thereof, is True Liberty*. It is a doctrinaire statement of a primitivist, individualist creed. Men ought to conduct themselves well according to the Golden Rule which he calls the Law Royal, or they ought at least to choose others who are able to guide and govern them according to the same precept. No power is legal except that derived from the people by free contract. Englishmen have lost the knowledge and ability to govern themselves, for the ruling, preaching powers have kept the people in ignorance; they have multiplied, confused and perverted the laws; and they have enslaved and burdened the populace. "Did they do well when they suffered the poor, blind and lame to perish in the streets and highways, permitting them to want work and their children bread, setting up a metal money . . . above the creation, monopolizing the earth . . . ?" Indeed, they would have done worse if they could: "it is thought they would have monopolized the sun, moon and stars if it had been possible; nay, God himself if they could have known where to find him." Rulers ought to govern in the common interest.

[24]William Covell, *A Declaration unto the Parliament* (London, 1659), 22.
[25]William Covell, *A True Copy of a Letter* (London, 1660), single sheet.
[26]*C.S.P.Dom., 1656-7*, 298-9.

Covell fails to make any practical statement of who is to decide what is governing well or of how to oust the wicked from power. In 1654 he was but a voice crying in the wilderness. Like many of the Puritans, he believed that there was a harmony latent in the nature of man and the universe. His faith was that, if the true and reasonable were made available to men, they would inevitably accept it and gain freedom.

Parallels between the thought of Covell and that of Winstanley the Digger are striking. Both made the Golden Rule the basis of their political, economic and ethical thought; for both, this rule was bound up with extreme individualism and yet also with a high degree of voluntary co-operation. Covell says, "Every man is a king, priest and governor in, to and over himself."[27] Winstanley states that every man has "his teacher and ruler within himself."[28] Both writers place sovereignty in the people and wish all laws referred to them for approval; both regard the economic welfare of the people as of prime importance; and both condemn the multiplicity and complication of the laws.

Covell's next and his most extensive pamphlet was probably inspired by the troubles at Enfield. It appeared under two different titles, *A Declaration unto the Parliament, Council of State and Army*, and *The Method of a Commonwealth*, but the material of the two works is essentially the same. Covell had become wiser, less vague and more practical than he had been in 1654. The purpose of his *Declaration* was more definite: to analyse the condition of England, and "to hint to you what a commonwealth is and how happy England may be before any part of the world if they will."[29]

As in the *Declaration*, Covell attributes the poverty and misery of the poor to kingship and to buying and selling with silver. The monetary system enables men to buy the labour of the poor for half what it is worth, with the result that the workers have scarcely enough food. They are unprotected, but "buyers and sellers are guarded, fenced with walls and defended with laws." Covell was probably thinking of the usurpations of the Intruders upon Enfield Chase. "What cannot buyers and sellers have," he says, "if they ask for it to advance trade?" It is through such a system of privilege and money that kings, lawyers, ecclesiastics and tradesmen all exploit the poor.[30]

However, Covell believes that the evils caused by narrow, covetous and worldly men are unnecessary; it is possible, though difficult, for England to be the happiest part of the world. "Many know how to act it, but have not the power and ability. Many know how and are able but will not, they are so covetous." Moreover, the covetous are strongly entrenched; union is their policy; they know that "strength united is stronger;" and they follow two other rules: "Divide and spoil," and "Make poor enough and

[27] *A Proclamation to All.*

[28] Gerrard Winstanley, *A Letter to the Lord Fairfax and His Council of War* (London, 1649), in *Works*, ed. G. H. Sabine (Ithaca, N.Y., 1941), 283.

[29] *A Declaration unto the Parliament*, 6. [30] *Ibid.*, 4-5.

you will rule well enough." In this strain Covell goes on to show that the oppressing groups are class-conscious and that their strength is established by law. Kings are associated to hold up each other's glory; lawyers are associated in their halls and charters; the ecclesiastical powers are associated; and the cities and corporations are associated: "Witness their halls, companies and vanities, the great tradesmen living on the sweat of the brows of handicraftsmen. . . ." In short, "wickedness is so associated that wickedness is established by law"; and agriculture and handicrafts cannot be carried on with comfort for the workers "when all these, with all the idle persons, depend on them." It is an unnatural system and must be changed.[31]

At this point, Marxist theorists would expect Covell to advocate a union of workers and oppressed persons against the privileged. But Covell is reluctant to urge any association of the underprivileged as a class, although he regards one organization, the Army, as "an association, and a heavenly one too! But it is a case of necessity."[32] He utters no call for workers to unite, no plea to overthrow oppressors by violence. His solution is the founding of co-operative communities of workers assisted by other groups. He looks not to the humble, but to the supreme powers of the nation, the Army and the Parliament, to effect his utopia. It is to be a commonwealth in deeds rather than words, a society with religious toleration, equality of all citizens before the law and no state-supported churches; tithes are to be used to pay public debts, defend the realm and aid the needy. In the economic field he asks for the abolition of monopolies and special privileges. Waste lands are to be improved to the best advantage. Royal patents and grants to lords of manors are to be investigated, "for they are encroachments upon the people." Parliament should encourage necessary arts and handicrafts.[33]

Covell then propounds his scheme for a model co-operative community, choosing the concrete instance of his own town of Enfield to illustrate his point. As might be expected from an Intruder, he shows little sympathy for those who claim rights of common: he implies that they have encroached upon the opportunity of the poor to maintain themselves. A further five hundred acres are to be taken from the common lands at Enfield in order that the poor may be looked after, and a mere thousand acres are to be allotted to the commoners. On the five hundred acres for the poor, twenty-four almshouses for the aged and impotent, and a workhouse or factory for the young and able-bodied, are to be erected. According to Covell, their labours on the land and in the workhouse will produce enough to maintain the whole community of the poor in Enfield. The workers on the thousand acres will unite with workers in other activities to produce all things necessary for themselves: "The disjointing of them spoils all"; but "the uniting the plough and handicrafts and mariners and arts recovers it all again."[34] The surplus produced in one co-operative

[31] *Ibid.*, 5-7. [32] *Ibid.*, 7. [33] *Ibid.*, 9. [34] *Ibid.*, 10.

community will be exchanged for goods produced by other groups, though each society will endeavour to be self-sufficient.

Thus Covell urges that co-operation between workers in different occupations in collectivist or partly collectivist communities is the realization of utopia. This co-operation or association, unlike that existing in England, is to be in the general interest: "For we want method exceedingly in associating in good things. We see it practised in wicked things."[35]

So far is Covell from advocating a union of workers against the privileged classes that he looks to rich men, to be known as "Fathers," for the wealth and advice necessary to the establishment of the co-operative societies. Workers skilled in arts and handicrafts and able to make good use of available resources will come together, about one hundred households to a Society. Each Society will contain about forty families of poor handicraftsmen living rent free. Each will govern itself methodically, learning Hebrew, Greek, Latin, nature's arts, handicrafts and whatever else seems necessary for its welfare. Within each of these communities there will be no buying or selling, but any surplus will be sold or exchanged for other commodities from outside. Being associated with mariners, the Fathers will be able to carry on trade in a Society's goods for the common benefit, and in their privately owned goods for their own benefit. Likewise, although he will co-operate in a Society, each worker who owns or purchases land for himself will be able to hold it as private property. Thus a system of individual ownership will exist along with the co-operative organization. The poorer members of a Society will live in the co-operative workhouse and almshouses; others will dwell in their own homes.[36]

The Diggers had advocated collectivist communities. They likewise felt "that England is not a free people till the poor that have no land have a free allowance to dig and labour the commons and so live as comfortably as the landlords that live in their enclosures."[37] They too urged union, for "wheresoever there is a people thus united by common community of livelihood into oneness, it will become the strongest land in the world."[38] Like Covell they complained that "the common people are filled with good words from pulpits and council tables, but no good deeds."[39] They made the same complaint against the selfish exploitation of the poor by the wealthier groups in society: "Did the light of reason make the earth for some men to engross . . . that others might be oppressed with poverty?"[40] They share an objection to money: "For where money bears all the sway there is no regard of that Golden Rule, 'Do as you would be done by.' "[41] The Diggers objected even more vehemently to buying and selling.[42] And like Covell, they attacked a system whereby "though there be land enough in England to maintain ten times as many people as are in it, yet some must

[35] *Ibid.* [36] *Ibid.*, 11. [37] Winstanley, *The True Leveller's Standard*, in *Works*, 260.
[38] *Ibid.*, 262. [39] *Ibid.*, 263. [40] Winstanley, *The New Law of Righteousness*, *ibid.*, 197.
[41] Winstanley, *The Law of Freedom*, *ibid.*, 596. [42] *Ibid.*, 594.

beg of their brethren or work in hard drudgery for day-wages for them or starve or steal . . . ."[43]

Nevertheless, Covell's scheme differed from that of the Diggers. He does not envisage absolute communism as his final aim. Although the Diggers had professed willingness to allow private property to continue,[44] they clearly regarded it as a temporary expedient. Covell seems to have regarded such an arrangement as a lasting one. In his utopia, private owners would co-operate in the communal enterprise. In the Diggers' plan, there would be either private and communal ownership, quite distinct from each other, or only communism. But Covell and the Diggers each felt that their scheme would be so successful that outsiders would associate with it in the first case or join it outright in the second.

Thus Covell wrote that as outsiders "come to understand the benefit of that rule that 'strength united is stronger,' they will come in with lands and goods." The obstacles to utopia, lack of method, unfair privileges, non-co-operation, and a money economy devoted to profits rather than to production, would all be removed.[45] Societies run by the Fathers for the benefit of all would result. "The sole end is that all people may enjoy the labours of each other at the first and best hand, with peace and rest and less trouble. . . . And it will be found better work to raise commodities than to raise moneys. Oh England! thou wantest but method. Blessed art thou above other nations! But thy ignorance and wilful covetousness is thy curse." God has provided ample resources for man's delight and pleasure if they are properly used; but "all the gold and silver and laws of men and books of men's making and images" will not deliver men from unhappiness. Not men skilled in such false inventions, but "men skilled in things that are," will set up the first Society as a pattern to others. "And if devils and men can destroy it, it must be destroyed." To prevent such destruction, Parliament and Army should follow the maxim of the ruling groups, "Divide and spoil"; but they should apply it against those very groups, dividing the oppressor from the oppressed and spoiling the "oppressing thing." They must undertake this or be destroyed. "For this is the day of burnings, confusions, tumults and cries. Methinks all look to be rulers, but none will be ruled. All will be teachers but none will be taught. And all is to get places of honour, pleasure, profit, that they may have the cap and knee, that they may domineer and have their wills."[46] Ten years earlier Winstanley had written in the same strain:

> But for the present state of the old world that is running up like a parchment in the fire and wearing away, we see proud imaginary flesh . . . gets dominion in some to rule over others, and so forces one part of the creation man to be slave to another . . . . The one looks upon himself as a teacher and ruler and so is lifted in pride over his fellow creature. The other looks upon himself as imperfect, and so is dejected in his spirit and looks upon his fellow creature of his own image as a lord above him."[47]

[43] *Ibid.*, 507. [44] *A Letter to the Lord Fairfax*, *ibid.*, 283.
[45] Covell, *A Declaration*, 12. [46] *Ibid.*, 13-15.
[47] Winstanley, *The True Levellers' Standard*, in *Works*, 252-3.

Covell asks the Army and Parliament to end the existing confusion, to eliminate the desire for domination, honours, pleasure and profit, and to lead men to submit to the word of God.

Covell therefore appeals to thirty different kinds of necessary workers, from carpenters to schoolmasters, to unite into collectivist communities. There will be four types of officers in each of these Societies: governors for the year, stewards, recorders and accountants. Covell's expression is confused, but he seems to advocate that thirty different kinds of workers, three officers of each kind, and twenty Fathers shall make up one "Family." All these will live, distinct from each other, in buildings constructed in quadrangles or triangles like colleges. In communities by the waterside, more arts and handicrafts will have to be represented.[48]

Thus from sixty to a hundred households will make up one Family or Society. They will eat together in a common dining hall. Their communal life will make it easy for the magistrates to keep them in order, save much time, expense and fuel, relieve the burden of toil and want, and destroy idleness, ignorance and cheating. No longer will it be necessary to bind children to the slavery of apprenticeship for seven years. Buying and selling and the use of money will decrease. The nation will be enriched and the people relieved.[49]

Although Covell opposes cities, markets, buying and selling, exclusive trades, and the use of money, he denies that he is a Leveller, claiming merely that he is opposed to evil in all places and to anything which occasions it.[50] Certainly he was no levelling communist like Winstanley. But Covell was close to the position of the Leveller party: like them he wished a society where there was an equality of opportunity and in which the petty *bourgeoisie* would thrive. But he went beyond them in his advocacy of collectivist Societies. Like them and the Diggers, he regarded the Norman Conquest as a sort of political Fall of Man, and he advocated a return to the "good ancient laws and customs which were before the Norman yoke."[51]

Covell's schemes were muddled; they lack whatever clarity the above account may possess. Their direction is partly primitivistic. He wished to go further than the Levellers in simplifying life; for he would eliminate or radically modify those aspects of civilization which are associated with cities: a money economy, buying and selling, and privileged vested interests. The unproductive elements in society are given little place in his utopia; he even eliminates the universities.[52] He wished a nation composed of co-operative communities of productive workers enjoying the full benefit of their labours. Cities and the evils of urban life were to pass away; the rest of the population would live on the land either in full or partial association with co-operative communities.

Covell is rather vague as to how his co-operative commonwealth is to

[48] *A Declaration*, 15-16. [49] *Ibid.*, 16-17. [50] *Ibid.*, 18. [51] *Ibid.*, 17. [52] *Ibid.*, 21.

be established. He appeals to the Parliament and Army to begin by setting up a model community at Enfield on the common land of the Chase, assisted by contributions from the wealthy. Opposition would be great, but it is necessary to remedy the confusion and misery of the country and to obey God's will. Capitalism with its abuses would be radically modified; and a utopia, based on co-operation and the production of goods, rather than on competition, restricted privilege and profit-making, would be realized.

Covell proposes four laws to start England on the path to utopia: (1) That all tithes, delinquents' estates, inns of court and chancery, universities, and all lands belonging to them, be used to pay public debts; (2) that primogeniture be abolished; (3) that all waste lands and commons be settled on the poor forever; (4) that the rich pay in proportion to their estates to maintain the poor, impotent and aged, and to provide work for the unemployed. To these four laws, he adds one other provision: that all other laws be annulled. In his desire to simplify the laws, he again resembles the Diggers.

Covell is also like Winstanley in his appreciation of nature, the work of God, as contrasted with the work of men.[53] "I will stand upon the earth," he writes, "and turn me round about and behold more glory and true beauty in the firmament and on the earth than all the inventing world can show me."[54] He professes only to show the works of God and the comfort to be derived from them. The way to utopia is through his co-operative communities: "For although England be a commonwealth in general, yet by little commonwealths it must appear . . . . And I dare say in a short time you may behold a pattern which may [be] fit for England and the whole world to follow."[55]

What became of Covell after 1660 is not known. But in that year he produced his last work, *The True Copy of a Letter*, a single sheet. He was still doctrinaire, class-conscious and utopian. The King was to act as God's steward, to look after the needy and the despised, to "provide a council of poor penitent souls, and not to take counsel of none but the mighty men of this world; for the ministry of wisdom is in the poor saints." He further enjoined the King to provide work for the unemployed "who are willing to live according to God's order in some place convenient for them, that they may be a pattern of good works to the ignorant world." Thus Covell retained the ideal of setting up a model community where men lived according to the Golden Rule; and he persisted in his complaints against "the sottish covetousness in the gentry," and against the "want of enlarged hearts [and] universal men." His utopianism is not very specific, although he promises that if his advice is followed, "within a short time there will be no beggar nor idle person in England." The means to utopia are to be the abolition of a monetary economy and dedication to production.

[53] E.g., Winstanley, *The New Law of Righteousness*, 207.
[54] *A Declaration*, 18. [55] *Ibid.*, 20.

"Breeding and planting restores. Buying and selling destroys."[56] Here again he resembles the Diggers in their teaching that "your buying and selling of land and the fruits of it, one to another, is THE CURSED THING; . . . for buying and selling is that great cheat that robs and steals the earth one from another."[57] Like them, Covell would have men "honour our mother the earth by labouring her in righteousness and leaving her free from oppression and bondage."[58]

After 1660, Covell's works faded into obscurity. As far as is known, they had no influence, although it is possible that they influenced the schemes for employing the poor which were put forth under the later Stuarts. In the history of utopian thought, Covell's project stands midway between the communism of Winstanley and the philanthropic schemes for model communities put forth by John Bellers.

It was probably no accident that the Digger movement and the enclosure troubles at Enfield both occurred where there were large areas of Crown property, where there had been much enclosing and consequent hardship, and where the proximity of capital, particularly on the south bank of the Thames, was bound to have a disturbing effect. These similarities may in some measure account for the likenesses between the thought of Covell and the Diggers. He may have been familiar with their writings or at least with their reputation, though there are no obvious parallels between their works which would confirm this probability. Certainly his experiences in the army and his persecution for the sake of religion in Edinburgh find a further parallel in the career of another Digger, William Everard. Indeed Covell's preoccupation with issues of religion and toleration early in his career indicates that he conforms to the general experience of Puritans of the Left and Centre: the final pattern of his political and social thinking, like that of Winstanley and the Diggers, Lilburne and the Levellers, and Cromwell and the Gentlemen Independents, developed in response to political and social realities but was informed and influenced by his religious prepossessions.

[56] *The True Copy of a Letter.*
[57] Winstanley, *A Declaration from the Poor Oppressed People*, in *Works*, 269, 271.
[58] Covell, *The True Copy.*

I. A. RICHARDS

WILLIAM BLISSETT

FOR twenty years Dr. I. A. Richards has been a pioneer in new fields of intellectual interest and activity. If, then, we find it difficult to classify his work, except very generally, as relevant to literary criticism, or if we notice a shift of emphasis in successive books, we must remember that an explorer is seldom at hand when a census is taken, and that his business is not to give a definitive topographical account of his field or to find the ideal site for a roadway, but to form some idea of the distinctive aspects of his surroundings and eventually—perhaps after many detours and much doubling of tracks—to reach a destination. It would be inefficient, of course, for us to follow Richards through all his involutions and circumambulations; we are, after all, interested in results, in destinations, not routes. I suggest, accordingly, that we leave the trail blazed by Richards and proceed as it were by plane, stopping at the most important "landing stages" which he has mapped out. The important landing stages are four, as I see it, and I have called them *psychology*, *semantics*, *ethics* and *education*. Richards never deals in an individual book with one of these topics alone; we shall never, therefore, be dealing in this essay with one work of Richards to the exclusion of the others.

Let us begin by considering Richards's psychological approach to literary criticism. While there is a general, though waning, tendency in his writings to accept the findings of psychology as the most secure truth, he never debates the issues of psychological controversy, referring quite impartially to Pavlov, to Freud and to Introspectionism, as well as to the neo-Associationism which he favours. Practical, ultimately ethical in interest, he approaches psychology looking for "ways of conceiving the mind that may help us in living."[1] Richards's procedure, is not, however, merely to quote passages from psychologists in support of his points: rather it is to base his theories on the physiological data common to all schools of psychology. Indeed, his most psychological book, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, may be described as an essay in speculative neurology.

The limitations of such a procedure become apparent when the question of communication is raised, for a psychology which deals exclusively with nerve-patterns in the individual has difficulty in explaining the social bearings of mind and conduct. True, Richards admits that "The two pillars upon which a theory of criticism must rest are an account of value and an account of communication," and his work does in fact rest on those two pillars, but his psychological theory of value is balanced by a logical, semantical, rather than a psychological theory of communication. Such a passage as this, for instance, leaves many questions unanswered: ". . . a

[1] *Coleridge on Imagination* (London, 1934), 48.

large part of the distinctive features of the mind is due to its being an instrument for communication. An experience has to be formed, no doubt, before it is communicated, but it takes the form it does largely because it may have to be communicated."[2] Nothing could be more vague, as Richards himself probably realizes, for in the paragraph following the one which I have quoted he refers to communication as a neglected aspect of the mind which might provide a key to many psychological questions. We must not, of course, require of an amateur the solution to a difficult problem of psychology, but we need constantly to remind ourselves that he has no solution and that communication in his account is nothing more than a process whereby two minds convey ideas to each other by the use of arbitrary symbols.[3]

Keeping this limitation in mind, let us consider Richards's psychological account of poetry and value. Mental events or experiences, in his theory, occur somewhere between a stimulus and a response, and are either coincident or contemporaneous with what he calls *attitudes*—"imaginal and incipient activities or tendencies to action."[4] The greater the number of attitudes involved between the stimulus and the response, the more rich and full the experience. Taking the accepted definition of pleasure as facilitation of response, Richards regards that as valuable which satisfies impulses with the least frustration of other impulses and argues that the delayed response and its attendant consciousness enable us so to organize our impulses as to ensure their most complete and pleasurable expression.

Here art in general and poetry in particular enter into his theory. "The differences between ordinary experiences and those due to works of art," he says, "are only special cases of a general difference between experiences made up of a less and of a greater number of impulses which have to be brought into co-ordination with one another."[5] The response facilitated by this more complex organization of inpulses is by definition valuable: for one reason because the impulses which might have frustrated it become organized as part of it; for another because, such organization necessarily causing delay in response, the consciousness attendant becomes accordingly rich and full.

The poet's experience, says Richards, is more than usually available to him in that "it is, as he undergoes it, more than usually organized through his more than usual vigilance. Connections become established for him which in an ordinary mind, much more rigid and exclusive in its play of impulses, are never effected, and it is through these original connections that much more of his past comes to be freely revivable for him at need."[6] The poet, it seems, organizes his perceptions and presents them to the reader in such a way that the reader's perceptions come to be organized in

[2] *Principles of Literary Criticism* (London, 1925), 25.

[3] An alternative, social conception of mind and meaning is to be found in G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago, 1936).

[4] *Principles*, 112. [5] *Ibid.*, 110. [6] *Ibid.*, 184.

a generally similar manner. Thus a poem is "a class of experiences which do not differ in any character more than a certain amount, varying for each character, from a standard experience. We may take as this standard experience the relevant experience of the poet contemplating the completed composition."[7]

Let us briefly criticize two points in Richards's psychological theory of poetry:

(1) *The poet organizes his perceptions.*

The psychological mechanism for such an act of organization is lacking in Richards's account. Here again Mead could help him, for Mead shows how the use of the significant symbol enables us to pick out and organize experience. The poet's skill in the use of language enables him to test many alternative responses within himself and to combine many attitudes into a unit. The poet's peculiar perception, of which Richards speaks, would be explained by Mead as a sensitiveness to symbolically constituted objects sharpened by continual use of significant symbols.

Another question arises under this heading. Richards remarks that "Keats, by universal qualified opinion, is a more efficient poet than Wilcox, and that is the same thing as saying that his works are more valuable."[8] Of course, by *efficiency* he means not mere technical skill but the ability to organize complex groups of impulses and to communicate this organization to the reader. But there appear to be two criteria of value—the efficiency of the organization and its complexity. Hardy is clumsy, Swinburne skilful, yet Hardy had more complex experience to express than Swinburne. Which is the more efficient in Richards's sense?

(2) *A poem is a more or less constant experience.*

Richards assumes that the experience produced by a serious reading of a poem will be generally constant for all readers. The revelation of diverse readings by the protocols in *Practical Criticism* does not affect his assumption: they merely prove to him that most readings are not serious enough. Behind all this is the image of the poet sitting down in a bare room and placing an experience on record for all time, and the reader in a bare room reconstructing this experience simply on the strength of the record. Of course, something like that does occur, simply because of the efficiency of poetry as a means of communication. But there remains an element for which Richards has not accounted, the social element, more specifically the element of literary convention. A poet's readers expect that certain of their responses will be called out by a poem, and the poet automatically or deliberately works with that expectation in mind: he works, that is to say, within a convention. No amount of attention to the poem alone can tell us what is new and what is conventional in it. Richards's protocol method of analysing anonymous poems, then, will best

[7] *Ibid.*, 226-7. [8] *Ibid.*, 206.

apply to traditional contemporary poetry where convention is taken for granted or to poems like those of John Donne where the whole experience is represented without regard for what readers may expect. It will apply least successfully to mediaeval romances or Elizabethan sonnets where convention is nine-tenths and the distinctive elements of the poems are the minute departures from, and additions to, the expected conventional pattern. Again Richards's individual psychology fails to give an adequate account of communication.

Before we leave this landing stage, we must remind ourselves of the pioneer nature of Richards's psychological criticism. He was the first literary critic to apply scientific psychology to the study of poetry, and it is greatly to his credit that the defects in his work are due not to his application but to the sort of psychology that he applied. That he is himself conscious of these defects is perhaps indicated by the fact that the whole tendency of his work since 1925 has been away from psychology. "Watson in place of the *Bible*," he says, "or in the place of Confucius or Buddha, as the source of our most fundamental conceptions about ourselves is an alarming prospect."[9] True, he continues more hopefully: "But the remedy of putting the clock back is impracticable. . . . The only possible course is to hasten . . . the development of a psychology which will ignore none of the facts and yet demolish none of the values that human experience has shown to be necessary. An account of poetry will be a pivotal point in such a psychology." But any of his readers who might have supposed *Principles* to have been such an account will find the ground gone from under him. Richards turns his back on psychological speculation and passes on to consider semantics and ethics and interpretation in teaching.

In this essay I do not intend to deal with the theories advanced in *The Meaning of Meaning*, since they lack the unifying element of Richards's other books, a direct application to literary criticism. Accordingly, our discussion of semantics will be limited to the field where Richards is alone and at a tangent from other semanticists—namely, his distinction between scientific and poetic uses of language and his concentration on the poetic side of that distinction.

"In the use of words," Richards argues, "poetry is just the reverse of science. Very definite thoughts do occur, but not because the words are so chosen as logically to bar out all possibilities but one. No. . . . It is never what a poem *says* which matters, but what it *is*. The poet is not writing as a scientist. He uses these words because the interests which the situation calls into play combine to bring them, just in this form, into his consciousness *as a means of ordering, controlling, and consolidating* the whole experience."[10] Poetic symbols, or *pseudo-statements*, do not "record events and communicate facts"[11] as do the statements of science, but serve to organize our experience; and our belief in these pseudo-statements has its

[9] *Practical Criticism* (London, 1929), 323. [10] *Science and Poetry* (London, 1926), 24-6.
[11] *The Meaning of Meaning* (London, 1923), 12.

justification in the fact that "we do not and, at present, cannot order our emotions and attitudes by true statements alone."[12]

In Richards's later books the distinction between poetic and scientific uses of language is more temperately stated. *Science and Poetry* creates the impression that there are but two kinds of human communication, one carried on through Messrs. Faber and Faber, the other through Messrs. Kegan Paul. This impression is dispelled in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* where Richards distinguishes between the "technical languages of the sciences" on the one hand and "all generally interesting discussion"[13] on the other. And in *How to Read a Page* in discussing the metaphor of the head and the heart he says that "there are numbers of ways of describing it: what is said and what we feel about it; the referential and emotional functions of language; the factual and rhetorical aspects, the semantic and pragmatic dimensions, intellect and impulse, content and purpose—all of them easily mislead us if we forget that they are abstractions, theoretical machinery made for special purposes, not actual cleavages in the stream of the mind's activity."[14]

With the qualifications which he has himself indicated, I believe that we may say that Richards has established a useful distinction when he discusses poetry as a use of language quite apart from science. It has certainly affected criticism, both in the abstract form in which we have stated it and in the theory of ambiguity which Empson and Richards have developed from it.[15]

The jump from the landing stage of semantics to that of ethics is a short one. There is a strong ethical element in Richards's writings; indeed, he stands in the same relation to many modern intellectuals as Shaftesbury stood to eighteenth-century gentlemen—he prescribes an individual ethical discipline for the serious part of the educated class.

This ethical element in Richards is not precisely the same as the semantical evangelism so prevalent now, though that, too, finds some place in his writings. "Words may come between us and our objects in countless subtle ways if we do not realize the nature of their power."[16] That is a reasonable statement of what words may do, but in this passage the thing becomes a trumpet: ". . . indeed language has succeeded until recently in hiding from us almost all the things we talk about . . . ," that is, of course, until the true Meaning of Meaning was proclaimed at Cambridge in 1923. In so recent a book as *How to Read a Page* the semantical fallacy is stated: "How a page was read has often been a matter of life and death. Misread orders on the battlefield have sent thousands to unnecessary destruction. Their readings of a page of Scripture have led as many to the stake."[17] In

[12] *Science and Poetry*, 60. [13] *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York, 1936), 72-3.

[14] *How to Read a Page* (New York, 1942), 100.

[15] See William Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (London, 1930), and Richards, *Philosophy of Rhetoric*.

[16] *Meaning of Meaning*, 130. [17] *How to Read a Page*, 10.

the first of these instances the difficulty in reading was mechanical and the destruction, as Richards says, "unnecessary." A semantical treatment of the utterance would have had relevance to the situation. But in the second instance the difficulty in reading is attitudinal, ultimately social—two conflicting semantical interpretations being the focus of conflicting social forces. A semanticist may deplore the controversy between the Homoiousians and the Homoousians, but he cannot prove that their difference was "purely verbal" (or in this case purely orthographic): he merely proves that he cannot take Christian doctrine seriously. There is a proper and an improper application of semantics to society. We may use it in order to become critical of the social forces behind the peculiar uses of words in advertising and in industrial and political propaganda. That is the proper use. The improper use is to set up semantics as a cure-all, to trace social ills to mistakes in the use of language and to deplore all conflicts as verbally inspired.

Fortunately Richards seldom deviates into this fallacy, and he bases his ethical theories for the most part not on semantics as a social corrective but on the value of poetry and the discipline of interpretation.

Art is valuable, in his account, in various ways, one being that it is "a means of establishing relations with persons not otherwise accessible"[18]—peoples of other times and other cultures, individuals we do not know; it is valuable, then, because it increases our experience by making the experience of others available to us. Pushing this a little farther, Richards points out that "In the arts we find the record . . . of the experiences which have seemed worth having to the most sensitive and discriminating persons. . . . The arts, if rightly approached, supply the best data for deciding what experiences are more valuable than others."[19]

A second source of value for Richards arises from his belief that poetic experiences are valuable in the same ways as other experiences. If the difference between good and evil is the difference between free and wasteful neural organization, between fullness and narrowness of life, then poetry, which produces neural organizations both rich and full, becomes of supreme value in life.

Here again we must remind ourselves of the individual, non-social character of Richards's psychology. In defining value in terms of individual neural organization it fails to mention, much less to explain, how values come to be social or the extent to which society prescribes the neural structure of the individual. All values, no more than all virtues, are self-regarding.

The fullest statement of a sort of individual lay-religion occurs in *Practical Criticism* where Richards says that "Something like a technique or ritual for heightening sincerity might well be worked out."[20] After enjoining certain rites to be performed over a poem, he concludes that "the

[18] *Foundations of Aesthetics*, 80. [19] *Principles*, 33. [20] *Practical Criticism*, 290.

value of poetry lies in the difficult exercise in sincerity it can impose upon its readers even more than on the poet."

Successive changes of ethical emphasis indicate the general trend of Richards's interests. A poem is in the first account valuable because it augments our experience by making the experience of the poet available to us; it is valuable in the second account in that it organizes our impulses and attitudes; in the third account it is valuable in being a means of self-discipline. The same trend is shown in the transition from *Principles* to *Practical Criticism*, from psychological theory to ethics and interpretation in teaching. The emphasis becomes increasingly practical.

We have now reached the fourth landing stage, the one from which we are to survey Richards's contributions to teaching and to the practice of literary criticism.

"The chief weakness of our best criticism today is the pretence that fundamental matters can be profitably discussed without prolonged and technical thinking."[21] Richards accepts and welcomes pseudo-statements in poetry, but in criticism he has no time for mere "appreciations" that have no exact reference to the object under discussion but simply produce an ecstatic effect in the critic or reader. One of the tough-minded, he stoutly maintains that poems require close analysis and that the critic's function is an important one. To facilitate analysis and to aid the critic in his business, Richards has devised three practical procedures—the protocol, multiple definition and translation into Basic English.

The protocol method of discussing poetry is a teaching device first practised by Richards with his classes at Cambridge. Copies of little-known and unsigned poems are distributed to a class for analysis; the students' criticisms—or *protocols*, as Richards calls them—are collected later, likewise unsigned. By this method the instructor can discover his students' difficulties in reading, and the students are given practice in perceiving the poem as it is. By "the poem as it is" I mean no more than that the students' responses (and the *poem* is in those responses) will be generally limited to those evoked by the words on the page and will exclude those evoked by the poet's name or period. We have mentioned an obstacle to this approach in our discussion of literary convention, but there is no reason why the protocol method could not be used even with conventional poems if the elements of the convention were explained to the students in abstract form before their analysis began.

Richards has developed a second method of analysing literature and disciplining the mind: this he calls the method of Multiple Definition. It consists of an intensive consideration of individual words, their meaning and ambiguities. He realizes, of course, that "words are not necessarily the units of meaning"[22] in the sense that an analysis of a single word in isolation will reveal its full significance. "We have to shift the focus of

[21] *Coleridge on Imagination*, 5. [22] *Ibid.*, 101.

our analysis and attempt a deeper and more minute grasp and try to take account of the smallest discussable units of meaning and the ways in which they vary as they are put with other units."[23] "Most words," he continues, "as they pass from context to context, change their meanings; and in many different ways. It is their duty and their service to us to do so."[24] Words are thus what Mead would call *universals:* they belong to the organization of many attitudes; and attention to words will enable us to grasp the number of contexts, of social situations, to which they may belong. Richards further believes that the longer the delay before response—that is to say, the more conscious deliberation on the ambiguities of expression and hence of the attitudes involved in a given passage—the more meaningful it will prove to be. But, as Aristotle says (Richards bravely quotes him in *Interpretation in Teaching*), "It is the mark of an educated man to look in every sentence for the degree of precision only which is suited to it." If so, *How to Read a Page*, which grapples with passages from Plato, Aristotle, and Whitehead, is a more educated book than *Interpretation in Teaching* which grinds unimportant utterances to powder.

The validity of multiple definitions is further limited by the fact that the unit of meaning is no more the verbal context than the individual word. The social process bears the same relation to the utterance as the utterance bears to the words which constitute it. To a certain degree individual poems are enclosures of meaning: the poet takes great care to organize his words in such a way that the responses of large sections of the public of his time and later, in his land and others, will be able to understand him. An analysis of his words by multiple definition will have some value. But in ordinary speech and ordinary writing a considerable weight of meaning is borne by the situation in which the utterance is made, and no amount of intensive analysis will reveal the influence of the situation on the statement.

Translation into Basic English remains as the third method devised by Richards for analysing literature and disciplining the mind. For the most part he is temperate in his claims of what Basic can do. His strongest point is expressed here in the interrogative mood. "A Basic version stands to a passage of poetry somewhat as a photograph may stand to a painting. Is it the case that a comparison between a photograph and a painting is likely to make us less conscious of the part played by colour?"[25] Extending his advocacy of Basic to the study of less poetic uses of languages, Richards says that "Being pinched within the limits of 850 words forces one to look at the original one in translating with an intentness hard to keep up otherwise. By cutting out the easy synonym it makes one go into the possibilities of the forbidden words more deeply."[26]

The same objections hold against the use of Basic English as against Multiple Definitions—that it is too purely intensive in its analysis. Of this limitation Richards himself is fully conscious. "When to break down

[23] *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 9-10. [24] *Ibid.*, 11.
[25] *Interpretation in Teaching* (New York, 1938), 210. [26] *How to Read a Page*, 29.

a non-Basic word into some Basic equivalent teaches one something about the new word (or about some Basic phrase), or makes one look at it from a new angle, or prompts questions unstirred by ordinary reading, we profit. The exercise is both instructive and entertaining. But when the non-Basic word, as there used, is something we understand perfectly already, the translation work is merely an expenditure of energy and soon palls."[27] Here we shall leave the question.

We have stopped at the four main landing stages that Richards as pioneer had discovered and cleared. We may now give some sort of survey of what we have noticed.

We saw that psychology and semantics for Richards are closely connected through the fact that poetry as a mode of communication is used for purposes not logical but psychological—for the ordering of impulses and attitudes. This ordering as brought about by poetry is of the highest value because it produces the richest and fullest experiences possible to human beings. So high, indeed, does Richards set the value of poetry that he insists on the greatest self-consciousness and discipline in approaching a poem so as to ensure our experiencing the organization of impulses and attitudes proper to it. This insistence on technical criticism has led him to devise certain new means of analysis, notably protocols, multiple definitions and translation into Basic English.

The weaknesses of Richards's theories may be grouped round the words *individual* and *intensive*—individual in psychology and ethics, intensive in semantics and critical practice. He never properly comes to grips with the question of the influence on the mind of society and communication or with the social nature of values. In semantics he treats words as parts of utterances but not utterances as parts of situations; more particularly he treats passages of verse and prose as if all the relevant material for understanding and judgment were present.

In assessing Richards's achievement we must keep in mind the fact that he has done pioneer work in the fields that he has entered. He is the first critic to apply scientific psychology to the study of literature, and the defects in his theory are due more to inadequacies in the psychology than in his application. This is a considerable achievement, but a contribution perhaps more permanent is his general distinction between the scientific and the poetic uses of language. By explaining the psychological nature of the pseudo-statement, he has absolved the poet from the necessity of making logical or informative statements. His general treatment of value is questionable, but I believe that he is right in insisting that the experiences that poetry occasions are both rich and full. In conclusion, we should remember that as a literary critic and teacher of literature Richards's contribution to the technique of both crafts is unequalled in our time.

[27] *Ibid.*, 125.

AREOPAGITICA REVISITED

ARNOLD WILLIAMS

IT would be a monstrous irony if, in the midst of a war fought partly for the preservation and extension of freedom of speech, we should overlook the tercentenary of one of the most important, and certainly the most eloquent, defences of a free press in English. For it is exactly three hundred years ago this November that John Milton addressed to the "Lords and Commons of England" a short pamphlet entitled *Areopagitica: a Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing*. A few moments in revisiting this monument of 1644 may not be misspent in the year of conflict, 1944.

Like many of Milton's major works, *Areopagitica* has had the power to separate its readers into two camps, the violent enemies and the heated defenders. One could almost write a history of the political ideals of the English-speaking peoples using no other material than the pronouncements of critics about Milton's prose works, *Areopagitica* among others. There have been times when it was neglected, or but rarely mentioned and then with condescension. Alternately, reverence of its very syntax has been enjoined on the young with all the prestige of organized pedagogy. It has attracted the patronage of politicians literate enough to read it, the idolatry of all manner of liberals and radicals and the cool scepticism of the sort of intellectual conservatives who a few years ago, while scorning the hysterical mass propaganda of Nazism, still recognized "that chap Hitler" as having something.

The high tide in the idolatry of *Areopagitica* was reached in the nineteenth century. In the age of its writing, Milton's plea for unlicensed printing seems to have attracted little notice and had no measurable influence.[1] The Restoration engulfed *Areopagitica* as it did most of the pamphlet literature of the Revolution. With the Revolution of 1688, Milton's fame began growing, but *Areopagitica* seems to have lagged behind *Paradise Lost* and even some of the anti-royalist pamphlets. With the gradual triumph of Whig principles, however, *Areopagitica* attracted its share of the glory which, by mid-nineteenth century, invested everything from the pen of "the blind Old Man." *Areopagitica* ultimately took its place, along with Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and Junius' letters, among the scriptures of the English peoples. Though men might not always live up to its strenuous demands, just as they were not always equal to keeping all the ten commandments, it was hardly to be expected that anyone would question the proposition that the liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely was the chief of all liberties. As well defend adultery or praise theft.

[1]See William Haller, *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution* (New York, 1934), I, 75, 134-9.

A few samples of the Victorian adoration suffice. In the famous essay on Milton, Macaulay speaks twice of *Areopagitica*, each time annexing to it the epithet "sublime." John Stuart Mill's "Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion" is in its main outlines merely a repetition, and often vulgarization, of the chief points of *Areopagitica*. Lecky, the historian of rationalism, thought *Paradise Lost* "scarcely a more glorious monument of the genius of Milton" than *Areopagitica*.[2] Perhaps the best measure of the reverence with which the tract was regarded is the fact that for decades it was one of the "classics" assigned for study in schools and academies. Someone has testified that schoolboy parsing of Milton's involved sentences gave him a lifelong aversion to the "unlicens'd" press.

In this enshrining of *Areopagitica* as a classic, the Victorians doubtless assumed that the principles for which Milton pleaded had been irrevocably won and that a free press was, like parliamentary government, an achieved milestone of progress. That assurance we fail to share, just as we doubt a good many of the Victorian certainties. Our leaders list freedom of the press as one of the purposes to which our war effort is dedicated, and it seems pretty certain that neither they nor we consider a free press as something we have won and wish to share with the less fortunate. We are sobered by the realization that freedom, whether of the press or of anything else, is a complicated business. There is no such thing as freedom, just plain, unqualified freedom. Freedom from what? From whom? To do what? Do we mean freedom from government control? Even if we had achieved that, it would mean little, if the press was still enslaved to the interest of a special group, who by wealth was able effectively to decide what the press printed. Too often we have found that those who ask for freedom mean freedom from responsibility. And one man's irresponsibility is an infringement on another man's freedom. Aside from the question of the suppression of military information for reasons of security, can a democracy, in peace-time, survive if it permits free access to its organs of opinion to those who wish to destroy democracy?

These are a kaleidoscopic epitome of the questions which pass through the mind of anyone who, three centuries after *Areopagitica*, attempts to assay its meaning to him. Naturally these questions and doubts reflect on one's attitude not merely towards the issue of a free press but also towards the classic plea for a free press. Some are naturally prone to dismiss *Areopagitica*, along with the Victorian idolatry of it, as a piece of interesting romanticism. Milton was naïvely trustful of the essential goodness of human nature and boyishly ignorant of the complexity of human affairs. Other important criticisms sometimes levelled at *Areopagitica* are that it is incomplete and evasive on the all-important question of responsibility, and that Milton himself was inconsistent, even traitorous to his principles, in denouncing licensing in 1644 and accepting a post as licenser in 1651.

[2] *History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism* (London, 1910), II, 76-7.

These criticisms all reflect an important attitude towards *Areopagitica*. They assume that it is a contemporary document, to be tried by tests appropriate to the twentieth century. Though this assumption is never stated, it is implicit. It is a great tribute to the vitality of *Areopagitica* that, almost alone among the documents of the Puritan Revolution, it is regarded as having contemporary meaning, at least to the extent of failing to measure up to contemporary standards.

Not all critics of *Areopagitica* have approached it in this unhistorical spirit. Professor Arthur Barker has recently shown how much light it sheds on the development of Milton's religious and political thought.[3] Doubtless, as Professor Barker indicates, the chief sources of Milton's concern with the problem of a free press are theological rather than political —though, of course, Milton made no distinction, only an emphasis. Other influences foreign to our mode of thinking are likewise at work in Milton's defence of unlicensed printing, such theological concepts as Christian liberty, total depravity and the separation between the elect and the reprobate. Those who have called our attention to these matters of historical criticism are entirely right. Yet the critics who unconsciously view *Areopagitica* as they would the latest book by Walter Lippmann have truth on their side, too. *Areopagitica* is living literature, and living literature, whenever written, is contemporary.

Hence it is worth spending a little time looking into the charges that have been brought against *Areopagitica*. Let us frankly accept it as a contemporary production, and see if it has present meaning to us. If the charges are true, it can have little. We should, of course, not expect to find that Milton envisaged all the problems which the subject holds for us. No one will reasonably ask from a pamphlet of 1644 an accurate blueprint for action in 1944. Moreover, we should not be surprised to find that Milton used different symbols to express the needs of his generation, defended his principles by arguments which are less moving today than when they were written, or used illustrations which time has obscured. But if there is a central core of principle to which we can not merely subscribe as noble but also appeal for practical help, then *Areopagitica* is meaningful to us. If we can find such principles, we should not just reverence, but better, study *Areopagitica*.

Was Milton unaware that freedom and responsibility are inseparably yoked? The crux of any problem involving a freedom is to prevent anarchy, which is the worst tyranny of all. Mr. Hilaire Belloc seems to say that Milton was so unaware of the limitations on a free press that his programme, if followed, would have led to anarchy. Milton neglects "the whole value of any thesis upon freedom of publication," he charges, "when he fails to establish the limits to a free press."[4] Instead of an analysis of the problem, Milton has written only a piece of turgid "special pleading."

[3] In *Milton and the Puritan Dilemma* (Toronto, 1942), especially 74-100.
[4] *Milton* (London, 1935), 168.

There is an amount of truth in what Mr. Belloc says. It is true that *Areopagitica* was written at a specific occasion to accomplish a specific, limited purpose. Milton hoped to prevail on Parliament to repeal a licensing ordinance passed in June, 1643. In the period from the fall of the Star Chamber in 1639 until the licensing ordinance of 1643, England had been practically without control of the press. Milton thought this lack of control productive of the free discussion so necessary to the thorough reformation of the church and state. Parliament by reinstituting licensing, Milton thought, was interfering with the process by which reformation might be most speedily and completely accomplished. Probably also Milton feared that the same Presbyterian forces whose Parliamentary majority had passed the licensing act would proceed against John Milton, the notorious author of an immoral tract advocating divorce at will. The danger appears to have been small, but perhaps Milton did not know that. Perhaps he sincerely felt that his personal programme of liberty, ecclesiastical, civil and domestic, was in jeopardy.

The tract itself carries many signs of its immediate purpose. It is addressed to the Parliament: "They, who to states and governors of the commonwealth direct their speech, high court or parliament . . . ." It begins and ends on a note of praise, not notably fulsome according to seventeenth-century standards, but smacking of thick flattery to modern ears. Milton dwells on "so fair a progress of your laudable deeds" and speaks of the nation's "long obligement" to the "indefatigable virtues" of the Parliament. As a controversialist Milton knew how to make friends and influence parliaments. Nor is there any doubt that he selected, arranged and set forth arguments which would appeal to the sort of Parliament England then possessed. The long argument to prove that censorship is a papistical invention, without precedent either in classical antiquity or the early church, is well calculated to impress both Praise-God Barebones and John Selden. The horrible example of the title-page stuffed with *imprimaturs* is a well-honoured device of controversialists, as is also the appeal to a rather exaggerated patriotism evident in several places. This is capable pamphleteering. In saying so, however, one does not indict Milton of insincerity. Perhaps he was unhistorical in our sense, but there is no basis for accusing him of wilful distortion of evidence. He naturally selected and arranged his arguments (what competent author doesn't?), but that is not to say that he did not believe them.

Moreover, Belloc has certainly overstated the purely personal motive behind *Areopagitica*. No one who reads it without previous bias can really feel that Milton is concerned principally about the fate of his divorce tracts. A narrowly individual cause simply cannot draw forth such high-principled and universalized treatment as Milton gives us. It is perhaps true that Milton identified himself with his cause, or his cause with himself, but that is hardly censurable.

The real importance of *Areopagitica* is not, moreover, in its contemporary effect, which, by all evidence on hand, was small. As "special pleading"

it was a failure. Whatever importance *Areopagitica* has must lie in the universality of its principles. As in nearly all his prose works, Milton rises in *Areopagitica* above the exigencies of the moments to high principles with permanent implications. A significant proof of this statement is furnished by the efforts of those who have sought sources for *Areopagitica* and have searched the pamphlet literature of the period for parallels. The most recent of such attempts is that of Mr. Don Wolfe, who finds many partial anticipations and parallels among the pleas for toleration written in the sixteen-forties. But altogether they do not add up to *Areopagitica*, and Mr. Wolfe must admit, "One looks, then, in vain among Milton's liberal contemporaries for a resourceful champion of a free press comparable with Milton himself."[5] *Areopagitica* is unique, not in its occasional nature, nor even by reason of the incomparable rhetoric of its author, but because of the clarity and height of principle to which it rises.

Milton uses a battery of arguments, a surprising number of which are as pertinent today as three hundred years ago. For instance, on the lower level, consider his line of argument that censorship is usually administered by men incompetent to judge of the worth of the books over which they have the power of life and death, that censorship is a feeble weapon with which to combat vice, and that censorship always falls harder on the competent and honest than on the vicious. If any proof is needed of the modernity of this description of the workings of censorship, we need only remember the inanities of the United States Customs, when, in the twenties, it undertook the protection of public morals by prohibiting the importation of "immoral" books. The youth of the land was guarded from such subverters as Boccaccio's *Decameron* in the Italian and James Joyce's *Ulysses*, but all the while anyone with a dime could buy in countless news stands native pornography by the bale, in the form of "art magazines."

On a higher plane than this argument is another which three hundred years of experience has amply proved: that a nation is not made strong by a mechanical conformity. "To be still searching what we know not, by what we know, still closing up truth to truth as we find it"—that makes a people strong, as Milton said it would make a church, and "not the forced and outward union of cold, neutral, and inwardly divided minds." To be sure, Milton's main concern is with the church, rather than with civil polity, but his basic concept applies with equal truth to both.

So *Areopagitica* is not special pleading, as Belloc calls it, if one takes this term to mean that it does not penetrate through the necessities of the moment to the sustaining principles underneath. It must be admitted that Milton was writing a persuasion, not an abstract study. *Areopagitica* is not a "thesis" nor an essay on free speech—it is a defence. Thus we should not expect the careful weighing and balancing, the close consideration of all possible exceptions, and the assumed impartiality of a scholarly study. Nevertheless, Milton built his immediate appeal for specific action on as solid rock of enduring truth as we are likely to find.

[5] *Milton in the Puritan Revolution* (New York, 1941), 135.

But, says Mr. Belloc, he did not consider the limitations on the freedom of the press, and that is the core of the matter. Well, it may be that Milton did not consider the free press at that time in danger from the excess that leads to anarchy. After all, he was not asking for more control, but for less. Argument requires a certain concentration of effort. An opponent of unreasonable restraint does not spend his time calling attention to the necessity of reasonable restraint; he depends on his adversary for that. Milton's strategy, if he does not dwell at length on the limitations of freedom, is exactly the same as that of other revolutionary propagandists. Thomas Jefferson was as conscious of the danger of irresponsible majorities as anyone, yet, in his first inaugural, he is satisfied to enunciate as the governing principle that government must be by the majority. Lenin, who certainly realized the necessity of discipline and unity of action, did not elaborate them in his appeals to the masses before the October Revolution. Milton, too, was anxious to establish the principle of the unlicensed press, not to discuss the limitations with which it must be safeguarded.

Yet he does show an awareness of the responsibilities of author and publisher which makes one wonder if Mr. Belloc has read *Areopagitica* carefully. Actually, Milton allows for more control over the press than any modern liberal would tolerate. All he insists on is that the work shall go through the press uncensored and unlicensed. Then, if it offends, it may be condemned and burned by the hangman. In his long treatment of the practice of the ancient world, he mentions with apparent approval the magistrates of Greece who took notice of books "either blasphemous and atheistical, or libellous" and of Rome, where "Naevius was quickly cast into prison for his unbridled pen" and where "libels were burnt, and their makers punished, by Augustus."

One more limitation Milton not merely accepts but commends. In the *Areopagitica*, during his defence of the diversity of theological opinion, Milton specifically excepts popery: "I mean not tolerated popery, and open superstition, which as it extirpates all religious and civil supremacies, so itself should be extirpate." This seems to have been a settled principle with Milton, for he returns to it again fifteen years later in *A Treatise of Civil Power*. Here he explains more precisely why he does not propose to tolerate papists:

> Their religion the more considered, the less can be acknowledged a religion; but a Roman principality rather, endeavoring to keep up her old universal domination under a new name . . . supported mainly by a civil, and except in Rome, by a foreign power: justly therefore suspected, not tolerated, by the magistrates of another country.

The conclusion is clear that Milton, neither in the sunrise of the Revolution in 1644 nor in its disappointing dusk in 1659, intended to tolerate Roman Catholicism nor to allow its advocates the use of the press, licensed or unlicensed.

About the propriety of Milton's exception there may be some argument from those who think the secular menace of seventeenth-century Catholicism exaggerated. But the principle at issue is clear and important. Milton

recognized that the free press must not be allowed to those who would use it to destroy freedom, whether religious or civil. No law can permit such liberty, Milton argues, "that intends not to unlaw itself." Far from neglecting the necessity of limitations on a free press, Milton recognized them more clearly than some of us, who, less than a decade ago, were debating whether to allow Fascists the rights of free press, free speech and free assembly.

Perhaps it is a failure to recognize the importance of this principle that accounts for the accusation of inconsistency sometimes levelled at Milton. Professor Rice in a recent article points out, what is true enough, that Milton's doctrine of liberty admits of many exceptions. In addition to Milton's own acceptance of a quasi-licensing function in the Commonwealth Government of 1651, Professor Rice notes that Milton seemingly accepts, in *Areopagitica* and elsewhere, a measure of censorship. The main insistence of *Areopagitica*, he finds, is that books shall not be restrained from publication. Once published, they may be burned and their authors and publishers held accountable.[6] It is precisely these exceptions which make *Areopagitica* so interesting and valuable a document. Milton's oversight of *Mercurius Politicus*, if indeed it was a censorial function, and the exceptions and qualifications of his stand on freedom of press ought certainly to be understandable to us, who have faced and still face many of the conditions which necessitated the exceptions and qualifications.

When we read *Areopagitica* in the light of these exceptions we see clearly what Milton was getting at. Freedom of the press is not something separate and wholly good in itself. It is part of a wider freedom; it is a tool for the achievement of progress. Milton phrased these statements in the symbols of theological reformation—Christian liberty and a thorough reformation—but we can perhaps best understand them as referring to social progress. Why do we want a free press? Fundamentally, Milton has two answers. One is rather metaphysical: the inseparability of good and evil, the inherent impossibility of attaining good without the possibility of evil. This certainly bears on the political education of a people, for only through the possibility of making and paying dearly for political errors can a people learn to govern itself. The other answer is perhaps more practical: truth can be discovered only if the search after truth is free. And the search can be free only under the conditions of a free press. Milton is most eloquent on this point:

> Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making. . . . What some lament of, we rather should rejoice at, should rather praise this pious forwardness among men, to reassume the ill-deputed care of their religion into their own hands again.

Milton expects much of a free press. He regards it as a chief instrument in the complete reformation of the church. Truth, like the body of Osiris, has been cut into many pieces and scattered abroad. No one has more than a tiny piece of it. Everyone must search, for the more who search,

[6] "A Note on Areopagitica" (*Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, XL, 1941, 474-81).

the more truth will be found, and the more will be assembled. Only when men have "above all the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely" can the conditions for a reformation be fully met.

There is, then, for Milton a principle higher than the freedom of the press. All the restraints which he puts on the press are for the purpose of ensuring this principle. Though he is not fully facing it, he is groping towards the paradox of all revolutionaries: that there comes a time when permanent liberty can be saved only by the temporary denial of liberty. This is a point which academic liberals hardly ever understand, but which all practical men, whether radical or conservative, instinctively recognize whenever they engage in the work of extending liberty. Nearly all the great statesmen of England and America have understood it, and many have expressed their understanding in word or deed. There is a fundamental consistency in the act of Lincoln in suspending the writ of habeas corpus in certain parts of the Union during the Civil War. For if men could not be arrested until they had committed acts of rebellion which, if successful, would put them beyond the power of arrest, then the Union would fall and with it all orderly process and all liberty.

It has become so much the fashion to look on Milton as an idealistic visionary, inspired by unlimited faith in human perfectability, that we forget that he had, even so early as 1644, some measure of common sense. He was not going to allow freedom of the press to those who would use it to destroy all freedom.

So viewed, the *Areopagitica* makes sense to our generation and elicits respect from us. One certainly must grant that much more is involved in it than the few principles I have developed. Historically considered, it lies in a framework of theological and ethical ideas, many of which are uninteresting, if not repugnant, to us. Milton's concern with reform in the church we do not share, but we have an equally pressing and fervent reason for wishing reform in the state. We cannot accept Milton as a democrat in the modern sense; to view him as one would be to make the same mistake as the Victorians, when they thought him a Whig and canonized him. There is undoubtedly much of the aristocrat in Milton, and the repelling Calvinistic distinction between the elect and the reprobate is surely basic in Milton's thinking about the free press, as about other matters.

Yet, it seems to me, the work of translating Milton's theological symbols and penetrating the forms of his thought are well worth our time and effort. From the very primitiveness of Milton's approach to the problem we gain new insight into certain fundamental principles, which have present meaning and application. We need not commit the error of the Victorians in making a "classic" of *Areopagitica*, a dead statue to which we must make obeisance. Passers-by often bow to statues, but seldom examine them closely. *Areopagitica* is an honest, eloquent and capable defence of one of the chief instruments of progress. A firmer grasp on its principles will not harm our time.

THE NATURE OF SATIRE

NORTHROP FRYE

THE word "satire" belongs to that fairly large class of words which have two meanings, one specific and technical, the other more general. In Roman literature, for instance, the study of satire is essentially the study of a specific literary form, or rather two literary forms, of that name: the poetic satire developed by Horace and Juvenal and the prose or "Menippean" satire developed by Petronius and (in Greek) Lucian. In English literature, with which we are at present concerned, the satire may also be and has been the name of a form. Juvenal and Horace are the models of Donne and Pope, and Lucian is the model of Swift. But this idea of a satire form is in English literature a Renaissance and neo-Classical idea: it hardly existed in the Middle Ages, and it hardly exists now, though we still have our Hilaire Bellocs and Roy Campbells trying to blow up its dying fire with antique bellows. The word now means a tone or quality of art which we may find in any form: in a play by Shaw, a novel by Sinclair Lewis or a cartoon by Low. Hence in dealing with English satire we must include not only Swift and Pope, who worked with the traditional models, but all the writers who have ignored the models but have preserved the tone and attitude of satire. A distinction essential to the treatment of Roman, and perhaps also of French, satire is quite unnecessary in English literature, which has never taken kindly to strict forms.

But this, like all our cherished freedoms, was won for us by our ancestors. In the year 1597 Joseph Hall, who later became a bishop, published three books of what he called "Toothless Satires," following them with three books of "Biting Satires." Hall begins by saying that he is introducing something radically new into English literature:

> I first adventure, follow me who list,
> And be the second English satirist.

He does not mean that he has never heard of the *Canterbury Tales* or *Piers Plowman*: he means that from the point of view of an imitator of Juvenal and Horace they are not satires. From this point of view his claim to be first is more or less correct: that is, he was about fourth. Later in his life Bishop Hall became involved in a controversy with Milton, who did not care for bishops. Milton carefully goes over Hall's literary output to show, as the custom then was, that his adversary had been a fool from birth. When he comes to the "Toothless Satires" he says that this so-called first English satirist might have learned better from *Piers Plowman*, besides other works, and adds: "But that such a Poem should be toothless I still affirm it to be a bull, taking away the essence of that which it calls itself. For if it bite neither the persons nor the vices, how is it a Satyr, and if it bite either, how is it toothless, so that toothless Satyrs are as much as if

he had said toothless teeth." If there can be no toothless satires, it is the tone that makes a work of art a satire: if Langland is a great satirist because of his satiric attitude, Swift and Pope are so for the same reason, not because of their form. On this point posterity has decided for Milton against the bishop.

As a tone or attitude, then, two things are essential to satire. One is wit or humour, the other an object of attack. Attack without humour, or pure denunciation, thus forms one of the boundaries of satire; humour without attack, the humour of pure gaiety or exuberance, is the other. Now these two qualities, it is obvious, are not simply different, but opposed. For satire one needs both pleasure in conflict and determination to win; both the heat of battle and the coolness of calculation. To have too much hatred and too little gaiety will upset the balance of tone. Man is a precocious monkey, and he wins his battles by the sort of cunning that is never far from a sense of mockery. All over the world people have delighted in stories of how some strong but stupid monster was irritated by a tiny human hero into a blind, stampeding fury, and how the hero, by biding his time and keeping cool, polished off his Blunderbore or Polyphemus at leisure. In literature, too, the slugging haymaker has no more chance against an expert pen-fencer than a bull in a bullfight. Milton, a deeply serious prophet haunted by the sense that he was responsible both to God and man for making the best use of his genius, had no gift for satire, and when we see this blind giant flailing at his buzzing assailants, we can only be thankful that he never encountered a first-rate satirist. The same is true of many romantics. Lord Castlereagh, who did not kill himself before he had achieved an all-time high in unpopularity with poets, is described by Shelley, along with his confederate Sidmouth, as:

> two vultures sick for battle,
> Two scorpions under one wet stone,
> Two bloodless wolves whose dry throats rattle,
> Two crows perched on the murrained cattle,
> Two vipers tangled into one.

This is very fine, but it is not fine satire. The poet is too angry and his victims too abstract. Let us try Byron:

> Cold-blooded, smooth-faced, placid miscreant!
> Dabbling its sleek young hands in Erin's gore,
> And thus for wider carnage taught to pant,
> Transferr'd to gorge upon a sister shore,
> The vulgarest tool that Tyranny could want,
> With just enough of talent, and no more,
> To lengthen fetters by another fix'd,
> And offer poison long already mix'd.

Byron wrote some great satire, but this is evidently not it. Let us turn to Tom Moore:

> Why is a Pump like Viscount Castlereagh?
> Because it is a slender thing of wood,

> That up and down its awkward arm doth sway,
> And coolly spout and spout and spout away,
> In one weak, washy, everlasting flood!

That does it exactly. It is rather flattering to one's ego to be called a wolf or a scorpion; there is a certain thrill in being thought a dark and terrible emissary of the demonic powers. But nobody likes to be called a pump, at any rate not with so much enthusiasm.

The satirist in whom the gift of seeing things absurdly appears most clearly as exuberance of mind is Dryden. He takes a physical pleasure in his victims; he transforms them into fantastic dinosaurs of bulging flesh and peanut brains. He is really impressed by the great bulk of his Falstaffian Og:

> Round as a globe, and liquor'd every chink,
> Goodly and great he sails behind his link.

He really admires the furious energy of the poet Doeg, and his heart is warmed by the spectacle of that noble Buzzard, Bishop Burnet:

> A portly prince, and goodly to the sight . . .
> A prophet form'd to make a female proselyte.

The great effectiveness of such satire comes from the victim's realization that no one could laugh at him with such genuine pleasure unless he were genuinely amused. In other words, one cannot merely adopt satire to express a personal or moral feeling; one must be born with the sardonic vision.

Now both humour and attack depend on certain conventions which are assumed to be in existence before the satirist begins to write. The world of humour is a rigidly stylized world in which generous Scotchmen, obedient wives, beloved mothers-in-law and professors with presence of mind are not permitted to exist. All humour demands common agreement that certain things, such as a picture of a wife beating her husband in a comic strip, are funny. To introduce a comic strip in which a husband beats his wife would distress and perplex the average reader: it would mean learning a new convention. Similarly, in order to attack anything, satirist and audience must agree on its undesirability. The misery and cold of German soldiers in a Russian winter is matter for satire in our newspapers; the misery and cold of Russians is not.

Much in these conventions is only fashion, and quantities of scandal, gossip, pasquinades and lampoons have gone the way of all flashes. Even our sense of what constitutes absurdity has changed. "We laugh at deformed creatures," says Sir Philip Sidney, but he does not speak for the twentieth century. That Milton was blind, Dryden poor and Pope a cripple does not seem as amusing to us as to their contemporary enemies. When Nashe tells us of the trick Jack Wilton played on a Captain, and how the best of the joke was, that the Captain was arrested as a spy, racked and flogged, we stop laughing long before Nashe does. Ben Jonson was a bricklayer's stepson, and his many enemies expected every reference to

bricklaying they made to be followed by knowing winks, leers and guffaws. But the whole social attitude which enabled that to be humorous has disappeared, and the satire with it. National hatreds are no longer-lived. In the Hundred Years' War, Laurence Minot vituperated the French; at the time of Flodden, Skelton poured scorn on the Scotch; when Holland was England's trade rival, Marvell persuaded himself that he disliked the Dutch; in Napoleon's time Canning's poetry of the *Anti-Jacobin* held all revolutionary ideas up to ridicule. Many of these wrote excellent satire, but it has gone stale and mouldy, and at best is something to be rescued. Now no one would claim that Chaucer or Pope or Swift had any Olympian superiority to the passions and prejudices of their times. To what, then, do they owe their amazing vitality and power of survival?

Denunciation, or humourless attack, is, we said, one of the boundaries of satire. It is a very hazy boundary, because invective is one of the most readable forms of literary art, just as panegyric is one of the dullest. It is simply an established datum of literature that we love to hear people cursed and are bored with hearing them praised; and almost any denunciation, if vigorous enough, is followed by a reader with the kind of pleasure that soon breaks into a smile. Now invective is never the expression of merely personal hatred, whatever the motivation for it may be, because the words for it simply do not exist in the language. About the only ones we have are derived from the animal world, but calling a man a swine or a skunk or even a cholera germ is merely an eructation. For effective attack we must reach some kind of impersonal level, and that commits the attacker, if only by implication, to a moral standard. As Shakespeare's Thersites says of Menelaus, "to what form, but that he is, should wit larded with malice, and malice forced with wit, turn him to? To an ass, were nothing; he is both ass and ox; to an ox, were nothing; he is both ox and ass." In the long run, then, the tone of antagonism or attack in satire must imply an assertion and a defence of a moral principle. The satirist, when attacked, takes a very high moral line. He is a prophet sent to lash the vices and follies of the time, and he will not stop until he has cleansed the foul body of the infected world. Pope says:

> Hear this, and tremble! you, who 'scape the Laws,
> Yes, while I live, no rich or noble knave
> Shall walk the World, in credit, to his grave,
> To VIRTUE ONLY and HER FRIENDS A FRIEND,
> The world beside may murmur, or commend.

That, you see, is what Pope is really doing when he is reflecting on the cleanliness of the underwear worn by the lady who had jilted him. And as far as the survival power of his satire goes, he is quite right. Hence satire based on persisting moral sentiments has a better chance for immortality than satire based on fluctuating ones, satire which strikes roots in the soil of stupidity, treachery, slovenliness, hypocrisy, and all the other things that are as evil today as in Chaucer's time.

Again, we said that the humour of gaiety was the other boundary of satire. But as Juvenal truly said that whatever men do is the subject of satire, and that in consequence it is difficult not to write it, it follows that most humorous situations are at least indirectly satiric. Non-satiric humour tends to fantasy: one finds it most clearly in the fairy worlds of Lewis Carroll, Edward Lear and Walt Disney, in Celtic romance and American tall tales. Yet even here one can never be sure, for the humour of fantasy is continually being pulled back into satire by means of that powerful undertow which we call allegory. The White Knight in Alice who felt that one should be provided for everything, and therefore put anklets around his horse's feet to guard against the bites of sharks, may pass without challenge. But what are we to make of the mob of hired revolutionaries in the same author's *Sylvie and Bruno*, who got their instructions mixed and yelled under the palace windows: "More taxes! less bread!"? Here we begin to sniff the acrid, pungent smell of satire. Those fantastic romances, *Gulliver's Travels*, *Utopia*, *Erewhon*, work on exactly the same principle.

Now just as denunciation contributes morality to satire, so exuberance or gaiety contributes to it absurdity or grotesqueness. It is absurdity of a special kind, which I should tentatively call a poetic imagination in reverse gear. The imagination of Quixote, who saw a windmill as a hundred-armed giant, was a genuinely poetic one, if over-literal in its application; but it is the business of the satirist to see giants as windmills, Castlereaghs as pumps. Poetry may deepen and intensify the imaginative impact of things; satire belittles and minimizes it. Allegory in high gear gives us a Spenser or a Bunyan; allegory in reverse gear gives us a *Tale of a Tub*. Poetry may be as primitive as you please, and may thrive on superstition or false belief: satire means civilization and a confidence in the invincibility of the intelligence. I should define satire, then, as poetry assuming a special function of analysis, that is, of breaking up the lumber of stereotypes, fossilized beliefs, superstitious terrors, crank theories, pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive fashions, and all other things that impede the free movement of society. I say free movement rather than progress: progress, besides implying a theory of history to which one may or may not subscribe, implies also that all satire is revolutionary, or at least progressive, which is nonsense. This does not explain the total effect of satire, as we shall see, but it covers its primary objectives.

For society to exist at all there must be a delegation of prestige and influence to organized groups: the church, the army, the medical and teaching professions, the government, all consist of individuals given more than individual power by the institution to which they belong. Whether they are given this power for good or for evil depends largely on them. If a satirist presents a clergyman, for instance, as a fool or a hypocrite, he is primarily attacking neither the man nor his church. The former is too petty and the latter carries him outside the range of satire. He is attacking

an evil man protected by the prestige of an institution. As such, he represents one of the stumbling-blocks in society which it is the satirist's business to clear out.

We have spoken of the resemblance of the giant-killing myth to the technique of satire: there is in both a victory of intelligence over stupid power. In the sort of case we are considering, the satirist's victim is a gigantic monster; monstrous because really a fool or a hypocrite while pretending to be otherwise; gigantic because protected by his position and by the prestige of the good men in it. The cowl might make the monk if it were not for the satirist. Hence, though Milton's etymology may be wrong, his principle is right: "for a Satyr as it was born out of a Tragedy, so ought to resemble his parentage, to strike high, and adventure dangerously at the most eminent vices among the greatest persons." The larger they come, the easier they fall.

When the Philistine giant comes out to battle with the children of light, he naturally expects to find someone his own size ready to meet him, someone who is head and shoulders over every man in Israel. Such a Titan would have to bear down his opponent by sheer weight of words, and hence be a master of that technique of torrential abuse which we call invective. And as invective is very close to moral denunciation, we should expect it to be a form closely allied to preaching. Another reason for this is that the literary qualities necessary for good invective are essentially those of good swearing: a sense of rhythm, an unlimited vocabulary and a technical knowledge of the two subjects which ordinarily form the subject-matter of swearing, one of which is theology. Now if we want satire on military life and martial courage we should expect to find most of it in the army: *Don Quixote* could only have been the work of an old soldier. Similarly, we should not be surprised to find that the two greatest masters of invective, Rabelais and Swift, have been recruited from the clergy. The association between satire and preaching goes back at least to the Hebrew prophets, runs all through medieval sermons on the Seven Deadly Sins and reaches its peak with the Reformation, when controversy poured oil on the fires.

There is another reason why this last period, the sixteenth century, was the golden age of abuse. Controversy supplies the anger, but not the gaiety, of satire: for the source of the latter we must turn to the great influx of new words then coming in. The Elizabethans had a delight in words of a physical kind which we can hardly comprehend today, a kind of reversed drunkenness that comes from outpouring rather than intake. Words spawn and swarm in every corner of their writings: their expenditure of erudite technicalities, fantastically abusive epithets and dizzily inclusive compounds was as reckless as their resources were inexhaustible both in coinage and in the plunder of every language in Europe, living or dead. They could hardly touch a foreign language without gloating over their own superior resources. Thus Cotgrave's French Dictionary defines the

French word *lourdans* as: "a sot, dullard, grotnoll, jobernoll, blockhead; a lowt, lob, lusk, boare, clown, churle, clusterfist; a proud, ignorant and unmannerly swaine." Rabelais tells of a man who retired to the country for quiet, and who found that the animals made such a noise that he could not sleep. Rabelais plagues him with nine sorts of animals; Urquhart of Cromarty, his Scotch translator, expands them to seventy. Urquhart, when not engaged in making Gargantua more Rabelaisian than Rabelais, was busy writing books with such titles as *Trissotetras*, *Pantochronochanon*, *Exkubalauron* and *Logopandecteison*. In an age when even pedantry could produce such a Holofernes, invective is not likely to die of malnutrition. Marston, Bishop Hall's chief follower, is put into a play by his enemy Ben Jonson, given a purge and made to vomit up some of his hard words. They include glibbery, lubrical, magnificate, turgidous, ventosity, oblatrant, furibund, fatuate, prorumped and obstupefact. Thomas Nashe, the greatest prose satirist of the period, calls his opponent, Gabriel Harvey, an impotent mote-catching carper, an indigested chaos of doctorship and a scholastical squitter-book. Here is one sentence from Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*, which, if not directly satirical in itself, certainly illustrates the method and technique of invective:

> Every lover admires his mistress, though she be very deformed of herself, ill-favoured, wrinkled, pimpled, pale, red, yellow, tanned, tallow-faced, have a swollen juggler's platter face, or a thin, lean, chitty face, have clouds in her face, be crooked, dry, bald, goggle-eyed, blear-eyed, or with staring eyes, she looks like a squis'd cat, hold her head still awry, heavy, dull, hollow-eyed, black or yellow about the eyes, or squint-eyed, sparrow-mouthed, Persian hook-nosed, have a sharp fox-nose, a red nose, China flat, great nose, *nare simo patuloque*, a nose like a promontory, gubber-tushed, rotten teeth, black, uneven, brown teeth, beetle-browed, a witch's beard, her breath stink all over the room, her nose drop winter and summer, with a Bavarian poke under her chin, a sharp chin, lave-eared, with a long crane's neck, which stands awry too, *pendulis mammis*, "her dugs like two double jugs," or else no dugs, in that other extreme, bloody-fallen fingers, she have filthy, long unpared nails, scabbed hands or wrists, a tanned skin, a rotten carcass, crooked back, she stoops, is lame, splay-footed, "as slender in the middle as a cow in the waist," gouty legs, her ankles hang over her shoes, her feet stink, she breed lice, a mere changeling, a very monster, an oaf imperfect, her whole complexion savours, an harsh voice, incondite gesture, vile gait, a vast virago, or an ugly tit, a slug, a fat fustilugs, a truss, a long lean rawbone, a skeleton, a sneaker (*si qua latent meliora puta*), and to thy judgment looks like a mard in a lanthorn, whom thou couldst not fancy for a world, but hatest, loathest, and wouldest have spit in her face, or blow thy nose in her bosom, *remedium amoris* to another man, a dowdy, a slut, a scold, a nasty, rank, rammy, filthy, beastly quean, dishonest peradventure, obscene, base, beggarly, rude, foolish, untaught, peevish, Irus' daughter, Thersites' sister, Grobian's scholar; if he love her once, he admires her for all this, he takes no notice of any such errors or imperfections of body or mind, *Ipsa haec delectant, veluti Balbinum polypus Agnae;* he had rather have her than any woman in the world.

Since Dryden, there has been little of this naïve and childlike quality in satire, which has trusted more to the rapier that stabs the heart than to the singlestick that breaks the head. Abuse of this kind is based on a solid physical laugh, an earthquake in miniature, a laugh which begins far down in the abdomen, bursts the vest buttons, rolls the stomach, shakes the

diaphragm, suffocates the throat, reddens the face and finally reduces the whole body to rolling and kicking in an epilepsy of joy, then, after quieting down, returns for the next few hours in a couple of dozen squalls of splutters, gasps and reminiscent chortles, and finally sinks into the subconscious to be left until called for. As Carlyle says:

> How much lies in Laughter: the cipher-key, wherewith we decipher the whole man! Some men wear an everlasting barren simper; in the smile of others lies a cold glitter as of ice: the fewest are able to laugh, what can be called laughing, but only sniff and titter and snigger from the throat outwards; or at best, produce some whiffling husky cachinnation, as if they were laughing through wool: of none such comes good.

Urquhart of Cromarty, an ardent Royalist, is reputed to have laughed on King Charles' Restoration until he burst himself and died. And anyone who has glanced at an old copy of *Punch* can see that their cartoons, with their enormous captions, elaborately festooned with garrulous explanations and parenthetic postscripts, are aimed at a John Bull or fox-hunting squire for whom a laugh was an exhausting indoor exercise. Such a fox-hunting squire might survive to hear himself described by Oscar Wilde as the unspeakable in pursuit of the uneatable. There is an entirely different kind of laughter; not the *forte* of invective but the *piano* of irony, which, like the poisoned rings of the Renaissance, distils its venom in a friendly handshake, unnoticed by its bulky victim.

For better or worse, it is the tiny David with his sudden and vicious stones who goes out to battle now, and the great Rabelaisian bellow has dropped out of literature. For that kind of satire flourishes in a world of solid assurances and unshakable values; the whole weight of a confident society is flung into the scales against limp affectation. The less sure society is of its assumptions, the more likely satire is to take the line of irony, of the method laid down once for all in the dialogues of Plato.

It is impossible not to sympathize with the floundering red-faced brawlers in Plato, with the Thrasymachus or Callicles who is inexorably led on from one trap to another while Socrates sits quietly and smiles. Yet we know that they can never win, because they can never lay a finger on Socrates. Socrates pleads his own ignorance, convicts his opponents of equal ignorance, and there, in most of the shorter dialogues, we are. The master of irony has done nothing but sow doubt and confusion. He calls himself a midwife, but all he does is kill the mother and demonstrate that there is no child.

For irony is not simply the small man's way of fighting a bigger one: it is a kind of intellectual tear-gas that breaks the nerves and paralyses the muscles of everyone in its vicinity, an acid that will corrode healthy as well as decayed tissues. We have said that satire is primarily directed at the impediments of society; but irony has an automatically expansive and destroying force; it is a bomb dropped on an objective which, if it misses that, will at any rate hit something in an enemy's territory. Take, for example, the warfare of science against superstition. Here the satirists

have done famously. Chaucer and Ben Jonson riddled the alchemists with a cross-fire of their own jargon; Nashe and Swift hounded astrologers into premature graves; Browning's *Sludge the Medium* annihilated the spiritualists; and a rabble of occultists, numerologists, Pythagoreans and Rosicrucians lie dead in the wake of *Hudibras*. But when triumphant science turns to shake hands with the satirists, there is again that little prick of the poisoned ring. For all satirists are not so ready to see the sharp dividing line between alchemists and chemists, a Rosicrucian cell meeting and the Royal Society. Samuel Butler makes his scientists discover an elephant in the moon which turns out to be a mouse in the telescope. It does not matter; their scientific reputation is at stake, and an elephant in the moon it must be. Swift's Grand Academy of Lagado, in *Gulliver's Travels*, is a vast scientific laboratory in which professors are deeply engaged in such experiments as "to sow land with chaff, wherein he affirmed the true seminal virtue to be contained." In fact there seems to be as perennial a warfare between satire and all forms of science and philosophy, as between satire and superstition. What Rabelais and Erasmus thought of the scholastics, Swift thought of the Cartesians; and what Voltaire thought of the Leibnitzians, Samuel Butler II thought of the Darwinians. In every case it is not the doctrine but its application to society that is attacked; however, the satirist has a latent distrust of the adequacy of human reason that becomes most articulate in *Gulliver's Travels:*

> I was going on to more particulars, when my master commanded me to silence. He said whoever understood the nature of Yahoos might easily believe it possible for so vile an animal to be capable of every action I had named, if their strength and cunning equalled their malice. But when a creature pretending to reason could be capable of such enormities, he dreaded lest the corruption of that faculty might be worse than brutality itself. He seemed therefore confident, that instead of reason, we were only possessed of some quality fitted to increase our natural vices.

Similarly with religion. There is a great deal of hypocrisy and corruption in any church, and a great deal of superstition in popular worship. Any really devout person would welcome a satirist who cauterized such infections as an ally of true religion. But once a hypocrite who sounds exactly like a good man is sufficiently blackened, the good man himself may begin to seem a little dingier than he was. Thus Burns' Holy Willie is doubtless only a reprobate, but does not his confession make many others, who would say Amen to much of it, look a little like Holy Willies?

> When frae my mither's womb I fell,
> Thou might hae plunged me in hell,
> To gnash my gums, to weep and wail,
> In burnin' lake,
> Where damned devils roar and yell,
> Chain'd to a stake.
>
> Yet I am here a chosen sample,
> To show thy grace is great and ample;
> I'm here a pillar in thy temple,

> Strong as a rock,
> A guide, a buckler, an example
> To a' thy flock.

Even the God Holy Willie is praying to begins to take on some of his features, just as the God of the Pharisee's prayer was a Pharisee. The same thing happens to the treatment of superstition. In Lilliput, we are told,

> They bury their dead with their heads directly downwards, because they hold an opinion, that in eleven thousand moons they are all to rise again, in which period the earth (which they conceive to be flat) will turn upside down, and by this means they shall, at their resurrection, be found ready standing on their feet. The learned among them confess the absurdity of this doctrine, but the practice still continues, in compliance to the vulgar.

But does not the satire go on quietly eating its way into the very heart of our own views of immortality, no matter how smug or how vague? In the same writer's *Tale of a Tub* we are much more convinced that Jack and Peter are wrong than that Martin is right.

Or again, take that scene, one of the most powerfully ironic in all literature, at the climax of *Huckleberry Finn*, where Huck has to decide whether he will go to heaven to the white slave-owners' God or to hell for stealing Jim out of slavery. We know that the white slave-owners' God is a bogey, an example, as Goya would say, of what a tailor can do. But Huck does not know that. He is no Prometheus Unbound; it never occurs to him to doubt that the white slave-owners' God is the only true God. And in contemplating his predicament we can only say that the half-gods have gone: we have no evidence that the gods have arrived.

And if we fall back from the outworks of faith and reason to the solid and tangible realities of the senses, satire will follow us even there. A slight shift of perspective, a different tinge in the emotional colouring, and the same real, physical world becomes an intolerable horror. *Gulliver's Travels* show, in rapid review, man from a large perspective as a venomous little rodent, man from a small perspective as a noisome and clumsy pachyderm, the mind of man as a bear-pit and the body of man as a compound of filth and ferocity. Swift shows us everything about the human body that can be made to appear disgusting and nauseating; his account of old age is the most hideous on record; and his sense of the nastiness and sordidness of ordinary life, which oozes through his *Directions to Servants* and his more unquotable poems, seems not so much abnormal as merely perverse. But he is simply following where his satiric genius leads him, and without raising any questions about his "purpose," surely anyone who had attentively read Swift could never again find complete satisfaction in gratifying his senses. And that is an important barrier in civilization removed.

The fact that all great satirists have been obscene suggests that obscenity is an essential characteristic of the satirist. Swift is in the direct tradition of the medieval preachers who painted the repulsiveness of

gluttony and lechery; and his account of the Struldbrugs is a late version of the medieval dance of death. The preoccupation of medieval satirists with the theme of death, often assigned to morbidity, is part of the same moral criticism. It is all very well to eat, drink and be merry; but one cannot always put off dying until tomorrow.

We are getting close to one of the fundamental facts about satire: that the sardonic vision is the seamy side of the tragic vision. We usually associate satire with comedy, but to the extent that a comedy is satiric it possesses a more than comic seriousness. A comedy is, or purports to be, a study of human behaviour, and in its most concentrated forms, in a play by Congreve or a novel by Jane Austen, we are superficially conscious of only an amiable and civilized prattle. The satire in such a comedy comes as a kind of backfire or recoil after it is read or seen as a whole. Once read, deserts of futile snobbery and simpering insipidity open up on all sides of it, and we begin to feel that Congreve and Jane Austen are more aware than a less able comedian would be of the importance of being earnest. Collins, in *Pride and Prejudice*, being a mere jackass, is treated as comic relief; but if the novel's main theme had been the married life of Charlotte and Collins, how long would Collins continue to be funny? And when this chattering world of card-parties and dances comes under direct satiric fire, it turns into a racking nightmare of horror:

> As Hags hold Sabbaths, less for joy than spite,
> So these their merry, miserable Night;
> Still round and round the Ghosts of Beauty glide,
> And haunt the places where their Honour died.
> See how the World its Veterans rewards!
> A Youth of Frolics, an old Age of Cards;
> Fair to no purpose, artful to no end,
> Young without Lovers, old without a Friend;
> A Fop their Passion, but their Prize a Sot;
> Alive, ridiculous, and dead, forgot!

It is possible for comedy on a very high plane, the plane of *The Tempest*, the *Franklin's Tale* or *The Magic Flute*, to escape altogether from satire; but tragedy can never separate itself from irony. Flights of angels sing Hamlet to his rest in the climax of a frantically muddled attempt at revenge which has taken eight lives instead of one. Cleopatra fades away with great dignity and solemn music after a careful search for the easiest way to die. And in *King Lear*, when the mad old king scampers off the stage with his flowers stuck in his hair, or Gloucester makes a noble farewell speech, throws himself from a cliff, and falls a couple of feet, tragedy and irony have completely merged in something which is neither, and yet both at once. The sublime and the ridiculous are convex and concave of the same dark lens. One may find this in the middle of one of the most terrible and bloody tragedies in English literature, Webster's *Duchess of Malfi:*

> What's this flesh? A little crudded milk, fantastical puff-paste. Our bodies are weaker

than those paper-prisons boys use to keep flies in; more contemptible, since ours is to preserve earth-worms. Didst thou ever see a lark in a cage? Such is the soul in the body: this world is like her little turf of grass, and the heaven o'er our heads, like her looking-glass, only gives us a miserable knowledge of the small compass of our prison.

Or one may find this in a modern American ballad, of uncertain parentage:

> The old grey hearse goes rolling by,
> You don't know whether to laugh or cry,
> For you know some day it'll get you too,
> And the hearse's next load may consist of you.
>
> They'll take you out, and they'll lower you down
> While men with shovels stand all around:
> They'll throw in dirt, and they'll throw in rocks,
> And they won't give a damn if they break the box.
>
> And your eyes drop out and your teeth fall in,
> And worms crawl over your mouth and chin:
> They invite their friends and their friends' friends too,
> And you look like hell when they're through with you.

At what point does the fact of death cease to be tragic and become a grim joke? When Mr. E. J. Pratt, in his poem called "The Drag-Irons," describes the hauling up of a drowned captain, is his mood the tragic one of violent death or the satiric one of the indignity of the body?

> But with his Captain's blood he did resent,
> With livid silence and with glassy look,
> This fishy treatment when his years were spent
> To come up dead upon a grapnel hook.

The same principle is clear in Chaucer. The *Canterbury Tales* is simply a human comedy: it is not a deliberate satire. Chaucer studies his pilgrims carefully, but does not distort or caricature them. If they are fools and weaklings, they will come out as that, and we may call the result a satire if we wish; if they are decent people, like the knight or the ploughman, they will come out as such. To this larger comic aim both tragedy and satire must be subordinated. The *Knight's Tale* is pathetic rather than tragic; it is sad, but it is told to amuse the pilgrims. The *Merchant's Tale* is bitter and cynical; but, again, that is merely a contributing aspect to the human comedy. In the *Troilus* the case is very different. Here we have a full-dress tragedy, complete in itself, with all the unanswerable problems in it that tragedy raises. And when its hero dies his tragic death, he ascends into the stars and looks down upon the world:

> And in hymself he lough right at the wo
> Of hem that wepten for his deth so faste;
> And dampned al oure werk that foloweth so
> The blynde lust, the which that may nat laste.

The laugh of pure satire is the echo to his tragedy.

Satire at its most concentrated, therefore, is tragedy robbed of all its dignity and nobility, a universal negation that cheapens and belittles

everything. *Gulliver's Travels* destroys every standard of values except the life according to reason and nature, and then demonstrates that such a life is impossible. More makes a shambles out of Christian Europe, contrasts it with a heathen Utopia, and finally shows us that there is little hope of Utopian principles being applied to Europe and that Christianity has started to destroy the Utopia. Langland's great vision culminates in something very like a triumph of Antichrist. It is against this background that we are able to see why the most deliberate and self-conscious satire in English literature, Pope's *Dunciad*, comes to the conclusion it does. It is not only the triumph of Dullness but the triumph of satire that that great poem records, and in the complete triumph of satire the victor reigns, like Elizabeth in Ireland, only over ashes and dead carcasses:

> Religion blushing veils her sacred fires,
> And unawares Morality expires.
> Nor public Flame, nor private, dares to shine;
> Nor human Spark is left, nor Glimpse divine!
> Lo! thy dread Empire, CHAOS! is restor'd;
> Light dies before thy uncreating word;
> Thy hand, great Anarch! lets the curtain fall,
> And universal Darkness buries All.

Now, one may reasonably ask, what is the use, or, if that is too vague a question, the motive, of this art of nihilism? For the occupational hazards of satire are very considerable. "Certainly, he that hath a satirical vein," says Lord Bacon, "as he maketh others afraid of his wit, so he had need be afraid of others' memory." Satire got Nashe, Jonson, Marston and Wither into gaol; it got Defoe into both gaol and the pillory; it involved Dryden and Pope in squabbles which their worst detractors will hardly affirm they enjoyed; and it perhaps had more to do than is generally thought with the poverty and neglect of Samuel Butler. Skelton, satiric poet and thrice-crowned laureate, tutor to King Henry VIII in his youth, has put the position of the satirist as plaintively as anyone. It was only fair that he should, for the sixteenth century made him a buffoon, the seventeenth ignored him, in the eighteenth Pope called him "beastly" and in the nineteenth a female historian called him an abandoned wretch whose tutorial influence undoubtedly explained King Henry's Bluebearding tendencies:

> What can it avail . . .
> To rhyme or to rail,
> To write or to indite,
> Either for delight
> Or else for despight?
> Or books to compile
> Of divers manner style,
> Vice to revile
> And sin to exile?
> To teach or to preach,
> As reason will reach?
> Say this, and say that,

His head is so fat,
He wotteth never what
Nor whereof he speaketh . . .
Or if he speak plain,
Then he lacketh brain,
He is but a fool;
Let him go to school . . .
And if that he hit
The nail on the head,
It standeth in no stead.
The Devil, they say, is dead,
The Devil is dead!

As for the use, that is the concern of posterity. The true seminal virtue of satire is not in the chaff, and it takes a good deal of winnowing to separate the harvest from the husks of gossip and insult. The use an age makes of satire thus depends on its own problems. In an age such as ours, when the urgency of radical change is a main pre-occupation, the innate nihilism of satire, reactionary and wrong-headed as it often is, can be put to a revolutionary use. Langland was doubtless what we should now call a Tory, but his identification of Christ with the honest workman Piers Plowman cuts through all the fat of compromise with the world down to the bare bones of an eternally subversive and anarchic Christianity, and that is his meaning for us. Dickens's influence also is for us completely radical, whatever he himself may have been. When his Pickwick goes from the law court into the debtor's prison, it never once occurs to him that the accumulated legal wisdom of his country, which has decided against him, is entitled to the smallest respect whatever. That is a useful frame of mind to have in citizens of a free democracy who are determined not to be hag-ridden by precedent. That curious self-depreciation in respect to physical courage which is so characteristic of the Englishman is also closer to satire than it looks. It is founded on the profoundly satiric belief that physical dignity can only last as far as the first banana peeling. Cockney cheek and impudence have done much to save England from swaggering and posturing tyrants; the Jorrocks of that neglected Victorian genius Surtees, who is one of the best Cockneys in literature, will do for an example:

"You 'air-dresser on the chestnut 'oss," roars Mr. Jorrocks, during a check, to a gentleman with very big, ginger whiskers, "pray, 'old 'ard!"

"Hair-dresser," replies the gentleman, turning round in a fury, "I'm an officer in the ninety-first regiment."

"Then you hossifer in the ninety-fust regiment, wot looks like an 'air-dresser, 'old 'ard!"

Satire, in short, is the completion of the logical process known as the *reductio ad absurdum*, and that is not designed to hold one in perpetual captivity, but to bring one to the point at which one can escape from an incorrect procedure. Just as a mother tells a timid child afraid of the dark that there is nothing there, so the satirist presents ignorance and confusion with a negation. And when the public tells the satirist that the devil is

dead, the very smugness of the response proves that his work has had some effect.

I have said that the sardonic vision is the seamy side of the tragic vision, but Skelton's remark provides me with a more exact image for what I mean. At the bottom of Dante's hell, which is also the centre of the spherical earth, Dante sees Satan standing upright in the circle of ice, and as he cautiously follows Virgil over the hip and thigh of the evil giant, letting himself down by the tufts of hair on his skin, he passes the centre and finds himself no longer going down but going up, climbing out on the other side of the world to see the stars again. From this point of view, the devil is no longer upright, but standing on his head, in the same attitude in which he was hurled downward from heaven upon the other side of the earth. Both tragedy and satire take us into a hell of narrowing circles, a blasted world of repulsiveness and idiocy, a world without pity and without hope. Both culminate in some such vision as that of Dante's, of the source of all evil in a personal form. Tragedy can take us no farther; but if we persevere with the satirist, we shall pass a dead centre, and finally see the gentlemanly Prince of Darkness bottom side up.

WHAT KIND OF POST-WAR SECURITY?

J. R. Mallory

I

THE kind of peace-keeping machinery men want will depend upon what they think are the causes of war. The Peace Conference which followed the last war revealed two widely different schools of thought, the chief exponents of which were on the one hand Clemenceau and on the other Wilson. The establishment of the League of Nations was a triumph for the Wilsonian view, but the enormous and unworkable reparations payments represented the demands of Clemenceau. The resulting peace was therefore a compromise between two irreconcileable ideas as to the cause and nature of the war. On the one hand the reparations demands, the attempt to make Germany pay the cost of the war though her trade was so crippled that full payment was impossible, were the result of a determination to impose the whole responsibility for the war upon Germany. On the other hand, it was implicit in the whole structure of the League of Nations that the cause of war lay elsewhere than in the villainy of any particular nation. The League Covenant was a vehicle for saving the nineteenth-century capitalist state from itself. It was the product of a generation which realized that war was bad for trade and a source of economic woe to both victor and vanquished. Clearly, therefore, war was contrary to the best interest of all states. Each state, however, in pursuing its own interest as it sees it, is sometimes driven to war through, as it were, the imperfection of its own environment.

Actually all differences between states were thought of as being capable of settlement through negotiation and reasoned compromise. However, the thing that led to war was a fear of being "had," a sense of insecurity because it was not possible to know the real bargaining strength of one's rival. Accordingly the Covenant aimed at keeping international agreements above the table, so that there could be no room for suspicion. Again, the League was to bend its efforts towards disarmament, because the army of a rival, no less than his secret allies, gave cause to fear him. Causes of friction, of course, did exist. But if they could be attended to in time and examined impartially, away from the atmosphere of contingent force that accompanied the old diplomacy, they seemed to stand a good chance of settlement without being magnified into major disputes.

That was the international philosophy of life that permeated the League and, in spite of the punitive clauses in the treaties, it came more and more to dominate the international scene in the twenties. It sought in essence to superimpose a voluntary self-denying code on the members of the international community. It accepted the comfortable belief that the paramountcy of the common interest, given reasonable stimulation,

was self-evident, and it sought peace by increasing the area of co-operation between states. Yet the framers of the League were not naïve enough to believe that reason would always prevail. Provision was made for imposing both economic and military sanctions on any state which failed to see an identity of interest between its own needs and the common welfare. It is quite possible that if the conditions of the twenties had persisted, these provisions would have been adequate to keep the peace.

However the League laboured under serious disadvantages from the outset. The defection of the United States was a hard blow to its capacity to back the interest of the community of states with a suitable show of force. Unfortunately, too, the League inherited the incongruous provisions of the peace treaties. In so far as it took on the shape of a mere defender of the *status quo*, it seemed more and more to be committed to preserving a prime cause of war instead of removing it. The provisions under Article XIX for peaceful revision of outworn treaties aroused little enthusiasm and were from the first a dead letter. But its chief weakness was structural. Because it failed to challenge the doctrine of unlimited national sovereignty, it could only recommend action to its members. For its members to bestir themselves in the face of common peril required that they should be convinced of the urgency of the need for action. Where the danger was external to the League, action was not difficult; but in the face of aggression from one of its own members the League had to contend with a whole mass of conflicting interests and loyalties. The attempts to rouse the League to deal with aggression when it came from Germany and Italy were largely frustrated by the fact that many of the members either sympathized strongly with the régimes in those countries or feared the result of their collapse more than the possibility of their expansion. On the other hand, the rapidity with which the Soviet Union was condemned with bell and book for invading Finland provides a highly instructive contrast. The Soviet Union was in many respects outside the international community. It represented a successful revolution and a rejection of values which were precious to the ruling groups in many countries. Since it was friendless, unanimity of condemnation was easy; and even reasonably effective action was possible; though it was noticeable that the enthusiasm of member states for the Finnish cause increased rapidly with their distance from the borders of the Soviet Union.

The above example suggests a further defect in the thinking of the framers of the League. They seem to have expected aggression primarily from those states which rejected the liberal internationalism on which the Covenant was based. It says much for the optimism that prevailed that it was assumed that such states would be few or at least small, such as the perennially turbulent Balkans. That widespread and general abandonment of liberal values was possible in so short a time quite naturally did not enter their heads.

When the peace comes to be made after this war we are not likely to

be worried by any marked divergence of view as to the cause and nature of the war. There is today a unanimity of opinion on the subject which would be extremely formidable if it were likely to be permanent. For all governments of the United Nations the problem and the solution appear in strikingly similar terms. The problem of peace is quite simply the prevention of a resurgence of German or Japanese power, and all other problems are subsidiary to it. The method is equally simple. It is in the first place to destroy that power, and in the second place to plan a concentration of international authority to be brought against the slightest threat of its recurrence.

II

The new international authority which is in the minds of the planners at Dumbarton Oaks will take over a large part of the machinery of the old League of Nations as worth using. It will make significant changes where the Great Powers consider the League was weak, or where it must be adapted to meet circumstances not foreseen by its original framers. These changes will reflect the difference between the two Great Wars and will indicate the new conditions which may endanger the peace of the future.

Though there are similarities between the closing phases of the present war and the events of 1918, there are also great differences. After the last war it was the Great Powers that were weakened most. The Russian Empire, a major weight in the European balance of power for two centuries, had gone down in revolutionary collapse. The second great continental nation, Germany, was defeated and broken; the Austrian Empire had finally disintegrated and France had suffered terribly from the war. Though the British Empire emerged intact, its power had declined relatively to that of the United States. But even the United States was unable to dominate the peace because of internal conflict generated by the dawning awareness of its new status. Japan had profited from the war but was not yet strong enough for a serious trial of strength in the Pacific. So the chief beneficiaries of the peace were the small nations, not a few of them newly created. The principle of national self-determination which President Wilson championed at Versailles spawned new states out of the ruins of the old Austrian Empire and at the expense of the friendless Russians. The League was the formal expression of the unity of this much-changed Europe, a Europe which did not include Russia and which in the beginning tried to exclude Germany. As a formal vehicle for holding together these new small states the League was not inappropriate, and it is significant that its most successful period was before any single large nation was in a position to challenge the *status quo*.

The result this time will be very different. The Great Powers have become greater and the small ones smaller. Both Russia and the United States have grown in strength since the war began. The British Empire has carried a heavy share of the burden of the war and is now relatively

much weaker in relation to both the United States and the Soviet Union. This has led on the one hand to a new attitude towards Soviet Russia, as revealed in the twenty-year treaty of friendship and alliance, and on the other to a marked deference to American wishes in numerous matters. At the same time it has made many Englishmen yearn with General Smuts and Lord Halifax for a tight imperial power bloc as a counterpoise to Russia and the United States in the post-war world.

The German conquests of the first years of the war have also knocked down a good many boundaries which will not be easy to restore—boundaries which defied geography and race and economics. The peoples of the small countries have been wrenched out of their national pigeon-holes and have, for the time being, become merely Europeans. Their laws, their institutions and their economic life have been torn from their national context and forced into a new pattern. The restoration of these ruined institutional structures may not be a simple matter. Certainly it would be foolish to expect that it will be possible to restore pre-war conditions in the wake of such profound changes. Several of the governments in exile are only in a very limited sense governments. They represent the old reactionary régimes which collapsed like paper before the German advance. The resistance movements which have grown up are led by stronger and more determined men who will not readily admit the authority of remote governments which even before the war did not rest on broad popular support. This is obviously true in the case of Poland and Yugoslavia. For just as the Stukas flattened much that was ugly and undesirable architecturally as well as much that was noble and beautiful from Coventry to Belgrade, so the Germans have destroyed more than the noble traditional values of the conquered countries. The solvent of war has washed away much that was rotten and corrupt in the social and political structure of Europe. Sometimes it was destroyed when the Germans swept it away, and sometimes it was destroyed when they befriended it. In spite of ourselves, both we and the Germans have set new currents moving in Europe. Men want not only to shake off the yoke of the New Order but also to be rid of the blighting effects of the old. Allied diplomacy could make no more fatal error than to attempt the restoration of discredited governments in the name of stability.

But the present war has differed from the last one in another and terrible way, and the problems of peace have thereby become more difficult. This is the most savage European conflict since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The great religious wars of that time were wars of extermination which divided men by reason of their faith rather than by reason of their nationality. They were wars in which both sides were so sure of their hold on ultimate truth that they had no compunction in exterminating opponents whom they considered damned in the grip of fundamental error.

It was reaction from the savagery of those times which gave birth to

the notion of the international law of war with which we associate the great name of Grotius. From that time an attempt was made to localize the effect of war to the actual participants. This was possible because even in war-time nations felt themselves part of a larger European community which shared common ideas of right and wrong. For the next two centuries wars were fought between armies, and their full horrors were spared non-combatants. Men realized that when the war was over they would have to live together in a world which must include both victor and vanquished.

We seem today to have recaptured the single-minded savagery of the age of faith. Today there are no non-combatants who are not within the range of bombing aircraft. Nor is this simply a war between states. It has cut across national loyalties. The Nazis have been able to exploit the aid and sympathy of powerful allies in all the countries opposed to them, while arrayed against them have been not only the people of their enemies but also a considerable band of Germans who see the only hope for their civilization in the destruction of the Nazi state. This is a war between two ideas of civilization as tenaciously held as the warring and irreconcilable religious faiths of the seventeenth century. We have lost, as we did not lose in 1914-18, all common grounds for agreement on what constitutes a satisfactory political and social order, and we are fighting a civil war to re-establish those common grounds.

The struggle against Japan is also, in part, a racial war. Like religious and ideological wars, racial ones feed on fears, dislikes and prejudices, so that when it is all over there is precious little common ground upon which to construct a peace in which both sides dare allow each other to survive. In spite of the fact that in Asia we find China and India on our side, it is hard to escape the tendency to hate the Japanese because of their race and colour. There are signs that the racial aspect of the war has affected not only the attitude of the North American countries towards their tiny and inoffensive Japanese minorities, but is having serious repercussions on the Negro problem in the United States.

The ideological and racial cleavage between the combatants is perhaps the most important feature distinguishing this war from the last one. The success of President Wilson's Fourteen Points in weakening the will of the German people revealed in itself how much of a common political language the two sides spoke. This time it is very different. Today there is such a mutual lack of comprehension that in almost every case what appears good to one side is abhorrent to the other. The failure of our leaders to appreciate the essentially revolutionary character of the German régime was largely responsible for the German successes before 1939. It is shown, for example, in the failure of the British Government to understand that the success of General Franco in Spain was a major strategic victory for the Axis Powers. It explains the utter failure of the purpose to which Mr. Neville Chamberlain devoted the last years of his life.

It will not be easy to build a peace out of such utterly irreconcilable differences. It presents the Allied Powers with the alternative of either utterly destroying Germany and Japan or of painfully rebuilding a world in which there are again common values of civilized behaviour. The first course has the beauty of simplicity but it is neither feasible nor desirable in the long run. Western Europe can no more live without the great reservoir of skills and resources of Germany than we in Canada can live without the Province of Ontario. In any event to attempt to destroy Germany would not only enlist all the instincts of humanity and decency in the Allied countries against their own governments; it would also play into the hands of those elements among the Nazis who are already said to be planning to go underground and capitalize on the frustration and resentment of defeated Germany in order to regain power. Yet it will be difficult to avoid a vindictive peace, even in Europe. In the occupied countries the desire for revenge is, not unnaturally, a dominant emotion. Since their contribution to the war has been, as Dr. Hambro has said, one hundred per cent, their feelings must be taken into account at the peace table. In part we can understand these feelings, though the people of Europe have undergone much that cannot be really understood without being shared. It is a feeling, however, which no North American country has a right to indulge, for we have suffered nothing to entitle us to it.

It may be possible to make Germany bear the burden of restoring what war has destroyed without jeopardizing the machinery of the peace. A method of doing this has been outlined by Julian Huxley in a brilliant essay.[1] Properly conceived it is possible to separate the problem of punishing war criminals from the problem of world organization. Here, however, we are concerned only with the latter.

Ultimately we shall have to rebuild the world on such a basis that we and our enemies can live together on a foundation of common notions of civilization. That the task is appallingly difficult is apparent to anyone familiar with the systematic poisoning of the minds of the younger generation of Germans and Japanese that has been going on for so long. The task of re-education is not only technically difficult, but it is full of inherent dangers of rousing the same resentments which made easy the psychological preparation for this war. However, we can take consolation from one fact. Just as at the end of the Thirty Years' War many Europeans concluded that no difference was so great as to justify prolonging the savagery of that struggle, so men may again conclude that mere survival will require a greater acceptance of common values. The fact that the war will have sapped the emotional and nervous energies of the combatants will itself provide the opportunity to secure the acceptance of agreement.

III

If we are to create a real and lasting peace it is necessary to construct a peace-keeping authority and to bring about a revival of international law.

[1]See his essay "Revolution and Peace" in *On Living in a Revolution* (New York, 1944).

The dealings of states in time of peace have long been governed by a set of commonly accepted principles which we call international law. Such matters as the treatment of one another's nationals, the control of ships at sea, the privileges accorded to diplomatic representatives and the rules governing the acquisition and transfer of territory have all come under international law either through commonly accepted custom or by direct adoption through treaties.

The growth of the scope of international law has meant the increased definition and recognition of rights which could be asserted and to some extent enforced by procedures built up to administer international law. Where disputes between states over rights involved no vital interest, the practice became more common of submitting such disputes to arbitration or judicial settlement. As the world drew closer together, because of the increase in transport and trade in the last century, the provision of impartial means of settlement for the disputes generated by increasing contact became more important.[2]

However international law has one fatal defect. It succeeds only where the parties to a dispute are satisfied with legal means of redress. It can do nothing to prevent a state from resorting to war to seek what it cannot gain by legal means. Now it is the essence of the notion of state sovereignty that no state can admit the existence of a legal superior entitled to compel it to obey. So as long as international law and state sovereignty co-exist, no state can be compelled to obey the law. The only basis of international law is consent, and the absence of sanctions to enforce its decrees has led most people to conclude that international law is not law at all.

But there is an important sense in which international law is law. All law rests, for its ultimate enforcement, on the consent of the governed, and any state which upholds the law in fair weather and ignores it in foul, at least raises some doubts as to the strict morality of its conduct. So long as international law exists as a crystallization of the sense of fair play of the community, it imposes a caveat which governments fear to trespass without elaborate justification.

The relative magnitude of modern states and the nature of modern warfare have made it less and less likely that justice, left to itself, will triumph in the end. It is therefore evident that we shall have to provide ourselves with peace-keeping machinery which is both effective and impartial. The great obstacle to such a step is the notion of state sovereignty. The metaphysical debate over its nature is largely beside the point so that it need not detain us here. The fact is that to use the term sovereignty to describe the essential characteristic of both Luxembourg and the United States of America reduces the term to something that is almost meaningless. Sovereign states may be equal in the eyes of international law, but they are obviously unequal in bargaining power. There are almost as many

[2]The bearing of international law on the peace is discussed at length in P. E. Corbett, *Post-War Worlds* (Toronto, 1942), 98-108.

degrees of sovereignty as there are states. The real problem is to create such conditions of mutual confidence that the strong will no longer prefer to confide their safety in their own strength.

Several courses are open to the nations after the war. They may prefer to return to power politics rather than assume the sacrifices essential to co-operation. To do so would clearly lead to the construction of regional power blocs and ultimately to war. They may revert to the kind of co-operation which was built up after the last war. Even if that system was so tender of the right of each state to be damned in its own way that it lacked any effective collective will, it did at least lead to a growth of the habit of co-operation. Its achievements were real, but limited. Again, the lesson of the *débâcle* of the League may have been so thoroughly learnt that an entirely new world authority may arise with the power to compel the preservation of an international system based on rights. That such an authority is desirable cannot seriously be questioned, but whether it is feasible is perhaps not so self-evident. Finally, there are those who see federation as the only logical alternative to anarchy. Logically their position may be sound, but those of us who have lived in a federal state may have to be convinced that there is any peculiar virtue in the mere form of federation. Federation translates whole areas of conflict of interest out of the arena of politics into the realm of judicial determination. To work, it requires a homogeneous community deeply imbued with the legal spirit and the reverence for law. That such a community is feasible among the very different civilizations of Western Europe and North America is at least open to much doubt. Federalism is inherently inflexible, and to expect it to adapt itself to the complex task of reconciling the clashes of interest of nations is close to utopianism.

The strategic lessons of the war have already given the Great Powers a healthy distrust of their capacity to stand alone and consequently increased their willingness to contemplate collective measures for mutual protection. All four of the Great Powers have indicated a willingness to see a world organization equipped to keep the peace.[3] It is not yet possible to say whether they will feel the same impelling need when the common task of the war is finished.

IV

What kind of peace-keeping machinery, then, can we expect to see emerging after the war is over? The promises and pronouncements made by the leaders of the United Nations, from the Atlantic Charter to the recent declarations on a revived world order, are bathed in sweetness and light. But what governments promise and what governments do are different things. The impelling sense of a common struggle has in the past four years lifted men's minds from lesser differences and fixed them on

[3]For a useful collection of the relevant documents see L. Savage (ed.), *The Nations Have Declared* (Toronto, 1944), a pamphlet prepared by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

great common necessities. When the war is over and the common peril has receded it may be harder to hold the nobler perspective, for then the sleeping dogs of vested interest will begin to sniff at the peace table. It is also worth remembering that these pronouncements are weapons of political warfare. They provide the concrete objectives which are so necessary for the will to victory in the Allied countries, and no doubt they help to soften the morale of the enemy.

Therefore we must be wary of pinning too much faith on mere words. "It is, after all," as Harold Laski has observed, "the primary lesson of the years of appeasement that we interpret our obligations in terms of our interests, as we see them at the moment when the obligations fall due."[4] We must not expect too much from the peace. Our politicians and advertising copy-writers are impelled to see the future in glorious colours. The rest of us will best serve ourselves by being cautious.

On the other hand, we perform no service by being merely cynical. In so doing we fail to take advantage of a real momentum of desire for a better world which can be harnessed to the support of a well-conceived peace. It was the cynical realists who could see Japan's point of view over Manchuria, and Italy's in Ethiopia, who as Englishmen applauded Mr. Chamberlain's common sense, or who as Americans thought that they could do business with Hitler. It was they who could not see that General Franco's triumph completed the encirclement of France, which did so much to bring about the collapse of French morale in 1940. That kind of realism is blinder than the blindest optimism, for it has no inner reserve of moral principle to make it fight.

We may save ourselves a lot of trouble if we realize that many of the post-war problems will already be solved before the peace conference has digested the chairman's opening remarks. Whatever the anxious doubts of the State Department, it is evident that Frenchmen have a perverse preference for General de Gaulle's Committee. It is also likely that events will have determined what kind of government there will be in Italy and Greece. It may even be that the course of the war will determine what will happen to Germany and to the German leaders before the energies of the peace conference can be brought to bear on the problem. Politically, Europe is a volcano which may evolve its own shape when the stopper of German power is removed.

We should be grateful for these things. If the European countries can reshape their own destinies there will be no residue of resentment to sour the peace settlement and provide aid and comfort to thwarted vested interests. We shall probably have to decide what to do with Japan and we may have to make up our minds about several hard problems in China before we are through. It is rather likely that the peace settlement in Asia will be much harder than that in Europe because it will have to be mposed and enforced by the Great Powers.

What we shall need to do, particularly in the West, is to concentrate

[4] *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (New York, 1943), 316.

more on the conditions under which peace may be reasonably permanent, than on the means of enforcing it. That was perhaps the major failure of the last settlement. It provided an elaborate machine for stopping aggression once it had started, but the League lacked the will and the understanding to prevent causes of friction from arising. It is encouraging that this time we appear to be putting first things first in such matters, for example as by the setting up of UNRRA. An international relief agency can have a permanent and valuable part in the post-war international order. Similarly, if the monetary conference at Bretton Woods leads to an adequate and permanent international monetary authority, we may go a long way towards removing the unevenness of benefits and burdens which played such a large part in generating the present war.

There is much to be said for the functional approach to the problem of peace. The functional approach is briefly, to consider each single problem as a problem in administration and then to decide the size and scope of the agency and the relative responsibility of its members according to the area of the problem and their relative importance in connection with it.

There is, as J. B. S. Haldane once observed, an appropriate size for every agency of human government just as there is an appropriate size for every form of life. The problem of allocating the world's food supplies is clearly a problem in which Canada, for example, has a primary interest and a major contribution to make. On the other hand, our interest in the equally international problem of the control of European rivers is slight. Consequently the two problems can be dealt with most effectively by different international bodies, with responsibilities allocated in the light of different needs.

In a very persuasive pamphlet David Mitrany has argued that we should attack the question of peace in the first instance through the setting up of these functional agencies.[5] They would do much to lay the foundations of a smoothly-working international society long before it becomes necessary to deal with the long-term problem of peace. Placing the latter problem first, and then arriving belatedly on the scene to deal with the former need, was one of the primary faults of the last international order. If we set out to deal with the common problems first without waiting to nail our differences to the mast in the manner of Mr. Streit's federal union of democracies, we may get better results.

However, international functional bodies will not of themselves stop wars, any more than good living conditions for the poor will stop all crime. We must provide some authority which will give aggressors less than an even chance of getting away with aggression. The human mind is a complex thing, and it would be very unwise to assume that mere mutual prosperity would make men peaceful and reasonable all the time. Further, our peace-keeping machinery cannot be merely negative. As E. H. Carr has written: "It cannot be too often repeated—for it is still not widely understood—that neither security nor peace can properly be made the object of policy . . . .

[5] *A Working Peace System* (London, 1943).

[International peace] cannot be achieved by the signing of pacts or covenants outlawing war any more than revolutions are prevented by making them illegal."[6] What is important is to prevent the causes of wars from arising.

That is where present events do not provide a rosy outlook for a lasting peace. The small nations were the principal beneficiaries of the last settlement, but it is clear that the Great Powers are determined to be the beneficiaries of the one to come. There is real danger that the future may see an uneasy balance of competing power blocs. No one who reads the lush outpourings of the advertising copy-writers in the United States can fail to be impressed by the degree that the American business man has grasped the commercial possibilities of world markets. It is not equally clear that he is aware of either the dangers or the responsibilities of aggressive commercial expansion. Though internal development will absorb all Russian energies for many years to come, it is not impossible that a clash of interest between those two Great Powers may impel each to re-examine the basis of its own security against attack, and perhaps debate the relative merits of survival and co-operation. It will be a strong international authority indeed which will be able to stand above a clash of interest of continental magnitude.

The danger is really our tendency to erect a sort of single-shot league after each war. Undoubtedly the League of Nations would have stopped Austria's dispute with Serbia before it led to war. But unfortunately the next great conflict did not start in that way. After this war we are almost certain to have a world authority in which the Great Powers will have the main responsibility for stopping aggression. Since they are to have that responsibility they are equally certain to have in effect a veto over any action which would commit them to fight. This kind of organization is inevitable because it is growing up in response to the immediate problem of the peace. It is aimed at preventing a resurgence of German and Japanese aggression, and against that kind of aggression there is no doubt that it will be effective. It would have stopped this war before it began—but will it stop the next?

We cannot for long have peace disassociated from justice. We seem to be solving the problem of putting power in the hands of a world authority, but that power is certainly not yet divorced from interest. The state of opinion is yet far from ready to see power divorced from the interest of those who posses it. In effect, we are electing to submit to the Leviathan lest worse befall.

The trouble with eliminating war is that it is, as E. H. Carr has put it, the most purposeful of our social institutions. It brings at a blow social change that might otherwise have taken generations. It releases energies that no other institution can seem to tap. It solves, or seems to solve, problems that otherwise appear insoluble. It has the exhilaration of emotional escape from the frustration of ordinary environment. If we are to see the last of it we shall have to erect an institutional framework which will perform its functions at reasonable social cost.

[6] *Conditions of Peace* (London, 1942), xxii.

REVIEWS

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY*

FRANK H. UNDERHILL

While their quadrennial election campaign works up to its climax the American people are being presented with a series of commitments in foreign policy on which the new executive and legislative authorities will have to pass judgment. They have already agreed to UNRRA, and the international machinery for the relief and rehabilitation of countries ravaged by the war is beginning to operate. At Bretton Woods a provisional agreement was made on the establishment of an international agency for stabilizing currencies and providing financial assistance to countries under strain in the post-war world; the essence of this agreement is that funds provided by the United States may be used by an international authority which the United States does not control, and over this there is likely to be a sharp controversy in Congress. At Dumbarton Oaks, at the moment of writing, the Big Three are constructing the framework of an international security organization to take the place of the old League of Nations; and in this field also the difficult question looms up as to how far the American Congress will allow American armed forces to be used to restrain aggression without specific authorization in each case from Congress itself. In Europe decisions are being made almost every day by American authorities on the spot as to the form of the régime that shall be set up in one liberated area after another, as to the proportions in which Left and Right are to be mixed in the new European governments; and these decisions are causing criticism both in Europe and America. In many other fields also the American Government is fixing the shape of the post-war world; it makes an agreement with Britain about the regulation of world oil resources; its veto limits the new international authority on civil aviation to purely technical functions. And so one could go on.

Yet on most of these issues there seems to be very little being said by the main spokesmen on either side in the election campaign. To an outsider it would appear that events have decided beyond question that the United States will not return to a negative policy of isolation after this war. But there is no real agreement among the American people as to the positive part they will play; and, however the election goes, its result will not denote any clear-cut decision. As the London *Economist* put it some months ago,

**The Time for Decision.* By SUMNER WELLES. New York: Harper and Brothers [Toronto: Musson Book Company]. Pp. vii, 431. ($4.00)

U.S. Post War Aims. By WALTER LIPPMANN. Boston: Little, Brown and Company [Toronto: McClelland and Stewart]. 1944. Pp. xii, 235. ($2.00)

The Great Decision. By JAMES T. SHOTWELL. New York [Toronto]: Macmillan Company. 1944. Pp. x, 268. ($3.50)

The Road to Foreign Policy. By HUGH GIBSON. New York: Doubleday, Doran. 1944. Pp. x, 252. ($2.50)

the election is only the second reading of a bill that will then enter upon an indefinite committee stage, and no one can be very sure what the bill will look like when it emerges from committee.

The Americans, as citizens of a great state, have one advantage over us Canadians, in that they are presented with abundance of material, in the form of newspaper editorials, articles in periodicals, and books, to guide them in making up their minds. Here are four recent books, each one written by an acknowledged expert on the subject of foreign policy. Sumner Welles was until recently the Under-Secretary of State in Washington. Walter Lippmann as a young man served on the peace delegation that went to Paris with President Wilson, and in recent years he has been perhaps the most influential columnist in American journalism. The Welles and Lippmann books have been best-sellers during recent weeks in the United States. In the *New York Times* list of current best-sellers for September 3, the Welles book ranked no. 2 in the non-fiction group and the Lippmann book no. 5; and the significance of this wide sale which the two books are enjoying is probably not much lessened by the fact that the no. 1 book of September 3 was Bob Hope's *I never left home*. Professor Shotwell was also a member of the 1919 peace delegation, playing a big part in the creation of the International Labour Organization; and his work through the Carnegie Foundation and elsewhere in the cause of international peace since then is well known. Hugh Gibson served his country abroad in several European capitals, and in particular he was the chief American representative at Geneva for some ten years.

Mr. Gibson's book differs from the other three in that it is a discussion not of what American foreign policy ought to be but of how it is made and how it ought to be made. As a professional diplomat he is highly critical of the amateurism which dominates so much of American foreign policy. His chapters form one long indictment of the "Crusaders, Reformers, Spenders and Exhibitionists" who have played so big a part in recent years. He is equally opposed to the idealist like Henry Wallace and to the business man who has got a political appointment for himself in the service; and his witty and pungent remarks are a delight to read. He ends by proposing a Council of National Defense, with representatives from other departments as well as the State Department, and representatives from both Houses of Congress. This Council would perform functions like those of the general staff in the defence departments, and would provide what Mr. Gibson thinks is most lacking in American policy, coordinated information and planning.

Mr. Gibson gives us a very convincing presentation of the case for the professional diplomat. And one hopes that there are more like him and Mr. Welles in the American service. Yet, as one compares his book with that of Mr. Welles, one cannot help noticing that Mr. Welles has nothing but reverential praise for President Roosevelt, is somewhat contemptuous about President Hoover and is simply blistering about President Coolidge;

whereas Mr. Wilson's attitude of disapproval towards many things that happened in the Roosevelt régime is only slightly veiled, and his admiration for President Hoover and his policies is open and avowed. When two able professionals can differ so widely as this, what becomes of Mr. Wilson's ideal professional diplomat who stands above political and party differences? The more one thinks about it the more one is led to suspect that his ideal diplomat is as mythical an animal as the detached, objective social scientist in our universities.

Professor Shotwell's book is a general summing up of the need for international organization in our day when totalitarian war involves the kind of totalitarian preparation for war which destroys our democratic civilization. He goes on to discuss what should be done in the fields of security, justice and welfare, on the basis of our experience since 1919. One cannot quarrel with most of his conclusions, but it seems to me that continuous attendance at conferences has produced in Professor Shotwell's mind a too easy assumption that conferences are something good in themselves, and has blinded him to the deep ideological cleavages that split our modern society and that are apt to make all the neat resolutions and formulae of conferences look terribly futile.

Professor Shotwell and Mr. Welles are in agreement about the necessity of a genuine functioning world organization now. The decision to set up such a world organization is the Decision to which the titles of their books refer. On this point they stand sharply opposed to Mr. Lippmann. He has reacted so violently from the Wilsonism of twenty-five years ago that, while he admits a world organization, he will give it no responsibilities for security but will confine it to cultural and welfare functions. Security with him is to be obtained through the division of the world into a few great regional spheres of influence, which in fact already exist. Mr. Lippmann poses as a realist and has only scorn for those innocents who think that world peace can be maintained through the parliamentary debates of some gathering of fifty odd sovereign states. On the question whether there is a satisfactory answer to be found to the Lippmann type of power-politics depends the future of our civilization.

Mr. Lippmann has for years been a persuasive worshipper at the shrine of the gods of things as they are. In his *Preface to Morals* he found that the "disinterestedness" which had once been provided by high religion, and without which civilization cannot endure, might be discerned in our day in the activities of big business men, the "managers" as we call them now, administering their great impersonal corporations. In *The Good Society* he was all against the regimentation of socialism but thought that liberal capitalism with a bit of central planning would provide us with the economy that modern technology demands. Needless to say, conclusions such as these are highly acceptable to the comfortable people of our day. And now Mr. Lippmann finds that the best of all possible worlds in the international politics of our time is exactly that world which is in fact developing before

our eyes. Our planet is divided into (1) an "Atlantic World," which is the Anglo-American alliance extended to all Western Europe as far inland as Greece in the eastern Mediterranean and extended in the other direction to Australia and New Zealand in the south Pacific; (2) a "Russian Orbit"; (3) a Chinese Orbit, hardly as yet solidified into any clear form; (4) in some ultimate future, a Hindu and a Moslem Orbit as well. These regional organizations will not clash with each other, he thinks, because they are based upon the nature of things. Our Atlantic World is a whale, and the Russian Orbit is an elephant, and whales and elephants do not fight. That the Anglo-American and the Russian power-units are only too likely to clash over Germany in Europe and over China in eastern Asia are ugly possibilities which Mr. Lippmann conjures out of sight by a few moral incantations. That the little states within the Anglo-American or the Russian sphere are likely to find themselves rather helpless satellites of their gigantic protectors does not worry Mr. Lippmann. That the peoples of Europe might discover that they have enough in common to lead them to resent being balkanized between a giant power aggregation on the east and another on the west does not worry Mr. Lippmann very much either. He is chiefly concerned with constructing a division of power in the world which will ensure the security of the United States.

Mr. Welles' book is one long answer to this type of argument, and seems to me to be a successful one. He is far more interested than Mr. Lippmann in the social and economic backgrounds which determine the international activity of different states. He warns his readers against being afraid of revolution in Europe. His detailed discussion of what has been going on in Europe, in the Near and Far East, in Pan-America, gives one a sense of realism which is just what is lacking in the abstract schematism of Mr. Lippmann. His story of his diplomatic visit to the belligerent capitals of Europe in 1940 is the most exciting news story that has appeared in recent months. Only when he deals with Latin America does this atmosphere of realism disappear, when the narrative becomes a bland diplomatic analysis of the Good Neighbourhood as it ought to be, neglecting all the ugly realities which even the superficial newspaper-reader must by this time know to exist in South America.

It is worth noting that all these American writers take for granted that the old European imperialism which dominated the Far East before 1941 must disappear or be transferred into something that certainly Mr. Churchill would find unacceptable. Mr. Welles says that one of the objectives of American policy should be the continuance of the British Commonwealth as distinct from the British Empire. Canada is hardly mentioned in any of the four books. We are not a part of world problems as envisaged by American thinkers.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW*

G. S. BRETT

Georges Gurvitch, now Professor at the New School for Social Research, was formerly Professor in Sociology at the University of Strasbourg and has to his credit a number of works in the field of sociology, social philosophy and ethics. In this book he presents (according to the statement on the cover) "the first complete study of the problems of the sociology of law in all its aspects." The statement seems to be essentially true. Though not a long treatise, this volume surveys all the different approaches to the study of law, elaborates minute but significant distinctions between the real sociology of law and other topics closely allied to it, defines and criticizes the movements of thought in the past century, summarizes the doctrines of many individual writers, and in short combines an astonishing amount of information with the development of a theme which gives unity and purpose to the whole work.

The value of a book is relative to the interests of the reader and the effort he is willing to make. This is definitely not a book for the general reader, nor does it make any concessions to indolence. Those who have not been initiated into any of the mysteries of sociology or law will find that the first necessity is to master the terminology. They will find that sociology of law is not the sociological theory of law, which has in recent times emerged as the standpoint of those who think that law should develop as the expression of changing social conditions. Neither is it to be identified with the genetic sociology of law, which explains existing laws as the outcome of social evolution and relies largely on anthropology for its material together with an over-simplified view of evolution. Omitting other possibilities of confusion with subjects which might seem at first sight to be what the author means by sociology of law, we may attempt to define the term. As Dean Roscoe Pound states in the Preface contributed to this book, and has frequently stated elsewhere, there is a fundamental difference of attitude implied by the use of the words *recht*, *droit* and *law*. The theoretical element is inherent in words which can only be translated *right:* the positive and empirical element dominates the uses of the word *law*. Though it is probably impossible to make a complete separation between right and law, there is an obvious tendency to favour one of the two possible extremes at different times, according as the emphasis is laid on philosophical foundations (natural or moral rights), or on legal technique and procedure as being the positive, realistic or pragmatic view. The standpoint of Gurvitch is clearly a synthesis of these two ways of interpreting what he calls "jural experience." Accordingly he would regard the sociology of law as the study of those legal procedures and situations in which at a given time spiritual values and ideals are concretely embodied, "incarnated," and made actual. This definition preserves, on the one hand, the reference

*_Sociology of Law_. By GEORGES GURVITCH. With a Preface by ROSCOE POUND. New York: Philosophical Library and Alliance Book Corporation. 1942. Pp. xx, 309. ($3.75)

to values and the life of the spirit, which are eliminated by theories too much influenced by positivism, pragmatism and behaviourism: on the other hand, it does not merge sociology into philosophy, because the sociology of law is not concerned to decide any question about values themselves but only to record the ways in which accepted values achieve expression in law as "a going concern." The understanding of this attractive programme would have been greatly assisted if Gurvitch had been more generous in providing examples. He says that "the Sociology of Law is that part of the sociology of the human spirit which studies the full social reality of law, beginning with its tangible and externally observable expressions in effective collective behaviours (crystallized organizations, customary practices and traditions or behavioural innovations) and in the material basis" (p. 61). In general terms, the sociology of law will include the external symbols or legal procedures, the internal meanings thus expressed and finally the "collective beliefs and intuitions which aspire to these values and grasp these ideas."

A relatively large part of the book is occupied by a critical survey of the "Forerunners and Founders of the Sociology of Law." This amounts to a summary of the principal contributions to the subject from Aristotle to present-day writers, with interesting estimates of their various degrees of success. It is not possible to give a satisfactory account of this historical survey in the limits of a review, but it deserves special mention because it presents in brief compass a most instructive comparison of the work of such men as Durkheim, Max Weber, Duguit and those American jurists who have recently attracted notice by theory and practice, Mr. Justice Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo and others. Through this survey, ranging from sociologists who think primarily in terms of organic solidarity and collective consciousness to practising lawyers who begin with the activity of the courts and are unwilling to be drawn into any discussions that seem likely to prove metaphysical, we get the best demonstration of the struggles that are really going on in this inexhaustible field of human action. For in the laws as they exist there is a meeting point and a temporary consolidation of all the fundamental interests of mankind. The blank wall of positivism or the impoverished conception of laws as "what the lawyers do" will not prevail against the expansiveness of either the intellect or the emotions; nor will it succeed in curbing those demands which in every age transcend edicts and proclaim the unwritten laws. But it is also true that rights are no sure foundation of social order: they may be altogether too individual and too fanatical; the idealism of the reformer and the revolutionist may take too little account of the forces which are controlled by custom and tradition. Through its function of expressing the conscience of the community, converting social demands into formal obligations, law becomes the index of the degree to which social unity is realized. To maintain this significance it must not become isolated from the other activities of the community: it must have vitality and flexibility. The conception

of law as entirely repressive has not been maintained since Aristotle stated the fundamental truth, that the function of law is to provide security. But the relation between coercive and regulative processes will vary with the degree of general stability and above all with the degree to which actual laws express the norms of social conduct. This wider view of law involves many topics, such as the function of the State, the independence of groups, the status of corporations, the limits of individual freedom. All these require careful study with the co-operation of students of political science, law, sociology and philosophy. The work of Gurvitch is a valuable contribution in the field of sociological enquiry. To give an adequate idea of his method and results it would be necessary to analyse the second half of the book which elaborates the systematic principles under the headings: "Systematic Sociology of Law," "Differential Sociology of Law" or "Jural Typology," and "Genetic Sociology of Law." These sections are very condensed and technical, so that they might be regarded as a programme for research in the different topics indicated. The outcome of this research would be exhaustive knowledge of "the innumerable variations of jural rules, behaviour patterns, symbols, principles and values" (p. 308). This would be necessary as a basis for a sound philosophy of law. So we come back to that synthesis of idealism and realism mentioned above, which, we suspect, amounts in the case of this writer to a reconciliation of the dominant European and American attitudes. At least it is significant that the final admonition is that philosophy and sociology may avoid conflict, provided they cling to a "radical empiricism" with an intuitional basis. This surely is a formula for combining William James and Immanuel Kant, that peace and goodwill may once more prevail among the students of human relations.

FOURSCORE YEARS* — G. B. HARRISON

It is a speculation worthy of the schoolmen whether a hundred years hence Dr. Coulton's autobiography will be read as introduction to his medieval studies or whether the medieval studies will be used by students as appendix to the autobiography. For myself, I would guess that the autobiography will survive longer. There are fashions in scholarship, but an honest well-written autobiography is a permanent monument, and *Fourscore Years* is a vintage book, full of good stories, acute observations and wise sentences. Nevertheless it is not to be commended without comment as a pattern for living for every earnest young student who aspires to the academic life, for Dr. Coulton's career has been unorthodox. At school he was undistinguished. He was an idle undergraduate, and his first degree was, more than in name, by Grace of the University of Cam-

**Fourscore Years: An Autobiography.* By G. G. COULTON. Cambridge: The University Press (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada). 1943. Pp. viii, 378. ($7.00)

bridge. Moreover, he never took a Ph.D., nor even an approved course in Historical Method. He did not teach in a university until he was in his fifties; and he loved hard-hitting public controversy. These are not courses to be followed by orthodox scholars, but they are part of the composition of a remarkable personality.

Dr. Coulton was born at Lynn—the unknowing call it King's Lynn. He has some good pictures of middle-class Victorian life in a town which is still rich in relics and customs of the Middle Ages. At the age of seven he was sent to learn French at St. Omer, and in 1867 he entered Lynn Grammar School where conditions would move modern educationists to horror, though Dr. Coulton maintains (and many of those brought up in the same kind of school would agree) that there is much virtue in compulsion. "I admit myself grateful to those who, in the class room, dragged me through the paths of Greek and Latin which I should never have trodden by mere unforced choice." Thence he was sent to Felsted in Essex, one of the smaller English public schools which had evolved from the grammar school founded in 1554 by Richard, Lord Rich, who had profited exceedingly from the spoils of the monasteries. Dr. Coulton's memories produce excellent chapters on the English public school of which he had considerable experience. From Felsted, after an attempt (fortunately unsuccessful) to win a scholarship at Wadham College, Oxford, he ultimately entered St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, as Senior Classical Scholar.

The chapters on Cambridge at the end of the eighteen-seventies are a permanent addition to the record, already rich, of Cambridge life, but Dr. Coulton admits that "the three idlest years of my life were spent at Cambridge." The Fellows of St. Catharine's were not inspiring teachers, which is not perhaps surprising, as six of them averaged nearly seventy-nine years, with the senior aged ninety-six and the junior a mere fifty-nine. This state of affairs passed after the first Great War when the old English universities came into line with younger foundations which decree that a man must make way for his juniors at sixty-five. Dr. Coulton left Cambridge with an aegrotat degree and went on to Llandaff to prepare for ordination in the Church of England. After a short spell as a curate he was soon involved in a spiritual crisis when he found that the dogmas which he professed were unacceptable to his common sense. He thereafter abandoned parish work and became a master in a small public school in Wales. Thence, in the interval before he finally lapsed into lay life, he went to Heidelberg where he combined a chaplaincy in an English school with the study of German, and a first-hand realization of the eternal bellicosity of the Germans. When he returned to England he held temporary posts at two other public schools—Sherborne and Sedbergh—and then went to Dulwich College, originally founded by Edward Alleyn, the Elizabethan actor. Here he was near London, with opportunities for studying at the British Museum.

His career at Dulwich came to an end in 1895 when he began seriously

to devote himself to medieval studies, a conversion which started after a severe illness and was completed in convalescence in Italy. His next post was at Eastbourne in Sussex with H. v. E. Scott, a famous crammer in his day.

The crammer is a type now rare in England. He was an expert in preparing for examinations those needing more personal attention than is available in universities or public schools. He charged high fees and gave individual tuition. His pupils were very mixed: some needing polish for the higher competitive examinations, such as entrance to the Indian Civil Service, others to be levered into the universities. The advantage of this life to Dr. Coulton was a sufficient income, work less regimented and more stimulating than the routine of schoolmastering and enough leisure to pursue his own enthusiasms.

Dr. Coulton remained at Eastbourne for eleven years. He had meanwhile begun to give lectures for the University Extension, particularly on Chaucer and his England, which afterwards developed into one of his most successful books. In 1903, after a memorable experience of winter sports, he was married and was thereafter happily led to turn author for the most efficacious of all reasons—a need for more money. He finally left Eastbourne and returned to Cambridge in 1911, where he set up as a coach but was soon brought in to lecture for the University. In 1919 when Cambridge was flooded with men returning from the war he was appointed University Lecturer in Medieval Studies for the newly founded English tripos and about the same time elected a Research Fellow at St. John's College. "Thus," as he expresses it, "began another *Vita Nuova* of unbroken help and harmony to the present day." Unfortunately at this point the autobiographical chapters cease, which—for those of my generation—is the more disappointing as it was at this time that I first was made aware of "G. G.", being one of the crowd of ex-service men who sat beneath him as he discoursed, peripatetically, on the social life of Chaucer's England. Of the early years of the English tripos and of the welter at Cambridge in the nineteen-twenties he says nothing. It is to be hoped that in the next edition he may be persuaded to add additional chapters on one of the most interesting periods in the history of the University.

As might be expected of the author, the book is vigorous and sometimes combative, and the chapter on "History and Controversy" is not so much a defence of those methods which Dr. Coulton has followed as a defiance of his critics. His criticisms of professional historians are pungent, and not unjust. "History suffers more than any other Faculty from academic conservatism and pedantry . . . . In History, as elsewhere, our first guide should be common-sense . . . . The more we divorce History from the common life of ordinary men, the more we strangle its own vigorous life." It is indeed lamentably true that few of those modern scholars who write history have ever helped to make it. Apart from his own personality and industry (which is prodigious) Dr. Coulton's greatest advantage as a

historian is that he has had an unusually wide experience of men. Believing that men differ very little in any age, he expects to find them behaving in the past as in the present. Hence his refusal to see any romance in the Middle Ages, and even less in the medieval Church.

The book is illustrated with photographs and drawings—and Dr. Coulton is no mean draughtsman. One in particular should give sardonic pleasure to those who have known him and his work. It was taken when he received the honorary degree of LL.D. at Queen's together with the Cardinal Archbishop of Quebec. The attitude and expression of both is perfect.

The test of an autobiography is its objective truth. *Fourscore Years* is a true picture of the writer, with his courtesy, modesty and humanity, learning and affability, his charm, honesty and common sense, and, it may be added, with his bonnet humming gently with his own peculiar bees.

PRELUDE TO GOOD NEIGHBOURHOOD*

EDGAR McINNIS

The Treaty of Washington in 1871 marked the close of a highly disturbed decade in the relations between Canada and the United States. The Civil War and its aftermath brought a whole series of developments which gave rise to acute tension and on occasion raised the possibility of actual hostilities. It was only when the treaty with its arbitration clauses provided for the adjustment of the chief difficulties of the United States with both Britain and Canada that the path was opened for the development of a firm and growing friendliness on both sides of the border.

The evolution of this spirit during the generation which followed was not entirely unclouded. On the one hand there was a tacit determination on both sides to live in harmony and to settle all difficulties by peaceful means. On the other there were controversies still to be settled which gave rise to a good deal of friction before solutions were finally reached. The four outstanding topics were commercial relations, fisheries, fur sealing and the Alaskan boundary. All of them gave rise to prolonged negotiations: and though they never threatened a breach of the basic good relations between the two countries, they created a constant undercurrent of minor irritations which delayed the evolution of mutual confidence and goodwill.

The recent volume by Professor Tansill in the Carnegie series of studies on Canadian-American relations is a detailed survey of the chief topics of diplomacy during this period. As such it fills a very real gap in the historical literature of the two countries. The author has worked through a mass of documents—many of them concerned with tedious and repetitious wrangling over detailed points—covering the negotiations which were in

**Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911.* By CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL. (The Relations of Canada and the United States, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.) New Haven: Yale University Press. Toronto: Ryerson Press. 1943. Pp. xx, 507. ($4.50)

almost constant progress on one or other of the main issues, and at times on all of them simultaneously. By digesting and summarizing this material he has provided an extremely useful reference volume, copiously illustrated with extracts from official sources.

Yet it is certain that many Canadian readers will find this a very exasperating book. That is not primarily the fault of the author. The few comments which he allows himself are generally fair and balanced. The source of irritation lies in the subject itself. Throughout all these negotiations the attitude of the United States is revealed as both self-centred and over-bearing. Canadian diplomacy is by no means free from faults of its own, but Canadians may well feel that beneath all its quibbling there lay a desire for a fair bargain which was not always clearly evident on the other side.

This feature is accentuated by the author's method of presentation. Though he has used both Canadian and American material, by far the larger part of his narrative rests directly on American sources. Thus the attitude of the United States is exhaustively portrayed in summaries and quotations, not always to its advantage. Some of the extracts from Canadian documents suggest that an equally full treatment would bring out quite a few shortcomings on the Canadian side, and it may be fortunate that here the examination is less exhaustive. As it is, however, the chronic indignation of American diplomats and statesmen over any resistance by Canada to American desires tends to provoke a reaction against this viewpoint which is not always wholly justified by the merits of the Canadian case. Students will be grateful to Professor Tansill for bringing so much material within easy reach, but the ordinary reader will gather an unfortunate impression about the degree to which the author's own views coincide with his statement of the American position.

The temper of the two countries in their relations with each other reflected the steady development of nationalist sentiments on both sides of the border. The United States at the beginning of the period had just emerged from the bitter struggle whose outcome vindicated the solidarity of the American Union. At the same time it had entered a period of tremendous expansion in which the rapid filling up of the remaining western lands was accompanied by the transformation of the United States into one of the leading industrial nations of the world. In spite of the economic tribulations and political unrest which accompanied this process, there was a growth of national wealth and national power which increased American self-confidence in foreign affairs. No other Great Power offered any serious menace to the United States. The nation felt able to stand aloof from world affairs and to pursue its own destiny independently of other continents. At the same time it asserted its position as master in the New World without feeling any serious need to conciliate the small states which lived under its shadow or to treat them as equals in matters of diplomacy. The habit of unilateral action grew steadily stronger, to reach a climax in the early part of the twentieth century.

For Canada, on the other hand, the last quarter of the nineteenth century was an era of aspirations much more than of achievement. It was by no means barren of accomplishment, but it was not until the turn of the century that the national expansion which had been dreamed of at Confederation at last seemed under way. Through the eighties and most of the nineties a prolonged economic depression accompanied by a steady stream of emigration across the border created an atmosphere of impatience and frustration. Yet the rising nationalist spirit which had triumphed at Confederation was constantly manifest during this period. Canadians continued to pursue the destiny which for the moment eluded them, but which still beckoned Canada to a place of independence and influence among the nations of the world.

There was a third and potent factor in the situation. All through this period, Canada's efforts to secure control of her own external relations met with only the most limited success. Britain insisted on keeping control not only of the form, but of much of the substance of negotiation, and this involved her directly and automatically in any controversies between the United States and Canada. This period in particular illustrates the fallacy of the legend that Canada, at least in times past, has been the mediator or interpreter between the United States and Britain. It is rather Britain who has been occupied in an effort to persuade Canada and the United States to compose their differences by compromise. Salisbury's persistent view of Britain as "a broker between the United States and Canada" was not far wide of the mark.

This triangular situation was one which the United States sought persistently to turn to its own advantage. American unwillingness to deal with Canada on a basis of equality and reciprocity, which was evident in respect to the substance of the chief disputes, was even more marked when it came to the form of negotiation. Whatever talk there might be in other circles about the desirability of Canadian separation from Britain, there was little of this spirit in the State Department when it came to actual diplomatic relations. Far from encouraging Canadian independence in negotiation, the United States insisted on dealing directly with Britain, and at times sought the actual exclusion of Canada from discussions with which she was vitally concerned. The reason was obvious. In disputes over fisheries or boundaries, Canada's own interests were at stake. Britain had no direct share in such interests. She was concerned rather with her imperial position and the importance to it of friendly relations with the United States. She felt increasingly the impossibility of actually overriding the Canadian government, but wherever possible she tried to get a modification of the Canadian attitude in the interests of harmony.

This was a situation which American diplomacy used with great effect. It was constantly pointed out that both Britain and Canada needed American friendship and should be prepared to purchase it by giving in to American desires. Ambassador Phelps summed it up bluntly in 1888:

"We must show Canada that she cannot outrage us with impunity. And the moment we take a firm stand all the trouble will cease. That is the surest way to avoid difficulty. And you may be sure it will be satisfactory to the present British government which is embarrassed by Canadian conduct which it can not control, and can not justify, and can not afford to fight for."

This implied threat of coercion and hostility, if not of actual war, constantly recurs in American dealings with Canada during this period It is the more regrettable because on most of the large issues the American case was good enough to stand on its own merits. Even in the sealing controversy, where narrow commercial motives led to claims that were in flagrant violation of international law, a case could have been made out on the broader ground of humanitarian interests. As it was, the form of American action often vitiated the merits of American claims. Habitually the government of the United States acted as though its case were so dubious that it did not dare entrust it to impartial adjudication. The most glaring example is that of the Alaska boundary, but a similar spirit is evident in the other controversies which mark this period.

What made this all the more deplorable was the fact that basically the United States did desire peace and good relations. Her leaders were even convinced that they were setting an example to the world in the pursuit of international harmony. They saw no contradiction between this faith and a determined insistence on their own interpretation of American claims, accompanied by an unwillingness to make any concessions to the desires—or at times even the rights—of a smaller neighbour. On the occasions when the Administration showed a more generous tendency it was promptly balked by Congress, and the peculiar constitutional difficulties which hampered American foreign policy undoubtedly delayed the development of a harmony which would have been achieved much earlier if Presidents and Secretaries of State had enjoyed a free hand.

It would have added very considerably to the value and interest of Professor Tansill's volume if these and other relevant background features had entered more frequently into his presentation. There is no real effort at an analytical approach which might reveal the roots of Canadian and American external policies during this critical and formative period. The narrative is confined to narrowly diplomatic affairs and treats them primarily as aspects of American diplomatic history. Even then the period after 1900 is dealt with in a very summary fashion; and in the preceding period the movement for Commercial Union is sketched in a way that does little more than touch its surface aspects. As for the many minor topics of negotiation during this time, their omission can be excused; but there is one development which certainly deserved at least a passing mention, and which has been completely overlooked. That is the creation of a Permanent International Joint Commission which, quite apart from the actual value of its work, was in a real sense the symbol of a new and better era in

Canadian-American relations. Coming as it did after a long period during which the United States, for all its loud professions of goodwill, would have found it hard to point to a single positive contribution to the cause of international amity, it marked the real beginning of a conscious effort at good neighbourhood whose fruits are so strikingly evident in our own day.

SHORTER NOTICES

George Gascoigne's A Hundreth Sundrie Flowres. Edited, with an introduction and notes, by C. T. Prouty. The University of Missouri Studies, vol. XVII, no. 2.) Columbia: University of Missouri. 1942. Pp. 305. ($2.50)

Not many of the poems in *A Hundreth Sundrie Flowres* (1573) have found their way into our modern collections, and yet it is without question one of the most extraordinary of Elizabethan anthologies. Gascoigne, the generally accepted author, showed real distinction in comedy, lyric and satire, and was at least better than mediocre even in his court love poetry. But he has been eclipsed by more distinguished examples of that Tudor specialty, the courtier-soldier-poet; before him were Wyatt and Surrey, after him, Sidney and Raleigh.

Published anonymously, *A Hundreth Sundrie Flowres* was punningly advertised on the original title page as "a Poesy" gathered "partly (by translation) in the fyne outlandish Gardins of Euripides, Ovid, Petrarke, Ariosto, and others: and partly by invention, out of our owne fruitefull Orchardes in Englande." Here is the typical Elizabethan attitude toward what we call plagiarism, and Gascoigne's frankness calls for appreciation of the gardener's own originality. It is to be found in an occasionally arresting effect of extravagant humour or semi-proverbial pithiness. Otherwise the collection is apt to seem illustrative rather than distinguished: everywhere we see the literary and social qualities of the amateur aristocratic romancing and versifying of the day.

In his recent book on Gascoigne, Professor Prouty attempted to portray the man and comment on his work. Here his aim is to provide a good critical text and settle the matter of Gascoigne's authorship, not questioned by his contemporaries, but denied by B. M. Ward, in his (1929) edition of the *Flowres*, on the basis of two sentences in which a possibly imaginary "editor" of the original text speaks of the poems as by "sundrie gentlemen" and "Master F. J. and divers others." If Ward's ascriptions of authorship to the Earl of Derby, Sir Christopher Hatton and others are very tenuous or erratic, it must be admitted that Professor Prouty's examples of literary practice are a little general for his purposes, and that in addition he leaves himself open to obvious objection for the way in which his own speculations are on later pages advanced as proven conclusions. On the whole, however, the arguments in favour of Gascoigne's sole authorship are plausible, and

the text seems to have been carefully collated. A number of examples among the textual variants disprove Ward's statement that the only errors in the original text are in punctuation, and that in comparison the later text of the collected *Posies* is corrupt. N. J. E.

Understanding New Zealand. By FREDERICK L. W. WOOD. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc. [Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company]. 1944. Pp. x, 267. ($4.50)

New Zealand: A Working Democracy. By WALTER NASH. New York: World Book Company [Toronto: Collins]. 1943. Pp. x, 335. ($3.75)

NEW ZEALAND has been singularly fortunate in many of the analysts who have described its life. Forty years ago André Siegfried, after visiting the country, wrote his earliest and perhaps his best study of an Anglo-Saxon state, translated into English as *Democracy in New Zealand.* Siegfried's work remains to the present a classic essay of its kind, with its comprehensive sweep and its shrewd social psychology in the tradition of French political science from de Tocqueville. In the same period William Pember Reeves, born in the South Island and prominent in its political affairs, wrote his fascinating volume, *The Long White Cloud,* wherein he described with genuine literary distinction not merely the history and politics but even the flora and fauna of his native country. Since then many other scholars have added to a growing library of careful analysis, and in the present year two significant books have appeared in Frederick L. W. Wood's *Understanding New Zealand* and Walter Nash's *New Zealand: A Working Democracy.*

Professor Wood has written a brilliant book, hardly in any measure inferior to the studies mentioned above. He has all the qualities necessary for interpreting New Zealand to itself and to the world: comprehensive knowledge, a philosophical turn of mind, a penetrating political judgment, and a highly dexterous pen. An Australian by birth, Sydney and Oxford by education, he has lived and taught history in Wellington for eight years. He comes to the subject with something of an outsider's perspective, but with a deep knowledge gleaned from historical study and direct observation of the society about him. Notable in particular are his discriminating observations on New Zealand democracy, which throughout bear interesting comparison with those of Siegfried four decades ago. In broad essentials the picture is not greatly different from that of Siegfried, although, as Professor Wood amply indicates, the character and alignment of social forces have undergone some profound changes in the past forty years. He is at pains to emphasize, as Siegfried had been, that New Zealand democracy is not moving toward goals set by rigid and doctrinaire leaders. The real trend in the state is prescribed by the ascendency in politics of the interests of the common man, and needless to add the common man is not the single-minded *proletarian* of Marx. He does not think that Labour, even

if it wished, can build in the present a socialist order in the strict terms of a theory, for the two weighty reasons that agriculture throughout New Zealand is in the hands of a multitude of small and relatively comfortable farmers, and trade unionism is not revolutionary, its tradition being "that of the arbitration Court rather than of class war." The New Zealander is characterized by a sturdy British humanitarianism and empiricism, and both qualities lead him, whether he is a labourer or farmer, to accept the state as an instrument to gradual social improvement. There is little else in what is called New Zealand's "socialism."

Much of the interest of Walter Nash's volume dwells in the position and personality of its author, a highly influential member of the Labour Government since 1935 and for years before that a national secretary of the party. His book lacks the incisive quality and careful balance of Professor Wood's, and introduces much that is not closely relevant to an understanding of New Zealand democracy, such as the chapters on "World Organisation" and the "End of Imperialism." But merely to have what an important Labour leader thinks about the political experiments of his country is useful in itself, and the social experiments since 1935 are here described and assessed (favourably of course) by one of their chief architects. A. B.



CAMEO

Stationery

Made in all the correct styles and sizes for social or society correspondence, yet economical for everyday letters . . . . . .

Consult your stationer

BARBER-ELLIS OF CANADA • LIMITED •

RELIANCE ENGRAVERS LIMITED

104 BOND ST. TORONTO

ARTISTS · ENGRAVERS · ELECTROTYPERS

PHONE ELGIN 0411

. . . . . OUR EXPERIENCE WILL SAVE YOU MONEY

A RECENT BOOK

Sir Francis Hincks by Professor R. S. Longley of Acadia University. Coming to Canada in 1830, Hincks was thrown into the rebellion years, the most turbulent decade in Canadian history. With the Union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1841, it was Hincks who brought Baldwin and Lafontaine together in the Reform Party which won Responsible Government. As newspaperman, banker, financial expert, and minister of the Crown, Hincks played a varied part at the centre of Canadian politics for over forty years. Professor Longley's is the first full-length study based on a thorough examination of the sources.

This readable biography is intended for the general reader as well as the historian. It is the story of the growth of an enlightened imperialism, the evolution of colonial responsible government, and the contribution made by Sir Francis Hincks to the political, social, financial, and industrial development of Canada in the nineteenth century. It is a judicious appraisement of the virtues, defects, and services of a statesman concerning whom the modern generation knows too little. Many of the problems of that day are problems of today. For this reason, it is the opinion of the Toronto "Globe and Mail" that "Great profit can be derived not merely by our politicans, but by the average voter, from studying Canadian history through the biographies of by-gone leaders like Sir Francis Hincks." $3.15 postpaid.

Published by

THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
TORONTO ONTARIO CANADA

Every type of Quality Printing Plates

PHOTO-ENGRAVERS
ARTISTS
PHOTOGRAPHERS
ELECTROTYPERS
MATS
STEREOTYPERS

Graphic York

468 KING STREET WEST
WAVERLEY TORONTO
WA. 4681